

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

CLAIM NO: PT-2025-001017

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY DIVISION

PROPERTY, TRUST AND PROBATE LIST

BETWEEN:

**(1) RWE GENERATION UK PLC
(Company registration number 3892782)**

Claimant

and

**(1) PERSONS UNKNOWN WHO WITHOUT THE CLAIMANT'S PERMISSION
ENTER OR REMAIN UPON THE PREMISES DESCRIBED IN THE CLAIM
FORM, OR WHO DAMAGE OR DEFACE ANY OF THOSE PREMISES OR
ANY PART OF THEM, FOR THE PURPOSES OF PROTEST WHETHER IN
SUPPORT OF ANY GREENPEACE CAMPAIGN OR OTHERWISE**

**(2) GREENPEACE UK LIMITED
(Company registration number 02463348)**

**(3) GREENPEACE LIMITED
(Company registration number 01314381)**

Defendants

AUTHORITIES BUNDLE

For the first annual review: October 2026

1. *Wolverhampton CC & ors v London Gypsies and Travellers and others* [2024] AC 983
2. *Valero Energy Limited v Persons Unknown* [2026] EWHC 397 (KB)
3. *Esso Petroleum v Persons Unknown* [2025] EWHC 1768 (KB)
4. *Exolum Pipeline Systems Limited v Persons Unknown* [2025] EWHC 1913 (KB)
5. *Hanson Quarry Products Ltd (t/a Heidelberg Materials UK) v Davies* [2026] EWHC 118 (KB)

A

Supreme Court

Wolverhampton City Council and others v London Gypsies and Travellers and others

[On appeal from *Barking and Dagenham London Borough Council v Persons Unknown*]

B

[2023] UKSC 47

2023 Feb 8, 9;
Nov 29

Lord Reed PSC, Lord Hodge DPSC,
Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Briggs JJSC, Lord Kitchin

C

Injunction — Trespass — Persons unknown — Local authorities obtaining injunctions against persons unknown to restrain unauthorised encampments on land — Whether court having power to grant final injunctions against persons unknown — Whether limits on court's power to grant injunctions against world — Senior Courts Act 1981 (c 54), s 37

D

With the intention of preventing unauthorised encampments by Gypsies or Travellers within their administrative areas, a number of local authorities issued proceedings under CPR Pt 8 seeking injunctions under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981¹ prohibiting “persons unknown” from setting up such camps in the future. Injunctions of varying length were granted to some 38 local authorities, or groups of local authorities, on varying terms by way of both interim and permanent injunctions. After the hearing of an application to extend one of the injunctions which was coming to an end, a judge ordered a review of all such injunctions as remained in force and which the local authority in question wished to maintain. The judge discharged the injunctions which were final and directed at unknown persons, holding that final injunctions could only be made against parties who had been identified and had had an opportunity to contest the order sought. The Court of Appeal allowed appeals by some of the local authorities and restored those final injunctions which were the subject of appeal, holding that final injunctions against persons unknown were valid since any person who breached one would as a consequence become a party to it and so be entitled to contest it.

E

F

On appeal by three intervener groups representing the interests of Gypsies and Travellers—

G

Held, dismissing the appeal, (1) that although now enshrined in statute, the court's power to grant an injunction was, and continued to be, a type of equitable remedy; that although the power was, subject to any relevant statutory restrictions, unlimited, the principles and practice which the court had developed governing the proper exercise of that power did not allow judges to grant or withhold injunctions purely on their own subjective perception of the justice and convenience of doing so in a particular case but required the power to be exercised in accordance with those equitable principles from which injunctions were derived; that, in particular, equity (i) sought to provide an effective remedy where other remedies available under the law were inadequate to protect or enforce the rights in issue, (ii) looked to the substance rather than to the form, (iii) took an essentially flexible approach to the formulation of a remedy and (iv) was not constrained by any limiting rule or principle, other than justice and convenience, when fashioning a remedy to suit new circumstances; and that the application of those principles had not only allowed the general limits or conditions within which injunctions were granted to be adjusted over time as circumstances changed, but had allowed new kinds of injunction to be formulated in response to the emergence of particular problems, including

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¹ Senior Courts Act 1981, s 37: see post, para 145.

prohibitions directed at the world at large which operated as an exception to the normal rule that only parties to an action were bound by an injunction (post, paras 16–17, 19, 22, 42, 57, 147–148, 150–153, 238).

Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] Fam 430 applied.

Dicta of Lord Mustill in *Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd* [1993] AC 334, 360–361, HL(E) and of Lord Scott of Foscote in *Fourie v Le Roux* [2007] 1 WLR 320, para 25, HL(E) applied.

Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs v Meier [2009] 1 WLR 2780, SC(E), *Cameron v Hussain* [2019] 1 WLR 1471, SC(E) and *Bromley London Borough Council v Persons Unknown* [2020] PTSR 1043, CA considered.

South Cambridgeshire District Council v Gammell [2006] 1 WLR 658, CA and *Canada Goose UK Retail Ltd v Persons Unknown* [2020] 1 WLR 2802, CA not applied.

(2) That in principle it was such a legitimate extension of the court’s practice for it to allow both interim and final injunctions against “newcomers”, i.e persons who at the time of the grant of the injunction were neither defendants nor identifiable and were described in the injunction only as “persons unknown”; that an injunction against a newcomer, which was necessarily granted on a without notice application, would be effective to bind anyone who had notice of it while it remained in force, even though that person had no intention and had made no threat to do the act prohibited at the time when the injunction was granted and was therefore someone against whom, at that time, the applicant had no cause of action; that, therefore, there was no immovable obstacle of jurisdiction or principle in the way of granting injunctions prohibiting unauthorised encampments by Gypsies or Travellers who were “newcomers” on an essentially without notice basis, regardless of whether in form interim or final; that, however, such an injunction was only likely to be justified as a novel exercise of the court’s equitable discretionary power if the applicant (i) demonstrated a compelling need for the protection of civil rights or the enforcement of public law not adequately met by any other available remedies (including statutory remedies), (ii) built into the application and the injunction sought procedural protection for the rights (including Convention rights) of those persons unknown who might be affected by it, (iii) complied in full with the disclosure duty which attached to the making of a without notice application and (iv) showed that, on the particular facts, it was just and convenient in all the circumstances that the injunction sought should be made; that, if so justified, any injunction made by the court had to (i) spell out clearly and in everyday terms the full extent of the acts it was prohibiting, corresponding as closely as possible to the actual or threatened unlawful conduct, (ii) extend no further than the minimum necessary to achieve the purpose for which it was granted, (iii) be subject to strict temporal and territorial limits, (iv) be actively publicised by the applicant so as to draw it to the attention of all actual and potential respondents and (v) include generous liberty to any person affected by its terms to apply to vary or discharge the whole or any part of the injunction; and that, accordingly, it followed that the challenge to the court’s power to grant the impugned injunctions at all failed (post, paras 142–146, 150, 167, 170, 186, 188, 222, 225, 230, 232, 238).

Per curiam. (i) The theoretical availability of byelaws or other measures or powers available to local authorities as a potential alternative remedy is no reason why newcomer injunctions should never be granted. The question whether byelaws or other such measures or powers represent a workable alternative is one which should be addressed on a case-by-case basis (post, paras 172, 216).

(i) To the extent that a particular person who has become the subject of a newcomer injunction wishes to raise particular circumstances applicable to them and relevant to a balancing of their article 8 Convention rights against the claim for an injunction, this can be done under the liberty to apply (post, para 183).

(iii) The emphasis in this appeal has been on newcomer injunctions in Gypsy and Traveller cases and nothing said should be taken as prescriptive in relation to newcomer injunctions in other cases, such as those directed at protesters who engage

- A in direct action. Such activity may, depending on all the circumstances, justify the grant of an injunction against persons unknown, including newcomers (post, para 235).
Decision of the Court of Appeal sub nom *Barking and Dagenham London Borough Council v Persons Unknown* [2022] EWCA Civ 13; [2023] QB 295; [2022] 2 WLR 946; [2022] 4 All ER 51 affirmed on different grounds.
- B The following cases are referred to in the judgment of Lord Reed PSC, Lord Briggs JSC and Lord Kitchen:
A (A Protected Party) v Persons Unknown [2016] EWHC 3295 (Ch); [2017] EMLR 11
Abela v Baadarani [2013] UKSC 44; [2013] 1 WLR 2043; [2013] 4 All ER 119, SC(E)
Adair v The New River Co (1805) 11 Ves 429
- C *Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd* [1976] Ch 55; [1976] 2 WLR 162; [1976] 1 All ER 779, CA
Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] UKHL 29; [2002] 1 WLR 2033; [2002] 4 All ER 193, HL(E)
Attorney General v Chaudry [1971] 1 WLR 1614; [1971] 3 All ER 938, CA
Attorney General v Crosland [2021] UKSC 15; [2021] 4 WLR 103; [2021] UKSC 58; [2022] 1 WLR 367; [2022] 2 All ER 401, SC(E)
- D *Attorney General v Harris* [1961] 1 QB 74; [1960] 3 WLR 532; [1960] 3 All ER 207, CA
Attorney General v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440; [1979] 2 WLR 247; [1979] 1 All ER 745; 68 Cr App R 342, HL(E)
Attorney General v Newspaper Publishing plc [1988] Ch 333; [1987] 3 WLR 942; [1987] 3 All ER 276, CA
Attorney General v Punch Ltd [2002] UKHL 50; [2003] 1 AC 1046; [2003] 2 WLR 49; [2003] 1 All ER 289, HL(E)
- E *Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd* [1992] 1 AC 191; [1991] 2 WLR 994; [1991] 2 All ER 398, HL(E)
Baden's Deed Trusts, In re [1971] AC 424; [1970] 2 WLR 1110; [1970] 2 All ER 228, HL(E)
Bankers Trust Co v Shapira [1980] 1 WLR 1274; [1980] 3 All ER 353, CA
Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKSC 12; [2018] 1 WLR 1119; [2018] 3 All ER 487, SC(E)
- F *Birmingham City Council v Afsar* [2019] EWHC 1619 (QB)
Blain (Tony) Pty Ltd v Splain [1993] 3 NZLR 185
Bloomsbury Publishing Group plc v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2003] EWHC 1205 (Ch); [2003] 1 WLR 1633; [2003] 3 All ER 736
Brett Wilson LLP v Persons Unknown [2015] EWHC 2628 (QB); [2016] 4 WLR 69; [2016] 1 All ER 1006
- G *British Airways Board v Laker Airways Ltd* [1985] AC 58; [1984] 3 WLR 413; [1984] 3 All ER 39, HL(E)
Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority v Robinson [2000] QB 775; [2000] 1 WLR 1590; [2000] 2 All ER 727, CA
Bromley London Borough Council v Persons Unknown [2020] EWCA Civ 12; [2020] PTSR 1043; [2020] 4 All ER 114, CA
Burris v Azadani [1995] 1 WLR 1372; [1995] 4 All ER 802, CA
- H *CMOC Sales and Marketing Ltd v Person Unknown* [2018] EWHC 2230 (Comm); [2019] Lloyd's Rep FC 62
Cameron v Hussain [2019] UKSC 6; [2019] 1 WLR 1471; [2019] 3 All ER 1, SC(E)
Canada Goose UK Retail Ltd v Persons Unknown [2019] EWHC 2459 (QB); [2020] 1 WLR 417; [2020] EWCA Civ 303; [2020] 1 WLR 2802; [2020] 4 All ER 575, CA

- Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd* [1999] HCA 18; 198 CLR 380 A
- Carr v News Group Newspapers Ltd* [2005] EWHC 971 (QB)
- Cartier International AG v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd* [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch);
[2015] Bus LR 298; [2015] 1 All ER 949; [2016] EWCA Civ 658; [2017] Bus LR
1; [2017] 1 All ER 700, CA; [2018] UKSC 28; [2018] 1 WLR 3259; [2018]
Bus LR 1417; [2018] 4 All ER 373, SC(E)
- Castanho v Brown & Root (UK) Ltd* [1981] AC 557; [1980] 3 WLR 991; [1981]
1 All ER 143, HL(E) B
- Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd* [1993] AC 334;
[1993] 2 WLR 262; [1993] 1 All ER 664, HL(E)
- Chapman v United Kingdom* (Application No 27238/95) (2001) 33 EHRR 18,
ECtHR (GC)
- Commerce Commission v Unknown Defendants* [2019] NZHC 2609
- Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd* [2021] UKPC 24; [2023] AC
389; [2022] 2 WLR 703; [2022] 1 All ER 289; [2022] 1 All ER (Comm) 633, PC C
- Cuadrilla Bowland Ltd v Persons Unknown* [2020] EWCA Civ 9; [2020] 4 WLR 29,
CA
- D v Persons Unknown* [2021] EWHC 157 (QB)
- Dresser UK Ltd v Falcongate Freight Management Ltd (The Duke of Yare)* [1992]
QB 502; [1992] 2 WLR 319; [1992] 2 All ER 450, CA
- EMI Records Ltd v Kudhail* [1985] FSR 36, CA
- ESPN Software India Pvt Ltd v Tudu Enterprise* (unreported) 18 February 2011, D
High Ct of Delhi
- Earthquake Commission v Unknown Defendants* [2013] NZHC 708
- Ernst & Young Ltd v Department of Immigration* 2015 (1) CILR 151
- F (or se A) (A Minor) (Publication of Information), In re* [1977] Fam 58; [1976]
3 WLR 813; [1977] 1 All ER 114, CA
- Financial Services Authority v Sinaloa Gold plc* [2013] UKSC 11; [2013] 2 AC 28;
[2013] 2 WLR 678; [2013] Bus LR 302; [2013] 2 All ER 339, SC(E) E
- Fourie v Le Roux* [2007] UKHL 1; [2007] 1 WLR 320; [2007] Bus LR 925; [2007]
1 All ER 1087, HL(E)
- Friern Barnet Urban District Council v Adams* [1927] 2 Ch 25, CA
- Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Hannay & Co* [1915] 2 KB 536, CA
- Hampshire Waste Services Ltd v Intending Trespassers upon Chineham Incinerator
Site* [2003] EWHC 1738 (Ch); [2004] Env LR 9
- Harlow District Council v Stokes* [2015] EWHC 953 (QB) F
- Heathrow Airport Ltd v Garman* [2007] EWHC 1957 (QB)
- Hubbard v Pitt* [1976] QB 142; [1975] 3 WLR 201; [1975] ICR 308; [1975] 3 All ER
1, CA
- Ineos Upstream Ltd v Persons Unknown* [2019] EWCA Civ 515; [2019] 4 WLR 100;
[2019] 4 All ER 699, CA
- Iveson v Harris* (1802) 7 Ves 251
- Joel v Various John Does* (1980) 499 F Supp 791 G
- Kingston upon Thames Royal London Borough Council v Persons Unknown* [2019]
EWHC 1903 (QB)
- M and N (Minors) (Wardship: Publication of Information), In re* [1990] Fam 211;
[1989] 3 WLR 1136; [1990] 1 All ER 205, CA
- MacMillan Bloedel Ltd v Simpson* [1996] 2 SCR 1048
- McPhail v Persons, Names Unknown* [1973] Ch 447; [1973] 3 WLR 71; [1973] 3 All
ER 393, CA H
- Manchester Corpn v Connolly* [1970] Ch 420; [1970] 2 WLR 746; [1970] 1 All ER
961, CA
- Marengo v Daily Sketch and Sunday Graphic Ltd* [1948] 1 All ER 406, HL(E)
- Mareva Cia Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers SA* [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep 509,
CA

- A *Maritime Union of Australia v Patrick Stevedores Operations Pty Ltd* [1998] 4 VR 143
Mercedes Benz AG v Leiduck [1996] AC 284; [1995] 3 WLR 718; [1995] 3 All ER 929, PC
Meux v Maltby (1818) 2 Swans 277
Michaels (M) (Furriers) Ltd v Askew [1983] Lexis Citation 198; The Times, 25 June 1983, CA
- B *Murphy v Murphy* [1999] 1 WLR 282; [1998] 3 All ER 1
News Group Newspapers Ltd v Society of Graphical and Allied Trades '82 (No 2) [1987] ICR 181
North London Railway Co v Great Northern Railway Co (1883) 11 QBD 30, CA
Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Comrs [1974] AC 133; [1973] 3 WLR 164; [1973] 2 All ER 943, HL(E)
OPQ v BJM [2011] EWHC 1059 (QB); [2011] EMLR 23
- C *Parkin v Thorold* (1852) 16 Beav 59
R v Lincolnshire County Council, Ex p Atkinson (1995) 8 Admin LR 529, DC
R (Wardship: Restrictions on Publication), In re [1994] Fam 254; [1994] 3 WLR 36; [1994] 3 All ER 658, CA
RWE Npower plc v Carrol [2007] EWHC 947 (QB)
RXG v Ministry of Justice [2019] EWHC 2026 (QB); [2020] QB 703; [2020] 2 WLR 635, DC
- D *Revenue and Customs Comrs v Egleton* [2006] EWHC 2313 (Ch); [2007] Bus LR 44; [2007] 1 All ER 606
Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs v Meier [2009] UKSC 11; [2009] 1 WLR 2780; [2010] PTSR 321; [2010] 1 All ER 855, SC(E)
Siskina (Owners of cargo lately laden on board) v Distos Cia Naviera SA (The Siskina) [1979] AC 210; [1977] 3 WLR 818; [1977] 3 All ER 803, HL(E)
Smith v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government [2022] EWCA Civ 1391; [2023] PTSR 312, CA
- E *South Bucks District Council v Porter* [2003] UKHL 26; [2003] 2 AC 558; [2003] 2 WLR 1547; [2003] 3 All ER 1, HL(E)
South Cambridgeshire District Council v Gammell [2005] EWCA Civ 1429; [2006] 1 WLR 658, CA
South Cambridgeshire District Council v Persons Unknown [2004] EWCA Civ 1280; [2004] 4 PLR 88, CA
- F *South Carolina Insurance Co v Assurantie Maatschappij "De Zeven Provinciën" NV* [1987] AC 24; [1986] 3 WLR 398; [1986] 3 All ER 487, HL(E)
Stoke-on-Trent City Council v B & Q (Retail) Ltd [1984] AC 754; [1984] 2 WLR 929; [1984] 2 All ER 332, HL(E)
TSB Private Bank International SA v Chabra [1992] 1 WLR 231; [1992] 2 All ER 245
UK Oil and Gas Investments plc v Persons Unknown [2018] EWHC 2252 (Ch); [2019] JPL 161
- G *United Kingdom Nirex Ltd v Barton* [1986] Lexis Citation 644; The Times, 14 October 1986
Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] Fam 430; [2001] 2 WLR 1038; [2001] 1 All ER 908
Winch, Persons formerly known as, In re [2021] EWHC 1328 (QB); [2021] EMLR 20, DC; [2021] EWHC 3284 (QB); [2022] ACD 22, DC
- H *Wykeham Terrace, Brighton, Sussex, In re, Ex p Territorial Auxiliary and Volunteer Reserve Association for the South East* [1971] Ch 204; [1970] 3 WLR 649
X (A Minor) (Wardship: Injunction), In re [1984] 1 WLR 1422; [1985] 1 All ER 53
X (formerly Bell) v O'Brien [2003] EWHC 1101 (QB); [2003] EMLR 37
Z Ltd v A-Z and AA-LL [1982] QB 558; [1982] 2 WLR 288; [1982] 1 All ER 556, CA

The following additional cases were cited in argument:

- A v British Broadcasting Corp'n* [2014] UKSC 25; [2015] AC 588; [2014] 2 WLR 1243; [2014] 2 All ER 1037, SC(SC)
- Abortion Services (Safe Access Zones) (Northern Ireland) Bill, In re* [2022] UKSC 32; [2023] AC 505; [2023] 2 WLR 33; [2023] 2 All ER 209, SC(NI)
- Astellas Pharma Ltd v Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty* [2011] EWCA Civ 752; *The Times*, 11 July 2011, CA
- Birmingham City Council v Nagmadin* [2023] EWHC 56 (KB)
- Cambridge City Council v Traditional Cambridge Tours Ltd* [2018] EWHC 1304 (QB); [2018] LLR 458
- Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd (Motor Insurers' Bureau intervening)* [2019] UKSC 6; [2019] 1 WLR 1471; [2019] 3 All ER 1, SC(E)
- Crédit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank v Persons Having Interest in Goods Held by the Claimant* [2021] EWHC 1679 (Ch); [2021] 1 WLR 3834; [2022] 1 All ER 83; [2022] 1 All ER (Comm) 239
- High Speed Two (HS2) Ltd v Persons Unknown* [2022] EWHC 2360 (KB)
- Hillingdon London Borough Council v Persons Unknown* [2020] EWHC 2153 (QB); [2020] PTSR 2179
- Kudrevičius v Lithuania* (Application No 37553/05) (2015) 62 EHRR 34, ECtHR (GC)
- MBR Acres Ltd v McGivern* [2022] EWHC 2072 (QB)
- Mid-Bedfordshire District Council v Brown* [2004] EWCA Civ 1709; [2005] 1 WLR 1460, CA
- Porter v Freudenberg* [1915] 1 KB 857, CA
- R (Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire Constabulary* [2006] UKHL 55; [2007] 2 AC 105; [2007] 2 WLR 46; [2007] 2 All ER 529, HL(E)
- R (M) v Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs and Lord Chancellor* [2004] EWCA Civ 312; [2004] 1 WLR 2298; [2004] 2 All ER 531, CA
- Redbridge London Borough Council v Stokes* [2018] EWHC 4076 (QB)
- Secretary of State for Transport v Cuciurean* [2021] EWCA Civ 357, CA
- Winterstein v France* (Application No 27013/07) (unreported) 17 October 2013, ECtHR

APPEAL from the Court of Appeal

On 16 October 2020 Nicklin J, with the concurrence of Dame Victoria Sharp P and Stewart J (Judge in Charge of the Queen's Bench Civil List), ordered a number of local authorities which had been involved in 38 sets of proceedings each obtaining injunctions prohibiting "persons unknown" from making unauthorised encampments within their administrative areas, or on specified areas of land within those areas, to complete a questionnaire with a view to identifying those local authorities who wished to maintain such injunctions and those who wished to discontinue them. On 12 May 2021, after receipt of the questionnaires and a subsequent hearing to review the injunctions, Nicklin J [2021] EWHC 1201 (QB); [2022] JPL 43 held that the court could not grant final injunctions which prevented persons who were unknown and unidentified at the date of the order from occupying and trespassing on local authority land and, by further order dated 24 May 2021, discharged a number of the injunctions on that ground.

By appellant's notices filed on or about 7 June 2021 and with permission of the judge, the following local authorities appealed: Barking and Dagenham London Borough Council; Havering London Borough Council; Redbridge London Borough Council; Basingstoke and Deane Borough Council and Hampshire County Council; Nuneaton and Bedworth Borough Council and Warwickshire County Council; Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council;

- A Test Valley Borough Council; Thurrock Council; Hillingdon London Borough Council; Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council; Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council and Wolverhampton City Council. The following bodies were granted permission to intervene in the appeal: London Gypsies and Travellers; Friends, Families and Travellers; Derbyshire Gypsy Liaison Group; High Speed Two (HS2) Ltd and Basildon Borough Council. On 13 January 2022 the Court of Appeal (Sir Geoffrey Vos MR, B Lewison and Elisabeth Laing LJ) [2022] EWCA Civ 13; [2023] QB 295 allowed the appeals.

- C With permission granted by the Supreme Court on 25 October 2022 (Lord Hodge DPSC, Lord Hamblen and Lord Stephens JJSC) London Gypsies and Travellers, Friends, Families and Travellers and Derbyshire Gypsy Liaison Group appealed against the Court of Appeal's orders. The following local authorities participated in the appeal as respondents: (i) Wolverhampton City Council; (ii) Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council; (iii) Barking and Dagenham London Borough Council; (iv) Basingstoke and Deane Borough Council and Hampshire County Council; (v) Redbridge London Borough Council; (vi) Havering London Borough Council; (vii) Nuneaton and Bedworth Borough Council and Warwickshire County Council; (viii) D Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council; (ix) Test Valley Borough Council and Hampshire County Council and (x) Thurrock Council. The following bodies were granted permission to intervene in the appeal: Friends of the Earth; Liberty, High Speed Two (HS2) Ltd and the Secretary of State for Transport.

- E The facts and the agreed issues for the court are stated in the judgment of Lord Reed PSC, Lord Briggs JSC and Lord Kitchin, post, paras 6–13.

Richard Drabble KC, Marc Willers KC, Tessa Buchanan and Owen Greenhall (instructed by *Community Law Partnership, Birmingham*) for the appellants.

- F The appellants are concerned about the detrimental consequences which the injunctions sought by the local authorities will have for the nomadic lifestyle of Gypsies and Travellers, including a chilling effect on those seeking to practise the traditional Gypsy way of life.

- G A court cannot exercise its statutory power under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 so as to grant an injunction which will bind “newcomers” (ie persons who at the time of the grant of the injunction are neither defendants to the application nor identifiable, and who were described in the injunction only as “persons unknown”) save on an interim basis or for the protection of Convention rights as an exercise of the jurisdiction first recognised in *Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd* [2001] Fam 430.

- H The High Court's power to grant an injunction under section 37 neither expressly permits nor prohibits the making of orders against persons unknown and so does not on its own terms provide an answer to the question. Although it had previously been argued by some of the local authorities below that, regardless of any limitations which applied to section 37, the court had a separate power to grant injunctions against persons unknown by virtue of section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 the Court of Appeal held that the procedural limitations under section 37 and section 187B were the same and that the latter did not bestow any

additional or more extensive jurisdiction on the court: see [2023] QB 295, paras 113–118. A

A final injunction operates only between the parties to the claim: see *Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd* [1992] 1 AC 191. The act by which a person becomes a party is the service of the claim form: see *Cameron v Hussain* [2019] 1 WLR 1471. A person who is unknown and unidentifiable cannot be served with a claim form. He or she will thus not be a party and will not be bound by the final injunction. B

It is a fundamental principle of justice that a person cannot be made subject to the jurisdiction of the court without having such notice of the proceedings as will enable him to be heard: see *Porter v Freudenberg* [1915] 1 KB 857, 883, 887–888, *Barton v Wright Hassall LLP* [2018] 1 WLR 1119, para 8 and *Cameron*, paras 17–18.

Cameron, in particular, is determinative of the appeal. It dealt with—and the decision is therefore binding as to—the position of newcomers, albeit that the proposed defendant was someone who was said to have committed an unlawful act in the past, rather than a person who might commit an unlawful act in the future. Even if *Cameron*, because of that distinction, was not strictly concerned with newcomers, the application of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in that case leads inescapably to the conclusion that such persons cannot be sued. C
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Newcomers are by their very nature anonymous. A person unknown may, if defined with sufficient particularity, be capable of being identified with a particular person. In the first instance decision in *Canada Goose UK Retail Ltd v Persons Unknown* [2020] 1 WLR 417, para 150 Nicklin J suggested that some of the protesters “could readily be identified on . . . camera footage as alleged ‘wrongdoers’ and, if necessary, given a pseudonym (eg ‘. . . the man shown in the footage . . . holding the loudhailer’)”. The person in question will still be anonymous, but he or she is identifiable and whatever the practical difficulties in locating him or her, it is not conceptually impossible to effect service. By contrast, however, designations of the type used in the instant cases, which are intended to capture newcomers (“persons unknown”, “persons unknown occupying land”, “persons unknown depositing waste”, “persons unknown fly-tipping”) do not identify anyone. They do not “enable one to know whether any particular person is the one referred to”: see *Cameron*, para 16. E
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The Court of Appeal wrongly held that *South Cambridgeshire District Council v Gammell* [2006] 1 WLR 658 was authority for the proposition that a final injunction can bind newcomers. That case concerned an interim injunction. It was explained by the Supreme Court as an example of alternative service—not as authority for the proposition that final injunctions bind newcomers—and the Court of Appeal below erred in departing from that interpretation. The other cases relied on by the Court of Appeal below (in particular *Bloomsbury Publishing Group plc v News Group Newspapers Ltd* [2003] 1 WLR 1633, *Hampshire Waste Services Ltd v Intending Trespassers upon Chineham Incinerator Site* [2004] Env LR 9 and *Ineos Upstream Ltd v Persons Unknown* [2019] 4 WLR 100) provide no real support for the Court of Appeal’s decision. Those cases either (at best) simply accepted, without deciding the point, that final injunctions could G
H

- A bind newcomers or, when properly understood, they undermine such a conclusion.

The reasoning in *Gammell* cannot properly be extended to cover final injunctions to bind newcomers. There is a qualitative distinction between interim and final injunctions. Parties must be identified before a final determination takes place so that they have an opportunity to present their case. The courts have long been willing to accept lower—or at least different—standards of fairness at the interim stage, in recognition of the fact that interim orders are temporary and designed to hold the ring (or limit damage) pending trial. Thus, for example, interim orders may be sought without notice to the defendant, or may control the way in which a defendant deals with his or her property in order to prevent the defendant frustrating any eventual judgment. Interim orders may indeed be more favourable to a claimant than any final order could be: see, for example, *Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd* [1992] 1 AC 191, 224 (“*Spycatcher*”).

- C As Nicklin J recognised at first instance, the courts have recognised that this can create an incentive for a claimant to obtain an interim injunction and then fail to progress the case to trial: see [2021] EWHC 1201 (QB) at [89]. The answer to this has not been to expand the principle in *Spycatcher* to final orders: instead, the court will put in place directions to ensure that the matter is progressed to a final hearing: see Nicklin J, paras 91–93. Interim relief which binds newcomers can only properly be granted where it is to preserve the position pending trial.

- D Although in certain cases the court has granted injunctions on a contra mundum basis (see *In re X (A Minor) (Wardship: Injunction)* [1984] 1 WLR 1422, *Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd* [2001] Fam 430, *X (formerly Bell) v O’Brien* [2003] EMLR 37, *Carr v News Group Newspapers Ltd* [2005] EWHC 971 (QB), *OPQ v BJM* [2011] EMLR 23, *RXG v Ministry of Justice* [2020] QB 703 and *D v Persons Unknown* [2021] EWHC 157 (QB)), there is a principled distinction between that line of cases and injunctions prohibiting the unauthorised use or occupation of land.
- F Those cases were all concerned with the publication of personal information, such as the identity of offenders. Once in the public domain, the subject matter protected by the injunction is irretrievably lost. This court should confirm that an injunction contra mundum should only be granted where to do otherwise would defeat the purpose of the injunction. That principle will not apply in traveller injunction cases.

- G *Stephanie Harrison KC, Stephen Clark and Fatima Jichi* (instructed by *Hodge Jones & Allen LLP*) for Friends of the Earth, intervening.

“Persons unknown” injunctions, although said to be aimed at curtailing unlawful protest, also have a chilling effect on lawful campaigning and protest. They expose wide groups of citizens to the risk of prohibitively costly legal proceedings and punitive sanctions, including unlimited fines and imprisonment for contempt for up to two years. There are serious obstacles to contesting the claims and a significant inequality of arms when accessing justice with no costs protection.

- H There is an increasingly widespread use of such injunctions, often on an industry and country-wide basis, with private companies in particular utilising private law proceedings as a default mechanism to address perceived

public order issues despite there being tailored statutory provisions and safeguards provided for by Parliament in the criminal law. A

The ruling of the Supreme Court in *Cameron v Hussain* [2019] 1 WLR 1471, paras 11–12 makes clear that it is not simply a matter of the court’s wide discretion to entertain a claim if a person (who is not evading service) cannot be served and cannot reasonably be expected to have notice of the claim so that he may have an opportunity to defend it. Identification is necessary so that the court can be satisfied that a person is properly subject to its jurisdiction with the capacity to be a party to legal proceedings. However unjust the outcome for the claimant who may have been wronged (as in the case of the claimant in *Cameron*, who had been injured in a vehicle collision caused by the negligence of another driver of unknown identity), the claim has simply not been validly brought. B

One of the purposes of a persons unknown injunction is to deter such newcomers from coming into existence and if it is effective there will only ever have been one party to the claim, namely the claimant. This is not, therefore, properly to be described as a permissible claim against persons unknown in the *Bloomsbury Publishing* sense (see *Bloomsbury Publishing Group plc v News Group Newspapers Ltd* [2003] 1 WLR 1633). It is simultaneously a claim against nobody, but can only be effective if it is in principle binding on everybody. C D

Justice between parties to litigation is not only about a just outcome. That outcome must be arrived at pursuant to a fair and just process. In addition to being contrary to basic principles of procedural fairness and natural justice, in both the Gypsy and Traveller context and in the protest context, newcomer injunctions can have arbitrary and disproportionate adverse impacts on fundamental rights, including the Convention rights under articles 8, 10 and 11 and the common law protections for free speech and assembly. E

The notion that a person only becomes a party to proceedings by the acts that put them in breach of an order made in their absence and upon its enforcement against them is fundamentally at odds with such core principles. In contempt cases, the court’s approach will not be concerned with whether the injunction should have been granted or the appropriateness of the terms which have led to the contempt. An order of the court has to be obeyed unless and until it has been set aside or varied by the court. F

Even if an injunction is subsequently varied or set aside, that is irrelevant to the liability in contempt of a person who breaches the injunction (although it may be relevant to sentence): see *South Cambridgeshire District Council v Gammell* [2006] 1 WLR 658, paras 33–34 and *Cuadrilla Bowland Ltd v Persons Unknown* [2020] 4 WLR 29, paras 76–77. Moreover, in *Secretary of State for Transport v Cuciurean* [2021] EWCA Civ 357 at [57]–[62] the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that liability for contempt for breach of a persons unknown injunction required knowledge of its terms. G H

In the protest context, the courts have recognised the injustice of the enforcement of orders against individuals without giving them an opportunity to be heard and without consideration of their individual circumstances even if bound by the order when made: see *Astellas Pharma*

- A *Ltd v Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty* [2011] EWCA Civ 752 and *RWE Npower plc v Carroll* [2007] EWHC 947 (QB).

The lack of procedural fairness and natural justice intrinsic to orders against newcomers means that they should not even be imposed at the interim stage. If such injunctions were to be allowed on an interim basis, they should be limited to cases where there is a danger of real and imminent unlawful action, with a view to holding the ring and allowing claimants time to identify unknown but existing defendants.

- B *Jude Bunting KC and Marlena Valles* (instructed by *Liberty*) for *Liberty*, intervening.

It is not open to the court to significantly expand the *contra mundum* jurisdiction so as to permit courts in Gypsy, Roma and Traveller (“GRT”) or protester cases to make persons unknown orders (interim or final) which bind newcomers. The Court of Appeal’s conclusion in this case demonstrates the serious limitations of seeking to solve complex questions of social policy by deploying a tool of civil law. A court cannot lawfully make a final injunction against newcomers when the injunction is likely to interfere with the human rights of newcomers and there has not been any assessment of the individual facts of their case.

- D Unlike established orders such as freezing orders, *Anton Piller* orders, or possession orders which are targeted at specific people, final persons unknown injunctions frequently involve severe interference with the rights of a large category of people, often extending to vast swathes of land, entire boroughs or the entirety of the strategic road network. They can cover entirely peaceful, lawful protest.

- E In both GRT cases (where article 8 rights are involved) and in protest cases (where articles 10 and 11 are involved) an individual assessment of proportionality is required. In the former context, there is a clear line of Strasbourg authority emphasising the strictness of the proportionality test when imposing measures which affect the GRT community, such as injunctions to prevent encampments. A potential breach of planning authorisation, for example, will not be enough: see *Winterstein v France* (Application No 27013/07) (unreported) 17 October 2013. Consideration must be given to individualised matters such as the length of time of the encampment, the consequences of removal and the risk of becoming homeless. Similar considerations apply in protester cases: see *Canada Goose UK Retail Ltd v Persons Unknown* [2020] 1 WLR 417, para 136 and *Kudrevičius v Lithuania* (2015) 62 EHRR 34, paras 145, 155. This applies not just to Convention rights, but to fundamental common law rights such as the right to a home, to respect for one’s ethnic identity and to freedom of expression.

- G The serious impact of persons unknown injunctions is graphically illustrated by the way in which some claimants have aggressively sought committal of persons who have breached persons unknown injunctions, even in circumstances where the breaches were “trivial and wholly technical” as in *MBR Acres Ltd v McGivern* [2022] EWHC 2072 (QB). In that case a solicitor was prosecuted by a private company for attending a protest site in her professional capacity and was said to have breached the injunction by parking her car for an hour in an “exclusion zone”. The committal proceedings lasted two days and were dismissed as “wholly frivolous”, but

necessitated the solicitor self-reporting to the Solicitors Regulation Authority and ceasing to work for her firm until authorised to return. A

General category measures involve complex issues of policy and are matters for the legislature, as in the measures considered in *In re Abortion Services (Safe Access Zones) (Northern Ireland) Bill* [2023] AC 505; see also *R (Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire Constabulary* [2007] 2 AC 105, para 52. A court at first instance is singularly ill-equipped to make such a category assessment. B

Nigel Giffin KC and Simon Birks (instructed by *Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council Legal Services*) for the second respondent local authority.

The essential starting point for addressing these issues is section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, because section 37 is the statutory power which is being exercised when the High Court grants an injunction in a case of this nature (unless it is acting under a specific statutory power). There are three important points to make about what Parliament has enacted in section 37(1). First, it is a statutory power which Parliament has elected to confer in terms of the greatest possible breadth. It is engaged whenever the court considers that the grant of an injunction would be “just and convenient”. Secondly, section 37(1) expressly applies both to interlocutory (interim) orders, and to final orders, without drawing any distinction between them whatsoever. Thirdly, the section 37 power is expressly exercisable in “all” cases where the grant of an injunction would be just and convenient. The appellants are therefore wrong to suggest that it is only exercisable in “some” cases, not including cases of the present nature. C

The courts are well aware that, as with any other broad discretionary power conferred upon it, the section 37 power must be exercised on a principled basis. Thus it is axiomatic, for example, that the grant of injunctive relief in a particular form must represent a proportionate response to the factual situation with which the court is faced; that the court must so far as possible ensure fairness to all those affected by the injunction; and that the injunction is consistent with Convention rights. D

It is wrong to fetter the exercise of the section 37 power in advance, whether by inflexible judge-made rules, or through the division of cases into rigid and potentially artificial categories to which distinct rules apply. Rather, a broad and flexible approach is called for: see *Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd* [2023] AC 389. If the grant of an injunction would not be a fair or proportionate measure on particular facts, then it will not be granted. But if an injunction in a particular form would be the appropriate response to the actual or threatened commission of a legal wrong—and especially if such an injunction represents the only effective means of protecting legal rights and preventing significant harm—then the court should be slow to conclude that it is powerless to grant such relief. E

Newcomer injunctions are just one sub-species of the “precautionary” (quia timet) injunction which is solidly established in English law, and for whose award the courts have long since established a framework of governing principles. The claimants in these proceedings manifestly have an interest which merits protection. F

Cameron v Hussain [2019] 1 WLR 1471 should be seen as a case about the need for the court to guard against exposing people to detrimental legal consequences without their having had an opportunity to be heard or G

A otherwise to defend their interests. It did not lay down an absolute conceptual or jurisprudential bar to the grant of newcomer injunctions. Albeit stating that the general rule is that proceedings may not be brought against unnamed parties, Lord Sumption specifically endorsed the approach in *South Cambridgeshire District Council v Gammell* [2006] 1 WLR 658 of granting injunctions against anonymous but identifiable defendants provided
B that the injunction is brought to the attention of the putative defendant (for example by posting copies of the documents in some prominent place near the land in question) and the defendant is afforded an opportunity to apply to set it aside

The practice endorsed in *Cameron* applies as much to final orders as it does to interim orders. There is no relevant conceptual difference between the two, and it would be paradoxical if the court's powers were less
C extensive when making a final order after trial. Nicklin J in the present case attempted to resolve this paradox by saying that interim injunctions could only be granted against persons unknown for a short period during which they were expected to be identifiable, but there is no sign of any such approach in existing authority, for example *Bloomsbury Publishing Group plc v News Group Newspapers Ltd* [2003] 1 WLR 1633 or *Ineos Upstream Ltd v Persons Unknown* [2019] 4 WLR 100.
D

Newcomer injunctions are not intrinsically incompatible with natural justice. There are many situations in which courts make orders without having heard the persons who might be affected by them, usually because it is impractical, for one reason or another, to afford a hearing to those persons in advance of the making of the order. In such circumstances, fairness is
E secured by enabling any person affected to seek the recall of the order promptly at a hearing inter partes: see *R (M) v Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs and Lord Chancellor* [2004] 1 WLR 2298, para 39 and *A v British Broadcasting Corp'n* [2015] AC 588, para 67.

Guidelines are already in place as to when newcomer injunctions should be granted and as to the safeguards which must be observed: see *Ineos* [2019] 4 WLR 100, *Cuadrilla Bowland Ltd v Persons Unknown* [2020]
F 4 WLR 29 and *Bromley London Borough Council v Persons Unknown* [2020] PTSR 1043. Those guidelines provide a fair balance. They would be otiose if the Supreme Court acceded to the appeal and the safeguards which they provide were to be replaced by a universal prohibition. For examples of the court applying the correct approach to particular facts, see *Hillingdon London Borough Council v Persons Unknown* [2020] PTSR 2179,
G paras 95–122, *Cambridge City Council v Traditional Cambridge Tours Ltd* [2018] LLR 458, para 81 and *Birmingham City Council v Nagmadin* [2023] EWHC 56 (KB), at [34]–[37], [49]–[54], [59]–[60]. [Reference was also made to *Crédit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank v Persons Having Interest in Goods Held by the Claimant* [2021] 1 WLR 3834.]

The operation of newcomer injunctions is not intrinsically incompatible with Convention principles of proportionality. It is accepted that, depending
H on the nature of the injunction in question, Convention rights of newcomers may well (though will not always) be engaged. But they have to be balanced against any competing common law or Convention rights of persons living in close proximity to the land in question who would otherwise be adversely affected by the prohibited acts. This is always a fact-sensitive exercise. The

court is well-equipped to carry out the necessary proportionality test even where the newcomers are not before the court, just as it is when granting injunctions which carry *Spycatcher*-type consequences for third parties: see *Attorney General v Punch Ltd* [2003] 1 AC 1046, paras 108, 113–114, 116, 122–123.

Mark Anderson KC and Michelle Caney (instructed by *Wolverhampton City Council Legal Services*) for the first respondent local authority.

Precautionary injunctions against persons unknown which bind newcomers form a species of injunction against the world, as the Court of Appeal correctly held in the present case: see [2023] QB 295, paras 119–121. The fact that they are exceptional orders that are only granted in narrow circumstances as a last resort (see *Bromley London Borough Council v Persons Unknown* [2020] PTSR 1043, para 99 et seq and *Ineos Upstream Ltd v Persons Unknown* [2019] 4 WLR 100, paras 31–34) falsifies any “floodgates” argument.

Section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 frames the question which the courts must ask: is it “just and convenient” to grant an injunction? The appellants’ argument would require the Supreme Court to pre-judge this question by holding in advance that it will never be just and convenient to grant an injunction to prevent future wrongs by persons who cannot be identified when the injunction is granted.

This would not only deny a remedy to the victims of unlawful encampments: it would prevent courts from granting injunctions to prevent a wide range of other wrongdoing, such as urban exploring and car cruising. To remove from the armoury of the courts the remedy which the courts have devised over the last 20 years would be to incentivise such wrongful conduct.

Moreover, if wrongdoers know that they cannot be subject to an injunction which does not name them, they will be provided with a perverse incentive to preserve their anonymity.

There is no fundamental distinction between interim and final injunctions. Section 37 includes the power to fashion an injunction which has some of the characteristics of both and such injunctions should be permitted where they are just and convenient. *Bloomsbury Publishing Group plc v News Group Newspapers Ltd* [2003] 1 WLR 1633 illustrates this.

The courts have laid down guidelines as to when such injunctions should be granted and as to the safeguards which must be observed. Those guidelines provide a fair balance. They would be otiose if the Supreme Court acceded to the appeal and the safeguards which they provide were replaced by a universal prohibition. This would offend principles of justice, most notably the principle that where there is a wrong, the law should provide a remedy: see *Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs v Meier* [2009] 1 WLR 2780, para 25.

It makes no sense to say that such injunctions should only be granted to protect Convention rights. There is no authority that Convention rights must be in play before an injunction against the world can be issued. As the Court of Appeal correctly observed at paras 80 and 120, the fact that protester or encampment cases do not fall within the exceptional category with which *Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd* [2001] Fam 430 was concerned does not mean that a species of injunction against the world is not also appropriate in protester or encampment cases.

A On the contrary, if it is right for the court to fashion an unconventional injunction, addressed to the whole world, in order to protect a claimant's Convention rights, it is unprincipled to conclude that it must never do so to protect non-Convention rights. The distinction between Convention rights and other rights is arbitrary and artificial.

B *Caroline Bolton and Natalie Pratt* (instructed by *Sharpe Pritchard LLP* and *Legal Services, Barking and Dagenham London Borough Council*) for the third to tenth respondent local authorities.

C Each of the third to tenth respondent local authorities' injunctions in these proceedings were sought and granted pursuant to section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Travellers injunctions under section 187B should be seen as a statutory exception to the "general" rule set out in *Cameron v Hussain* [2019] 1 WLR 1471, para 9 that proceedings may not be brought against unnamed parties.

D By section 187B(1) a local authority may seek an injunction to restrain "any actual or apprehended breach of planning control": hence the local authority only has to "apprehend" a breach in order to apply for an injunction. By subsection (2) the court "may" grant "such injunction as it thinks appropriate", thus giving it the same wide jurisdiction as under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. (The permissive "may" in subsection (2) applies not only to the *terms* of any injunction but also to the decision *whether* to grant an injunction: see *South Bucks District Council v Porter* [2003] 2 AC 558, para 28.) And by subsection (3), rules of court (currently to be found in CPR PD 49E) may provide for injunctions to be issued against persons whose identity is unknown. In unauthorised encampment cases the court may describe the persons targeted by reference to evidence of what might potentially happen on the land sought to be protected, in the same way that persons unknown in unauthorised development cases are often defined by reference to the evidence of what was happening on the land (for example the injunction directed at "persons unknown . . . causing or permitting hardcore to be deposited [and] caravans . . . stationed [on specified land]" in *South Cambridgeshire District Council v Persons Unknown* [2004] 4 PLR 88).

F Section 187B does not confine itself to interim injunctions. Nor was the Court of Appeal in *South Cambridgeshire District Council v Gammell* [2006] 1 WLR 658 confining itself to interim injunctions, as may be seen from its reliance (at para 29) on *Mid-Bedfordshire District Council v Brown* [2005] 1 WLR 1460, which was a case about a final injunction (under section 187B) which bound newcomers as well as the named defendant. [Reference was also made to *Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs v Meier* [2009] 1 WLR 2780, paras 1–4 and *Redbridge London Borough Council v Stokes* [2018] EWHC 4076 (QB) at [10]–[23].]

G *Richard Kimblin KC* and *Michael Fry* (instructed by *Treasury Solicitor*) for High Speed Two (HS2) Ltd and the Secretary of State, intervening.

H Although the appellants complain about the "chilling effect" of injunctions on the right to protest, consideration should also be given to the beneficial effect of injunctions to deter disruptive, unlawful conduct: see *Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs v Meier* [2009] 1 WLR 2780, para 83. It is no part of the Secretary of State's or HS2's case that lawful

protest should be constrained. However, since 2021 there has been significant disruption to the strategic road network caused by the unlawful conduct of protesters seeking a change of government policy. Similarly, since 2017 there has been significant disruption to the construction of the HS2 rail link by the unlawful conduct of activists opposed to the project. Hence the need for the Secretary of State and HS2 to seek tailored “newcomer” injunctions (see, for example, *High Speed Two (HS2) Ltd v Persons Unknown* [2022] EWHC 2360 (KB)) to prevent activities which are not only unlawful but often risk injury to contractors and/or members of the public.

Any person affected by such injunctions will have liberty to apply at any time to vary or discharge the injunction and anyone who successfully discharges an order would in principle be entitled to their costs. Further, claimants are normally required to give a cross-undertaking in damages that, should it later be determined that the interim injunction should not have been granted, they must compensate for any loss caused by the injunction.

Although the term “contra mundum” is frequently used—the ultimate in catch-all terms—it is necessary to consider what it actually means on the particular facts of each case. It is obtuse to consider the appropriateness of a contra mundum order on the basis that everybody is affected: it is not, for example, the whole world which wishes to climb gantries on the M25. Rather, the court should (and does as a matter of practice) take a view about who, in the particular circumstances, might be affected. It will be a cautious view. It is a matter of degree and a judgement which is not difficult to make.

Drabble KC replied.

The court took time for consideration.

29 November 2023. LORD REED PSC, LORD BRIGGS JSC and LORD KITCHIN (with whom LORD HODGE DPSC and LORD LLOYD-JONES JSC agreed) handed down the following judgment.

1. Introduction

(1) The problem

1 This appeal concerns a number of conjoined cases in which injunctions were sought by local authorities to prevent unauthorised encampments by Gypsies and Travellers. Since the members of a group of Gypsies or Travellers who might in future camp in a particular place cannot generally be identified in advance, few if any of the defendants to the proceedings were identifiable at the time when the injunctions were sought and granted. Instead, the defendants were described in the claim forms as “persons unknown”, and the injunctions similarly enjoined “persons unknown”. In some cases, there was no further description of the defendants in the claim form, and the court’s order contained no further information about the persons enjoined. In other cases, the defendants were described in the claim form by reference to the conduct which the claimants sought to have prohibited, and the injunctions were addressed to persons who behaved in the manner from which they were ordered to refrain.

2 In these circumstances, the appeal raises the question whether (and if so, on what basis, and subject to what safeguards) the court has the power to grant an injunction which binds persons who are not identifiable at the time

A when the order is granted, and who have not at that time infringed or threatened to infringe any right or duty which the claimant seeks to enforce, but may do so at a later date: “newcomers”, as they have been described in these proceedings.

3 Although the appeal arises in the context of unlawful encampments by Gypsies and Travellers, the issues raised have a wider significance.
 B The availability of injunctions against newcomers has become an increasingly important issue in many contexts, including industrial picketing, environmental and other protests, breaches of confidence, breaches of intellectual property rights, and a wide variety of unlawful activities related to social media. The issue is liable to arise whenever there is a potential conflict between the maintenance of private or public rights and the future behaviour of individuals who cannot be identified in advance. Recent years
 C have seen a marked increase in the incidence of applications for injunctions of this kind. The advent of the internet, enabling wrongdoers to violate private or public rights behind a veil of anonymity, has also made the availability of injunctions against unidentified persons an increasingly significant question. If injunctions are available only against identifiable individuals, then the anonymity of wrongdoers operating online risks conferring upon them an
 D immunity from the operation of the law.

4 Reflecting the wide significance of the issues in the appeal, the court has heard submissions not only from the appellants, who are bodies representing the interests of Gypsies and Travellers, and the respondents, who are local authorities, but also from interveners with a particular interest in the law relating to protests: Friends of the Earth, Liberty, and (acting jointly) the Secretary of State for Transport and High Speed Two (HS2) Ltd.

E 5 The appeal arises from judgments given by Nicklin J and the Court of Appeal on what were in substance preliminary issues of law. The appeal is accordingly concerned with matters of legal principle, rather than with whether it was or was not appropriate for injunctions to be granted in particular circumstances. It is, however, necessary to give a brief account of the factual and procedural background.

F (2) *The factual and procedural background*

6 Between 2015 and 2020, 38 different local authorities or groups of local authorities sought injunctions against unidentified and unknown persons, which in broad terms prohibited unauthorised encampments within their administrative areas or on specified areas of land within those areas.
 G The claims were brought under the procedure laid down in Part 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (“CPR”), which is appropriate where the claimant seeks the court’s decision on a question which is unlikely to involve a substantial dispute of fact: CPR r 8.1(2). The claimants relied upon a number of statutory provisions, including section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, under which the court can grant an injunction
 H to restrain an actual or apprehended breach of planning control, and in some cases also upon common law causes of action, including trespass to land.

7 The claim forms fell into two broad categories. First, there were claims directed against defendants described simply as “persons unknown”, either alone or together with named defendants. Secondly, there were claims against unnamed defendants who were described, in almost all cases, by

reference to the future activities which the claimant sought to prevent, either alone or together with named defendants. Examples included “persons unknown forming unauthorised encampments within the Borough of Nuneaton and Bedworth”, “persons unknown entering or remaining without planning consent on those parcels of land coloured in Schedule 2 of the draft order”, and “persons unknown who enter and/or occupy any of the locations listed in this order for residential purposes (whether temporary or otherwise) including siting caravans, mobile homes, associated vehicles and domestic paraphernalia”.

8 In most cases, the local authorities obtained an order for service of the claim forms by alternative means under CPR r 6.15, usually by fixing copies in a prominent location at each site, or by fixing there a copy of the injunction with a notice that the claim form could be obtained from the claimant’s offices. Injunctions were obtained, invariably on without notice applications where the defendants were unnamed, and were similarly displayed. They contained a variety of provisions concerning review or liberty to apply. Some injunctions were of fixed duration. Others had no specified end date. Some were expressed to be interim injunctions. Others were agreed or held by Nicklin J to be final injunctions. Some had a power of arrest attached, meaning that any person who acted contrary to the injunction was liable to immediate arrest.

9 As we have explained, the injunctions were addressed in some cases simply to “persons unknown”, and in other cases to persons described by reference to the activities from which they were required to refrain: for example, “persons unknown occupying the sites listed in this order”. The respondents were among the local authorities who obtained such injunctions.

10 From around mid-2020, applications were made in some of the claims to extend or vary injunctions of fixed duration which were nearing their end. After a hearing in one such case, Nicklin J decided, with the concurrence of the President of the Queen’s Bench Division and the Judge in Charge of the Queen’s Bench Civil List, that there was a need for review of all such injunctions. After case management, in the course of which many of the claims were discontinued, there remained 16 local authorities (or groups of local authorities) actively pursuing claims. The appellants were given permission to intervene. A hearing was then fixed at which four issues of principle were to be determined. Following the hearing, Nicklin J determined those issues: *Barking and Dagenham London Borough Council v Persons Unknown* [2022] JPL 43.

11 Putting the matter broadly at this stage, Nicklin J concluded, in the light particularly of the decision of the Court of Appeal in *Canada Goose UK Retail Ltd v Persons Unknown* [2020] 1 WLR 2802 (“*Canada Goose*”), that interim injunctions could be granted against persons unknown, but that final injunctions could be granted only against parties who had been identified and had had an opportunity to contest the final order sought. If the relevant local authority could identify anyone in the category of “persons unknown” at the time the final order was granted, then the final injunction bound each person who could be identified. If not, then the final injunction granted against “persons unknown” bound no-one. In the light of that conclusion, Nicklin J

A discharged the final injunctions either in full or in so far as they were addressed to any person falling within the definition of “persons unknown” who was not a party to the proceedings at the date when the final order was granted.

B 12 Twelve of the claimants appealed to the Court of Appeal. In its decision, set out in a judgment given by Sir Geoffrey Vos MR with which Lewison and Elisabeth Laing LJ agreed, the court held that “the judge was wrong to hold that the court cannot grant final injunctions that prevent persons, who are unknown and unidentified at the date of the order, from occupying and trespassing on land”: *Barking and Dagenham London Borough Council v Persons Unknown* [2023] QB 295, para 7. The appellants appeal to this court against that decision.

C 13 The issues in the appeal have been summarised by the parties as follows:

(1) Is it wrong in principle and/or not open to a court for it to exercise its statutory power under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (“the 1981 Act”) so as to grant an injunction which will bind “newcomers”, that is to say, persons who were not parties to the claim when the injunction was granted, other than (i) on an interim basis or (ii) for the protection of Convention rights (ie rights which are protected under the Human Rights Act 1998)?

D (2) If it is wrong in principle and/or not open to a court to grant such an injunction, then—

(i) Does it follow that (other than for the protection of Convention rights) such an injunction may likewise not properly be granted on an interim basis, except where that is required for the purpose of restraining wrongful actions by persons who are identifiable (even if not yet identified) and who have already committed or threatened to commit a relevant wrongful act?

E (ii) Was Nicklin J right to hold that the protection of Convention rights could never justify the grant of a Traveller injunction, defined as an injunction prohibiting the unauthorised occupation or use of land?

F 2. *The legal background*

14 Before considering the development of “newcomer” injunctions—that is to say, injunctions designed to bind persons who are not identifiable as parties to the proceedings at the time when the injunction is granted—it may be helpful to identify some of the issues of principle which are raised by such injunctions. They can be summarised as follows:

G (1) Are newcomers parties to the proceedings at the time when the injunction is granted? If not, is it possible to obtain an injunction against a non-party? If they are not parties at that point, when (if ever) and how do they become parties?

(2) Does the claimant have a cause of action against newcomers at the time when the injunction is granted? If not, is it possible to obtain an injunction without having an existing cause of action against the person enjoined?

H (3) Can a claim form properly describe the defendants as persons unknown, with or without a description referring to the conduct sought to be enjoined? Can an injunction properly be addressed to persons so described? If the description refers to the conduct which is prohibited, can the defendants properly be described, and can an injunction properly be

issued, in terms which mean that persons do not become bound by the injunction until they infringe it? A

(4) How, if at all, can such a claim form be served?

15 This is not the stage at which to consider these questions, but it may be helpful to explain the legal context in which they arise, before turning to the authorities through which the law relating to newcomer injunctions has developed in recent times. We will explain at this stage the legal background, prior to the recent authorities, in relation to (1) the jurisdiction to grant injunctions, (2) injunctions against non-parties, (3) injunctions in the absence of a cause of action, (4) the commencement of proceedings against unidentified defendants, and (5) the service of proceedings on unidentified defendants. B

(1) *The jurisdiction to grant injunctions* C

16 As Lord Scott of Foscote commented in *Fourie v Le Roux* [2007] 1 WLR 320, para 25, in a speech with which the other Law Lords agreed, jurisdiction is a word of some ambiguity. Lord Scott cited with approval Pickford LJ's remark in *Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Hannay & Co* [1915] 2 KB 536, 563 that "the only really correct sense of the expression that the court has no jurisdiction is that it has no power to deal with and decide the dispute as to the subject matter before it, no matter in what form or by whom it is raised". However, as Pickford LJ went on to observe, the word is often used in another sense: "that although the court has power to decide the question it will not according to its settled practice do so except in a certain way and under certain circumstances". In order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to distinguish between these two senses of the word: between the power to decide—in this context, the power to grant an injunction—and the principles and practice governing the exercise of that power. D

17 The injunction is equitable in origin, and remains so despite its statutory confirmation. The power of courts with equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctions is, subject to any relevant statutory restrictions, unlimited: Spry, *Equitable Remedies*, 9th ed (2014) ("Spry"), p 333, cited with approval in, among other authorities, *Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority v Robinson* [2000] QB 775, paras 20–21 and *Cartier International AG v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd* [2017] Bus LR 1, para 47 (both citing the equivalent passage in the 5th ed (1997)), and *Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd* [2023] AC 389 ("Broad Idea"), para 57. The breadth of the court's power is reflected in the terms of section 37(1) of the 1981 Act, which states that: "The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so." As Lord Scott explained in *Fourie v Le Roux* (ibid), that provision, like its statutory predecessors, merely confirms and restates the power of the courts to grant injunctions which existed before the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict c 66) ("the 1873 Act") and still exists. That power was transferred to the High Court by section 16 of the 1873 Act and has been preserved by section 18(2) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 and section 19(2)(b) of the 1981 Act. E F G H

A 18 It is also relevant in the context of this appeal to note that, as a court of inherent jurisdiction, the High Court possesses the power, and bears the responsibility, to act so as to maintain the rule of law.

B 19 Like any judicial power, the power to grant an injunction must be exercised in accordance with principle and any restrictions established by judicial precedent and rules of court. Accordingly, as Lord Mustill observed in *Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd* [1993] AC 334, 360–361:

“Although the words of section 37(1) [of the 1981 Act] and its forebears are very wide it is firmly established by a long history of judicial self-denial that they are not to be taken at their face value and that their application is subject to severe constraints.”

C Nevertheless, the principles and practice governing the exercise of the power to grant injunctions need to and do evolve over time as circumstances change. As Lord Scott observed in *Fourie v Le Roux* at para 30, practice has not stood still and is unrecognisable from the practice which existed before the 1873 Act.

D 20 The point is illustrated by the development in recent times of several new kinds of injunction in response to the emergence of particular problems: for example, the *Mareva* or freezing injunction, named after one of the early cases in which such an order was made (*Mareva Cia Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers SA* [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 509); the search order or *Anton Piller* order, again named after one of the early cases in which such an order was made (*Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd* [1976] Ch 55); the *Norwich Pharmacal* order, also known as the third party disclosure order, which takes its name from the case in which the basis for such an order was authoritatively established (*Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Comrs* [1974] AC 133); the *Bankers Trust* order, which is an injunction of the kind granted in *Bankers Trust Co v Shapira* [1980] 1 WLR 1274; the internet blocking order, upheld in *Cartier International AG v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd* [2017] Bus LR 1 (para 17 above), and approved by this court in the same case, on an appeal on the question of costs: *Cartier International AG v British Telecommunications plc* [2018] 1 WLR 3259, para 15; the anti-suit injunction (and its offspring, the anti-anti-suit injunction), which has become an important remedy as globalisation has resulted in parties seeking tactical advantages in different jurisdictions; and the related injunction to restrain the presentation or advertisement of a winding-up petition.

G 21 It has often been recognised that the width and flexibility of the equitable jurisdiction to issue injunctions are not to be cut down by categorisations based on previous practice. In *Castanho v Brown & Root (UK) Ltd* [1981] AC 557, for example, Lord Scarman stated at p 573, in a speech with which the other Law Lords agreed, that “the width and flexibility of equity are not to be undermined by categorisation”. To similar effect, in *South Carolina Insurance Co v Assurantie Maatschappij “De Zeven Provinciën” NV* [1987] AC 24, Lord Goff of Chieveley, with whom Lord Mackay of Clashfern agreed, stated at p 44:

“I am reluctant to accept the proposition that the power of the court to grant injunctions is restricted to certain exclusive categories. That power

is unfettered by statute; and it is impossible for us now to foresee every circumstance in which it may be thought right to make the remedy available.”

In *Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd* [1993] AC 334 (para 19 above), Lord Browne-Wilkinson, with whose speech Lord Keith of Kinkel and Lord Goff agreed, expressed his agreement at p 343 with Lord Goff’s observations in the *South Carolina* case. In *Mercedes Benz AG v Leiduck* [1996] AC 284, 308, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead referred to these dicta in the course of his illuminating albeit dissenting judgment, and stated:

“As circumstances in the world change, so must the situations in which the courts may properly exercise their jurisdiction to grant injunctions. The exercise of the jurisdiction must be principled, but the criterion is injustice. Injustice is to be viewed and decided in the light of today’s conditions and standards, not those of yester-year.”

22 These dicta are borne out by the recent developments in the law of injunctions which we have briefly described. They illustrate the continuing ability of equity to innovate both in respect of orders designed to protect and enhance the administration of justice, such as freezing injunctions, *Anton Piller* orders, *Norwich Pharmacal* orders and *Bankers Trust* orders, and also, more significantly for present purposes, in respect of orders designed to protect substantive rights, such as internet blocking orders. That is not to undermine the importance of precedent, or to suggest that established categories of injunction are unimportant. But the developments which have taken place over the past half-century demonstrate the continuing flexibility of equitable powers, and are a reminder that injunctions may be issued in new circumstances when the principles underlying the existing law so require.

(2) *Injunctions against non-parties*

23 It is common ground in this appeal that newcomers are not parties to the proceedings at the time when the injunctions are granted, and the judgments below proceeded on that basis. However, it is worth taking a moment to consider the question.

24 Where the defendants are described in a claim form, or an injunction describes the persons enjoined, simply as persons unknown, the entire world falls within the description. But the entire human race cannot be regarded as being parties to the proceedings: they are not before the court, so that they are subject to its powers. It is only when individuals are served with the claim form that they ordinarily become parties in that sense, although it is also possible for persons to apply to become parties in the absence of service. As will appear, service can be problematical where the identities of the intended defendants are unknown. Furthermore, as a general rule, for any injunction to be enforceable, the persons whom it enjoins, if unnamed, must be described with sufficient clarity to identify those included and those excluded.

25 Where, as in most newcomer injunctions, the persons enjoined are described by reference to the conduct prohibited, particular individuals do not fall within that description until they behave in that way. The result is

- A that the injunction is in substance addressed to the entire world, since anyone in the world may potentially fall within the description of the persons enjoined. But persons may be affected by the injunction in ways which potentially have different legal consequences. For example, an injunction designed to deter Travellers from camping at a particular location may be addressed to persons unknown camping there (notwithstanding that
- B no-one is currently doing so) and may restrain them from camping there. If Travellers elsewhere learn about the injunction, they may consequently decide not to go to the site. Other Travellers, unaware of the injunction, may arrive at the site, and then become aware of the claim form and the injunction by virtue of their being displayed in a prominent position. Some of them may then proceed to camp on the site in breach of the injunction.
- C Others may obey the injunction and go elsewhere. At what point, if any, do Travellers in each of these categories become parties to the proceedings? At what point, if any, are they enjoined? At what point, if any, are they served (if the displaying of the documents is authorised as alternative service)? It will be necessary to return to these questions. However these questions are answered, although each of these groups of Travellers is affected by the injunction, none of them can be regarded as being party to the proceedings at
- D the time when the injunction is granted, as they do not then answer to the description of the persons enjoined and nothing has happened to bring them within the jurisdiction of the court.

- 26 If, then, newcomers are not parties to the proceedings at the time when the injunctions are granted, it follows that newcomer injunctions depart from the court's usual practice. The ordinary rule is that "you cannot
- E have an injunction except against a party to the suit": *Iveson v Harris* (1802) 7 Ves 251, 257. That is not, however, an absolute rule: Lord Eldon LC was speaking at a time when the scope of injunctions was more closely circumscribed than it is today. In addition to the undoubted jurisdiction to grant interim injunctions prior to the service (or even the issue) of proceedings, a number of other exceptions have been created in response to
- F the requirements of justice. Each of these should be briefly described, as it will be necessary at a later point to consider whether newcomer injunctions fall into any of these established categories, or display analogous features.

(i) Representative proceedings

- 27 The general rule of practice in England and Wales used to be that the defendants to proceedings must be named, and that even a description of
- G them would not suffice: *Friern Barnet Urban District Council v Adams* [1927] 2 Ch 25; *In re Wykeham Terrace, Brighton, Sussex, Ex p Territorial Auxiliary and Volunteer Reserve Association for the South East* [1971] Ch 204. The only exception in the Rules of the Supreme Court ("RSC") concerned summary proceedings for the possession of land: RSC Ord 113.

- 28 However, it has long been established that in appropriate
- H circumstances relief can be sought against representative defendants, with other unnamed persons being described in the order in general terms. Although formerly recognised by RSC Ord 15, r 12, and currently the subject of rule 19.8 of the CPR, this form of procedure has existed for several centuries and was developed by the Court of Chancery. Its rationale was

explained by Sir Thomas Plumer MR in *Meux v Maltby* (1818) 2 Swans 277, 281–282: A

“The general rule, which requires the Plaintiff to bring before the Court all the parties interested in the subject in question, admits of exceptions. The liberality of this Court has long held, that there is of necessity an exception to the general rule, when a failure of justice would ensue from its enforcement.” B

Those who are represented need not be individually named or identified. Nor need they be served. They are not parties to the proceedings: CPR r 19.8(4)(b). Nevertheless, an injunction can be granted against the whole class of defendants, named and unnamed, and the unnamed defendants are bound in equity by any order made: *Adair v The New River Co* (1805) 11 Ves 429, 445; CPR r 19.8(4)(a). C

29 A representative action may in some circumstances be a suitable means of restraining wrongdoing by individuals who cannot be identified. It can therefore, in such circumstances, provide an alternative remedy to an injunction against “persons unknown”: see, for example, *M Michaels (Furriers) Ltd v Askew* [1983] Lexis Citation 198, concerned with picketing; *EMI Records Ltd v Kudhail* [1985] FSR 36, concerned with copyright infringement; and *Heathrow Airport Ltd v Garman* [2007] EWHC 1957 (QB), concerned with environmental protesters. D

30 However, there are a number of principles which restrict the circumstances in which relief can be obtained by means of a representative action. In the first place, the claimant has to be able to identify at least one individual against whom a claim can be brought as a representative of all others likely to interfere with his or her rights. Secondly, the named defendant and those represented must have the same interest. In practice, compliance with that requirement has proved to be difficult where those sought to be represented are not a homogeneous group: see, for example, *News Group Newspapers Ltd v Society of Graphical and Allied Trades ’82 (No 2)* [1987] ICR 181, concerned with industrial action, and *United Kingdom Nirex Ltd v Barton* [1986] Lexis Citation 644, concerned with protests. In addition, since those represented are not party to the proceedings, an injunction cannot be enforced against them without the permission of the court (CPR r 19.8(4)(b)): something which, it has been held, cannot be granted before the individuals in question have been identified and have had an opportunity to make representations: see, for example, *RWE Npower plc v Carrol* [2007] EWHC 947 (QB). E
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(ii) Wardship proceedings G

31 Another situation where orders have been made against non-parties is where the court has been exercising its wardship jurisdiction. In *In re X (A Minor) (Wardship: Injunction)* [1984] 1 WLR 1422 the court protected the welfare of a ward of court (the daughter of an individual who had been convicted of manslaughter as a child) by making an order prohibiting any publication of the present identity of the ward or her parents. The order bound everyone, whether a party to the proceedings or not: in other words, it was an order contra mundum. Similar orders have been made in subsequent cases: see, for example, *In re M and N (Minors) (Wardship:* H

- A *Publication of Information* [1990] Fam 211 and *In re R (Wardship: Restrictions on Publication)* [1994] Fam 254.

(iii) Injunctions to protect human rights

- B 32 It has been clear since the case of *Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd* [2001] Fam 430 (“*Venables*”) that the court can grant an injunction contra mundum in order to enforce rights protected by the Human Rights Act 1998. The case concerned the protection of the new identities of individuals who had committed notorious crimes as children, and whose safety would be jeopardised if their new identities became publicly known. An injunction preventing the publication of information about the claimants had been granted at the time of their trial, when they remained children. The matter returned to the court after they attained the age of majority and applied for the ban on publication to be continued, on the basis that the information in question was confidential. The injunction was granted against named newspaper publishers and, expressly, against all the world. It was therefore an injunction granted, as against all potential targets other than the named newspaper publishers, on a without notice application.
- D 33 Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P held that the jurisdiction to grant an injunction in the circumstances of the case lay in equity, in order to restrain a breach of confidence. She recognised that by granting an injunction against all the world she would be departing from the general principle, referred to at para 26 above, that “you cannot have an injunction except against a party to the suit” (para 98). But she relied (at para 29) upon the passage in *Spry* (in an earlier edition) which we cited at para 17 above as the source of the necessary equitable jurisdiction, and she felt compelled to make the order against all the world because of the extreme danger that disclosure of confidential information would risk infringing the human rights of the claimants, particularly the right to life, which the court as a public authority was duty-bound to protect from the criminal acts of others: see
- E paras 98–100. Furthermore, an order against only a few named newspaper publishers which left the rest of the media free to report the prohibited information would be positively unfair to them, having regard to their own Convention rights to freedom of speech.
- F

(iv) Reporting restrictions

- G 34 Reporting restrictions are prohibitions on the publication of information about court proceedings, directed at the world at large. They are not injunctions in the same sense as the orders which are our primary concern, but they are relevant as further examples of orders granted by courts restraining conduct by the world at large. Such orders may be made under common law powers or may have a statutory basis. They generally prohibit the publication of information about the proceedings in which they are made (eg as to the identity of a witness). A person will commit a contempt of court if, knowing of the order, he frustrates its purpose by publishing the information in question: see, for example, *In re F (or se A) (A Minor) (Publication of Information)* [1977] Fam 58 and *Attorney General v Leveller Magazine Ltd* [1979] AC 440.
- H

(v) Embargoes on draft judgments

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35 It is the practice of some courts to circulate copies of their draft judgments to the parties' legal representatives, subject to a prohibition on further, unauthorised, disclosure. The order therefore applies directly to non-parties to the proceedings: see, for example, *Attorney General v Crosland* [2021] 4 WLR 103 and [2022] 1 WLR 367. Like reporting restrictions, such orders are not equitable injunctions, but they are relevant as further examples of orders directed against non-parties.

B

(vi) The effect of injunctions on non-parties

36 We have focused thus far on the question whether an injunction can be granted against a non-party. As we shall explain, it is also relevant to consider the effect which injunctions against parties can have upon non-parties.

C

37 If non-parties are not enjoined by the order, it follows that they are not bound to obey it. They can nevertheless be held in contempt of court if they knowingly act in the manner prohibited by the injunction, even if they have not aided or abetted any breach by the defendant. As it was put by Lord Oliver of Aylmerton in *Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd* [1992] 1 AC 191, 223, there is contempt where a non-party "frustrates, thwarts, or subverts the purpose of the court's order and thereby interferes with the due administration of justice in the particular action" (emphasis in original).

D

38 One of the arguments advanced before the House of Lords in *Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd* was that to invoke the jurisdiction in contempt against a person who was neither a party nor an aider or abettor of a breach of the order by the defendant, but who had done what the defendant in the action was forbidden by the order to do was, in effect, to make the order operate in rem or contra mundum. That, it was argued, was a purpose which the court could not legitimately achieve, since its orders were only properly made inter partes.

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39 The argument was rejected. Lord Oliver acknowledged at p 224 that "Equity, in general, acts in personam and there are respectable authorities for the proposition that injunctions, whether mandatory or prohibitory, operate inter partes and should be so expressed (see *Iveson v Harris*; *Marengo v Daily Sketch and Sunday Graphic Ltd* [1948] 1 All ER 406)". Nevertheless, the appellants' argument confused two different things: the scope of an order inter partes, and the proper administration of justice (pp 224–225):

F

"Once it is accepted, as it seems to me the authorities compel, that contempt (to use Lord Russell of Killowen's words [in *Attorney General v Leveller Magazine Ltd* at p 468]) 'need not involve disobedience to an order binding upon the alleged contemnor' the potential effect of the order contra mundum is an inevitable consequence."

G

40 In answer to the objection that the non-party who learns of the order has not been heard by the court and has therefore not had the opportunity to put forward any arguments which he may have, Lord Oliver responded at p 224 that he was at liberty to apply to the court:

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"The Sunday Times' in the instant case was perfectly at liberty, before publishing, either to inform the respondent and so give him the

A opportunity to object or to approach the court and to argue that it should be free to publish where the defendants were not, just as a person affected by notice of, for example, a *Mareva* injunction is able to, and frequently does, apply to the court for directions as to the disposition of assets in his hands which may or may not be subject to the terms of the order.”

B The non-party’s right to apply to the court is now reflected in CPR r 40.9, which provides: “A person who is not a party but who is directly affected by a judgment or order may apply to have the judgment or order set aside or varied.” A non-party can also apply to become a defendant in accordance with CPR r 19.4.

C 41 There is accordingly a distinction in legal principle between being bound by an injunction as a party to the action and therefore being in contempt of court for disobeying it and being in contempt of court as a non-party who, by knowingly acting contrary to the order, subverts the court’s purpose and thereby interferes with the administration of justice. Nevertheless, cases such as *Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd* and *Attorney General v Punch Ltd* [2003] 1 AC 1046, and the daily impact of freezing injunctions on non-party financial institutions (following *Z Ltd v A-Z and AA-LL* [1982] QB 558), indicate that the differences in the legal analysis can be of limited practical significance. Indeed, since non-parties D can be found in contempt of court for acting contrary to an injunction, it has been recognised that it can be appropriate to refer to non-parties in an injunction in order to indicate the breadth of its binding effect: see, for example, *Marengo v Daily Sketch and Sunday Graphic Ltd* [1948] 1 All ER 406, 407; *Attorney General v Newspaper Publishing plc* [1988] Ch 333, 387–388.

E 42 Prior to the developments discussed below, it can therefore be seen that while the courts had generally affirmed the position that only parties to an action were bound by an injunction, a number of exceptions to that principle had been recognised. Some of the examples given also demonstrate that the court can, in appropriate circumstances, make orders which prohibit the world at large from behaving in a specified manner. It is also F relevant in the present context to bear in mind that even where an injunction enjoins a named individual, the public at large are bound not knowingly to subvert it.

(3) *Injunctions in the absence of a cause of action*

G 43 An injunction against newcomers purports to restrain the conduct of persons against whom there is no existing cause of action at the time when the order is granted: it is addressed to persons who may not at that time have formed any intention to act in the manner prohibited, let alone threatened to take or taken any steps towards doing so. That might be thought to conflict with the principle that an injunction must be founded on an existing cause of action against the person enjoined, as stated, for example, by Lord Diplock in *Owners of cargo lately laden on board the Siskina v Distos Cia Naviera SA* [1979] AC 210 (“*The Siskina*”), at p 256. There has been a gradual but growing reaction against that reasoning (which Lord Diplock himself H recognised was too narrowly stated: *British Airways Board v Laker Airways Ltd* [1985] AC 58, 81) over the past 40 years, culminating in the recent decision in *Broad Idea* [2023] AC 389, cited in para 17 above, where the

Judicial Committee of the Privy Council rejected such a rigid doctrine and asserted the court's governance of its own practice. It is now well established that the grant of injunctive relief is not always conditional on the existence of a cause of action. Again, it is relevant to consider some established categories of injunction against "no cause of action defendants" (as they are sometimes described) in order to see whether newcomer injunctions fall into an existing legitimate class, or, if not, whether they display analogous features.

44 One long-established exception is an injunction granted on the application of the Attorney General, acting either ex officio or through another person known as a relator, so as to ensure that the defendant obeys the law (*Attorney General v Harris* [1961] 1 QB 74; *Attorney General v Chaudry* [1971] 1 WLR 1614).

45 The statutory provisions relied on by the local authorities in the present case similarly enable them to seek injunctions in the public interest. All the respondent local authorities rely on section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972, which confers on local authorities the power to bring proceedings to enforce obedience to public law, without the involvement of the Attorney General: *Stoke-on-Trent City Council v B & Q (Retail) Ltd* [1984] AC 754. Where an injunction is granted in proceedings under section 222, a power of arrest may be attached under section 27 of the Police and Justice Act 2006, provided certain conditions are met. Most of the respondents also rely on section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, which enables a local authority to apply for an injunction to restrain any actual or apprehended breach of planning control. Some of the respondents have also relied on section 1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which enables the court to grant an injunction (on the application of, inter alia, a local authority: see section 2) for the purpose of preventing the respondent from engaging in anti-social behaviour. Again, a power of arrest can be attached: see section 4. One of the respondents also relies on section 130 of the Highways Act 1980, which enables a local authority to institute legal proceedings for the purpose of protecting the rights of the public to the use and enjoyment of highways.

46 Another exception, of great importance in modern commercial practice, is the *Mareva* or freezing injunction. In its basic form, this type of order restrains the defendant from disposing of his assets. However, since assets are commonly held by banks and other financial institutions, the principal effect of the injunction in practice is generally to bind non-parties, as explained earlier. The order is ordinarily made on a without notice application. It differs from a traditional interim injunction: its purpose is not to prevent the commission of a wrong which is the subject of a cause of action, but to facilitate the enforcement of an actual or prospective judgment or other order. Since it can also be issued to assist the enforcement of a decree arbitral, or the judgment of a foreign court, or an order for costs, it need not be ancillary to a cause of action in relation to which the court making the order has jurisdiction to grant substantive relief, or indeed ancillary to a cause of action at all (as where it is granted in support of an order for costs). Even where the claimant has a cause of action against one defendant, a freezing injunction can in certain limited circumstances be granted against another defendant, such as a bank, against which the

A claimant does not assert a cause of action (*TSB Private Bank International SA v Chabra* [1992] 1 WLR 231; *Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd* (1999) 198 CLR 380 and *Revenue and Customs Comrs v Egleton* [2007] Bus LR 44).

B 47 Another exception is the *Norwich Pharmacal* order, which is available where a third party gets mixed up in the wrongful acts of others, even innocently, and may be ordered to provide relevant information in its possession which the applicant needs in order to seek redress. The order is not based on the existence of any substantive cause of action against the defendant. Indeed, it is not a precondition of the exercise of the jurisdiction that the applicant should have brought, or be intending to bring, legal proceedings against the alleged wrongdoer. It is sufficient that the applicant intends to seek some form of lawful redress for which the information is needed: see *Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd* [2002] 1 WLR 2033.

C 48 Another type of injunction which can be issued against a defendant in the absence of a cause of action is a *Bankers Trust* order. In the case from which the order derives its name, *Bankers Trust Co v Shapira* [1980] 1 WLR 1274 (para 20 above), an order was granted requiring an innocent third party to disclose documents and information which might assist the claimant in locating assets to which the claimant had a proprietary claim. D The claimant asserted no cause of action against the defendant. Later cases have emphasised the width and flexibility of the equitable jurisdiction to make such orders: see, for example, *Murphy v Murphy* [1999] 1 WLR 282, 292.

E 49 Another example of an injunction granted in the absence of a cause of action against the defendant is the internet blocking order. This is a new type of injunction developed to address the problems arising from the infringement of intellectual property rights via the internet. In the leading case of *Cartier International AG v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd* [2017] Bus LR 1 and [2018] 1 WLR 3259, cited at paras 17 and 20 above, the Court of Appeal upheld the grant of injunctions ordering internet service providers F (“ISPs”) to block websites selling counterfeit goods. The ISPs had not invaded, or threatened to invade, any independently identifiable legal or equitable right of the claimants. Nor had the claimants brought or indicated any intention to bring proceedings against any of the infringers. It was nevertheless held that there was power to grant the injunctions, and a principled basis for doing so, in order to compel the ISPs to prevent their facilities from being used to commit or facilitate a wrong. On an appeal to G this court on the question of costs, Lord Sumption JSC (with whom the other Justices agreed) analysed the nature and basis of the orders made and concluded that they were justified on ordinary principles of equity. That was so although the claimants had no cause of action against the respondent ISPs, who were themselves innocent of any wrongdoing.

H (4) *The commencement and service of proceedings against unidentified defendants*

50 Bringing proceedings against persons who cannot be identified raises issues relating to the commencement and service of proceedings. It is necessary at this stage to explain the general background.

51 The commencement of proceedings is an essentially formal step, normally involving the issue of a claim form in an appropriate court. The forms prescribed in the CPR include a space in which to designate the claimant and the defendant. As was observed in *Cameron v Hussain* [2019] 1 WLR 1471 (“*Cameron*”), para 12, that is a format equally consistent with their being designated by name or by description. As was explained earlier, the claims in the present case were brought under Part 8 of the CPR. CPR r 8.2A(1) provides that a practice direction “may set out circumstances in which a claim form may be issued under this Part without naming a defendant”. A number of practice directions set out such circumstances, including Practice Direction 49E, paras 21.1–21.10 of which concern applications under certain statutory provisions. They include section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, which concerns proceedings for an injunction to restrain “any actual or apprehended breach of planning control”. As explained in para 45 above, section 187B was relied on in most of the present cases. CPR r 55.3(4) also permits a claim for possession of property to be brought against “persons unknown” where the names of the trespassers are unknown.

52 The only requirement for a name is contained in paragraph 4.1 of Practice Direction 7A, which states that a claim form should state the full name of each party. In *Bloomsbury Publishing Group plc v News Group Newspapers Ltd* [2003] 1 WLR 1633 (“*Bloomsbury*”), it was said that the words “should state” in paragraph 4.1 were not mandatory but imported a discretion to depart from the practice in appropriate cases. However, the point is not of critical importance. As was stated in *Cameron*, para 12, a practice direction is no more than guidance on matters of practice issued under the authority of the heads of division. It has no statutory force and cannot alter the general law.

53 As we have explained at paras 27–33 above, there are undoubtedly circumstances in which proceedings may be validly commenced although the defendant is not named in the claim form, in addition to those mentioned in the rules and practice directions mentioned above. All of those examples—representative defendants, the wardship jurisdiction, and the principle established in the *Venables* case [2001] Fam 430—might however be said to be special in some way, and to depend on a principle which is not of broader application.

54 A wider scope for proceedings against unnamed defendants emerged in *Bloomsbury*, where it was held that there is no requirement that the defendant must be named. The overriding objective of the CPR is to enable the court to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost. Since this objective is inconsistent with an undue reliance on form over substance, the joinder of a defendant by description was held to be permissible, provided that the description was “sufficiently certain as to identify both those who are included and those who are not” (para 21). It will be necessary to return to that case, and also to consider more recent decisions concerned with proceedings brought against unnamed persons.

55 Service of the claim form is a matter of greater significance. Although the court may exceptionally dispense with service, as explained below, and may if necessary grant interlocutory relief, such as interim injunctions, before service, as a general rule service of originating process is

A the act by which the defendant is subjected to the court's jurisdiction, in the sense of its power to make orders against him or her (*Dresser UK Ltd v Falcongate Freight Management Ltd* [1992] QB 502, 523; *Barton v Wright Hassall LLP* [2018] 1 WLR 1119). Service is significant for many reasons. One of the most important is that it is a general requirement of justice that proceedings should be brought to the notice of parties whose interests are affected before any order is made against them (other than in an emergency), so that they have an opportunity to be heard. Service of the claim form on the defendant is the means by which such notice is normally given. It is also normally by means of service of the order that an injunction is brought to the notice of the defendant, so that he or she is bound to comply with it. But it is generally sufficient that the defendant is aware of the injunction at the time of the alleged breach of it.

C 56 Conventional methods of service may be impractical where defendants cannot be identified. However, alternative methods of service can be permitted under CPR r 6.15. In exceptional circumstances (for example, where the defendant has deliberately avoided identification and substituted service is impractical), the court has the power to dispense with service, under CPR r 6.16.

D 3. *The development of newcomer injunctions to restrain unauthorised occupation and use of land—the impact of Cameron and Canada Goose*

E 57 The years from 2003 saw a rapid development of the practice of granting injunctions purporting to prohibit persons, described as persons unknown, who were not parties to the proceedings when the order was made, from engaging in specified activities including, of most direct relevance to this appeal, occupying and using land without the appropriate consent. This is just one of the areas in which the court has demonstrated a preparedness to grant an injunction, subject to appropriate safeguards, against persons who could not be identified, had not been served and were not party to the proceedings at the date of the order.

F (1) *Bloomsbury*

G 58 One of the earliest injunctions of this kind was granted in the context of the protection of intellectual property rights in connection with the forthcoming publication of a novel. The *Bloomsbury* case [2003] 1 WLR 1633, cited at para 52 above, is one of two decisions of Sir Andrew Morritt V-C in 2003 which bear on this appeal. There had been a theft of several pre-publication copies of a new Harry Potter novel, some of which had been offered to national newspapers ahead of the launch date. By the time of the hearing of a much adjourned interim application most but not all of the thieves had been arrested, but the claimant publisher wished to have continued injunctions, until the date a month later when the book was due to be published, against unnamed further persons, described as the person or persons who had offered a copy of the book to the three named newspapers and the person or persons in physical possession of the book without the consent of the claimants.

H 59 The Vice-Chancellor acknowledged that it would under the old RSC and relevant authority in relation to them have been improper to seek to

identify intended defendants in that way (see para 27 above). He noted (para 11) the anomalous consequence: A

“A claimant could obtain an injunction against all infringers by description so long as he could identify one of them by name [as a representative defendant: see paras 27–30 above], but, by contrast, if he could not name one of them then he could not get an injunction against any of them.” B

He regarded the problem as essentially procedural, and as having been cured by the introduction of the CPR. He concluded, at para 21:

“The crucial point, as it seems to me, is that the description used must be sufficiently certain as to identify both those who are included and those who are not. If that test is satisfied then it does not seem to me to matter that the description may apply to no one or to more than one person nor that there is no further element of subsequent identification whether by service or otherwise.” C

(2) *Hampshire Waste Services*

60 Later that same year, Sir Andrew Morritt V-C made another order against persons unknown, this time in a protester case, *Hampshire Waste Services Ltd v Intending Trespassers upon Chineham Incinerator Site* [2004] Env LR 9 (“*Hampshire Waste Services*”). The claimants, operators of a number of waste incinerator sites which fed power to the national grid, sought an injunction to restrain protesters from entering any of various named sites in connection with a “Global Day of Action against Incinerators” some six days later. Previous actions of this kind presented a danger to the protesters and to others and had resulted in the plants having to be shut down. The police were, it seemed, largely powerless to prevent these threatened activities. The Vice-Chancellor, having referred to *Bloomsbury*, had no doubt the order was justified save for one important matter: the claimants were unable to identify any of the protesters to whom the order would be directed or upon whom proceedings could be served. Nevertheless, the Vice-Chancellor was satisfied that, in circumstances such as these, joinder by description was permissible, that the intended defendants should be described as “persons entering or remaining without the consent of the claimants, or any of them, on any of the incinerator sites at [specified addresses] in connection with the ‘Global Day of Action Against Incinerators’ (or similarly described event) on or around 14 July 2003”, and that posting notices around the sites would amount to effective substituted service. The court should not refuse an application simply because difficulties in enforcement were envisaged. It was, however, necessary that any person who wished to do so should be able promptly to apply for the order to be discharged, and that was allowed for. That being so, there was no need for a formal return date. D E F G

61 Whereas in *Bloomsbury* the injunction was directed against a small number of individuals who were at least theoretically capable of being identified, the injunction granted in *Hampshire Waste Services* was effectively made against the world: anyone might potentially have entered or remained on any of the sites in question on or around the specified date. This H

- A is a common if not invariable feature of newcomer injunctions. Although the number of persons likely to engage in the prohibited conduct will plainly depend on the circumstances, and will usually be relatively small, such orders bear upon, and enjoin, anyone in the world who does so.

(3) *Gammell*

- B 62 The *Bloomsbury* decision has been seen as opening up a wide jurisdiction. Indeed, Lord Sumption observed in *Cameron*, para 11, that it had regularly been invoked in the years which followed in a variety of different contexts, mainly concerning the abuse of the internet, and trespasses and other torts committed by protesters, demonstrators and paparazzi. Cases in the former context concerned defamation, theft of information by hacking, blackmail and theft of funds. But it is upon cases and newcomer injunctions in the second context that we must now focus, for they include cases involving protesters, such as *Hampshire Waste Services*, and also those involving Gypsies and Travellers, and therefore have a particular bearing on these appeals and the issues to which they give rise.

- D 63 Some of these issues were considered by the Court of Appeal only a short time later in two appeals concerning Gypsy caravans brought onto land at a time when planning permission had not been granted for that use: *South Cambridgeshire District Council v Gammell*; *Bromley London Borough Council v Maughan* [2006] 1 WLR 658 (“*Gammell*”).

- E 64 The material aspects of the two cases are substantially similar, and it will suffice for present purposes to focus on the *South Cambridgeshire* case. The Court of Appeal (Brooke and Clarke LJ) had earlier granted an injunction under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 against persons described as “persons unknown . . . causing or permitting hardcore to be deposited . . . caravans, mobile homes or other forms of residential accommodation to be stationed . . . or existing caravans, mobile homes or other forms of residential accommodation . . . to be occupied” on land adjacent to a Gypsy encampment in rural Cambridgeshire: *South Cambridgeshire District Council v Persons Unknown* [2004] 4 PLR 88 (“*South Cambs*”). The order restrained the persons so described from behaving in the manner set out in that description. Service of the claim form and the injunction was effected by placing them in clear plastic envelopes in a prominent position on the relevant land.

- G 65 Several months later, Ms Gammell, without securing or applying for the necessary planning permission or making an application to set the injunction aside or vary its terms, proceeded to station her caravans on the land. She was therefore a newcomer within the meaning of that word as used in this appeal, since she was neither a defendant nor on notice of the application for the injunction nor on the site when the injunction was granted. She was served with the injunction and its effect was explained to her, but she continued to station the caravans on the land. On an application for committal by the local authority she was found at first instance to have been in contempt. Sentencing was adjourned to enable her to appeal against the judge’s refusal to permit her to be added as a defendant to the proceedings, for the purpose of enabling her to argue that the injunction should not have the effect of placing her in contempt until a

proportionality exercise had been undertaken to balance her particular human rights against the grant of an injunction against her, in accordance with *South Bucks District Council v Porter* [2003] 2 AC 558.

66 The Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal. In his judgment, Sir Anthony Clarke MR, with whom Rix and Moore-Bick LJ agreed, stated that each of the appellants became a party to the proceedings when she did an act which brought her within the definition of defendant in the particular case. Ms Gammell had therefore already become a defendant when she stationed her caravan on the site. Her proper course (and that of any newcomer in the same situation) was to make a prompt application to vary or discharge the injunction as against her (which she had not done) and, in the meantime, to comply with the injunction. The individualised proportionality exercise could then be carried out with regard to her particular circumstances on the hearing of the application to vary or discharge, and might in any event be relevant to sanction. This reasoning, and in particular the notion that a newcomer becomes a defendant by committing a breach of the injunction, has been subject to detailed and sustained criticism by the appellants in the course of this appeal, and this is a matter to which we will return.

(4) *Meier*

67 We should also mention a decision of this court from about the same time concerning Travellers who had set up an unauthorised encampment in wooded areas managed by the Forestry Commission and owned by the Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs: *Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs v Meier* [2009] 1 WLR 2780 (“*Meier*”). This was in one sense a conventional case: the Secretary of State issued proceedings alleging trespass by the occupying Travellers and sought an order for possession of the occupied sites. More unusual (and ultimately unsuccessful) was the application for an order for possession against the Travellers in respect of other land which was wholly detached from the land they were occupying. This was wrong in principle for it was simply not possible (even on a precautionary basis) to make an order requiring persons to give immediate possession of woodland of which they were *not* in occupation, and which was wholly detached from the woodland of which they *were* in occupation (as Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury MR explained at para 75). But that did not mean the courts were powerless to frame a remedy. The court upheld an injunction granted by the Court of Appeal against the defendants, including “persons names unknown”, restraining them from entering the woodland which they had not yet occupied. Since it was not argued that the injunction was defective, we do not attach great significance to Lord Neuberger MR’s conclusion at para 84 that it had not been established that there was an error of principle which led to its grant. Nevertheless, it is notable that Lord Rodger of Earlsferry JSC expressed the view that the injunction had been rightly granted, and cited the decisions of Sir Andrew Morritt V-C in *Bloomsbury* and *Hampshire Waste Services*, and the grant of the injunction in the *South Cambs* case, without disapproval (at paras 2–3).

A (5) *Later cases concerning Traveller injunctions*

68 Injunctions in the Traveller and Gypsy context were targeted first at actual trespass on land. Typically, the local authorities would name as actual or intended defendants the particular individuals they had been able to identify, and then would seek additional relief against “persons unknown”, these being persons who were alleged to be unlawfully occupying the land but who could not at that stage be identified by name, although often they could be identified by some form of description. But before long, many local authorities began to take a bolder line and claims were brought simply against “persons unknown”.

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D 69 A further important development was the grant of Traveller injunctions, not just against those who were in unauthorised occupation of the land, whether they could be identified or not, but against persons on the basis only of their potential rather than actual occupation. Typically, these injunctions were granted for three years, sometimes more. In this way Traveller injunctions were transformed from injunctions against wrongdoers and those who at the date of the injunction were threatening to commit a wrong, to injunctions primarily or at least significantly directed against newcomers, that is to say persons who were not parties to the claim when the injunction was granted, who were not at that time doing anything unlawful in relation to the land of that authority, or even intending or overtly threatening to do so, but who might in the future form that intention.

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G 70 One of the first of these injunctions was granted by Patterson J in *Harlow District Council v Stokes* [2015] EWHC 953 (QB). The claimants sought and were granted an interim injunction under section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972 and section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 in existing proceedings against over thirty known defendants and, importantly, other “persons unknown” in respect of encampments on a mix of public and private land. The pattern had been for these persons to establish themselves in one encampment, for the local authority and the police to take action against them and move them on, and for the encampment then to disperse but later reappear in another part of the district, and so the process would start all over again, just as Lord Rodger JSC had anticipated in *Meier*. Over the months preceding the application numerous attempts had been made using other powers (such as the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (“CJPOA”)) to move the families on, but all attempts had failed. None of the encampments had planning permission and none had been the subject of any application for planning permission.

H 71 It is to be noted, however, that appropriate steps had been taken to draw the proceedings to the attention of all those in occupation (see para 15). None had attended court. Further, the relevant authorities and councils accepted that they were required to make provision for Gypsy and Traveller accommodation and gave evidence of how they were working to provide additional and appropriate sites for the Gypsy and Traveller communities. They also gave evidence of the extensive damage and pollution caused by the unlawful encampments, and the local tensions they generated, and the judge summarised the effects of this in graphic detail (at paras 10 and 11).

72 Following the decision in *Harlow District Council v Stokes* and an assessment of the efficacy of the orders made, a large number of other local authorities applied for and were granted similar injunctions over the period from 2017–2019, with the result that by 2020 there were in excess of 35 such injunctions in existence. By way of example, in *Kingston upon Thames Royal London Borough Council v Persons Unknown* [2019] EWHC 1903 (QB), the injunction did not identify any named defendants.

73 All of these injunctions had features of relevance to the issues raised by this appeal. Sometimes the order identified the persons to whom it was directed by reference to a particular activity, such as “persons unknown occupying land” or “persons unknown depositing waste”. In many of the cases, injunctions were granted against persons identified only as those who might in future commit the acts which the injunction prohibited (eg *UK Oil and Gas Investments plc v Persons Unknown* [2019] JPL 161). In other cases, the defendants were referred to only as “persons unknown”. The injunctions remained in place for a considerable period of time and, on occasion, for years. Further, the geographical reach of the injunctions was extensive, indeed often borough-wide. They were usually granted without the court hearing any adversarial argument, and without provision for an early return date.

74 It is important also to have in mind that these injunctions undoubtedly had a significant impact on the communities of Travellers and Gypsies to whom they were directed, for they had the effect of forcing many members of these communities out of the boroughs which had obtained and enforced them. They also imposed a greater strain on the resources of the boroughs and councils which had not yet obtained an order. This combination of features highlighted another important consideration, and it was one of which the judges faced with these applications have been acutely conscious: a nomadic lifestyle has for very many years been a part of the tradition and culture of many Traveller and Gypsy communities, and the importance of this lifestyle to the Gypsy and Traveller identity has been recognised by the European Court of Human Rights in a series of decisions including *Chapman v United Kingdom* (2001) 33 EHRR 18.

75 As the Master of the Rolls explained in the present case, at paras 105 and 106, any individual Traveller who is affected by a newcomer injunction can rely on a private and family life claim to pursue a nomadic lifestyle. This right must be respected, but the right to that respect must be balanced against the public interest. The court will also take into account any other relevant legal considerations such as the duties imposed by the Equality Act 2010.

76 These considerations are all the more significant given what from these relatively early days was acknowledged by many to be a central and recurring set of problems in these cases (and it is one to which we must return in considering appropriate guidelines in cases of this kind): the Gypsies and Travellers to whom they were primarily directed had a lifestyle which made it difficult for them to access conventional sources of housing provision; their attempts to obtain planning permission almost always met with failure; and at least historically, the capacity of sites authorised for their occupation had fallen well short of that needed to accommodate those seeking space on which to station their caravans. The sobering statistics

A were referred to by Lord Bingham of Cornhill in *South Bucks District Council v Porter* [2003] 2 AC 558 (para 65 above), para 13.

77 The conflict to which these issues gave rise was recognised at the highest level as early as 2000 and emphasised in a housing research summary, *Local Authority Powers for Managing Unauthorised Camping* (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, No 90, 1998, updated 4 December 2000):

B “The basic conflict underlying the ‘problem’ of unauthorised camping is between [Gypsies]/Travellers who want to stay in an area for a period but have nowhere they can legally camp, and the settled community who, by and large, do not want [Gypsies]/Travellers camped in their midst. The local authority is stuck between the two parties, trying to balance the conflicting needs and often satisfying no one.”

C 78 For many years there has also been a good deal of publicly available guidance on the issue of unauthorised encampments, much of which embodies obvious good sense and has been considered by the judges dealing with these applications. So, for example, materials considered in the authorities to which we will come have included a Department for the Environment Circular 18/94, *Gypsy Sites Policy and Unauthorised Camping* (November 1994), which stated that “it is a matter for local discretion whether it is appropriate to evict an unauthorised [Gypsy] encampment”. Matters to be taken into account were said to include whether there were authorised sites; and, if not, whether the unauthorised encampment was causing a nuisance and whether services could be provided to it. Authorities were also urged to try to identify possible emergency stopping places as close as possible to the transit routes so that Travellers could rest there for short periods; and were advised that where Gypsies were unlawfully encamped, it was for the local authority to take necessary steps to ensure that any such encampment did not constitute a threat to public health. Local authorities were also urged not to use their powers to evict Gypsies needlessly, and to use those powers in a humane and compassionate way. In 2004 the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister issued *Guidance on Managing Unauthorised Camping*, which recommended that local authorities and other public bodies distinguish between unauthorised encampment locations which were unacceptable, for instance because they involved traffic hazards or public health risks, and those which were acceptable, and stated that each encampment location must be considered on its merits. It also indicated that specified welfare inquiries should be undertaken in relation to the Travellers and their families before any decision was made as to whether to bring proceedings to evict them. Similar guidance was to be found in the Home Office *Guide to Effective Use of Enforcement Powers (Part 1; Unauthorised Encampments)*, published in February 2006, in which it was emphasised that local authorities have an obligation to carry out welfare assessments on unauthorised campers to identify any issue that needs to be addressed before enforcement action is taken against them. It also urged authorities to consider whether enforcement was absolutely necessary.

H 79 The fact that Travellers and Gypsies have almost invariably chosen not to appear in these proceedings (and have not been represented) has left judges with the challenging task of carrying out a proportionality assessment

which has inevitably involved weighing all of these considerations, including the relevance of the breadth of the injunctions sought and the fact that the injunctions were directed against “persons unknown”, in deciding whether they should be granted and, if so, for how long; and whether they should be made subject to particular conditions and safeguards and, if so, what those conditions and safeguards should be.

(6) Cameron

80 The decision of the Supreme Court in *Cameron* [2019] 1 WLR 1471 (para 51 above) highlighted further and more fundamental considerations for this developing jurisprudence, and it is a decision to which we must return for it forms an important element of the case developed before us on behalf of the appellants. At this stage it is sufficient to explain that the claimant suffered personal injuries and damage to her car in a collision with another vehicle. The driver of that vehicle failed to stop and fled the scene. The claimant then brought an action for damages against the registered keeper, but it transpired that that person had not been driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. In addition, although there was an insurance policy in force in respect of the vehicle, the insured person was fictitious. The claimant could not sue the insurers, as the relevant legislation required that the driver was a person insured under the policy. The claimant could have sought compensation from the Motor Insurers’ Bureau, which compensates the victims of uninsured motorists, but for reasons which were unclear she applied instead to amend her claim to substitute for the registered keeper the person unknown who was driving the car at the time of the collision, so as to obtain a judgment on which the insurer would be liable under section 151 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (“the 1988 Act”). The judge refused the application.

81 The Court of Appeal allowed the claimant’s appeal. In the Court of Appeal’s view, it would be consistent with the CPR and the policy of the 1988 Act for proceedings to be brought and pursued against the unnamed driver, suitably identified by an appropriate description, in order that the insurer could be made liable under section 151 of the 1988 Act for any judgment obtained against that driver.

82 A further appeal by the insurer to the Supreme Court was allowed unanimously. Lord Sumption considered in some detail the extent of any right in English law to sue unnamed persons. He referred to the decision in *Bloomsbury* and the cases which followed, many of which we have already mentioned. Then, at para 13, he distinguished between two kinds of case in which the defendant could not be named, and to which different considerations applied. The first comprised anonymous defendants who were identifiable but whose names were unknown. Squatters occupying a property were, for example, identifiable by their location though they could not be named. The second comprised defendants, such as most hit and run drivers, who were not only anonymous but could not be identified.

83 Lord Sumption proceeded to explain that permissible modes of service had been broadened considerably over time but that the object of all of these modes of service was the same, namely to enable the court to be satisfied that one or other of the methods used had either put the defendant in a position to ascertain the contents of the claim or was reasonably likely to

- A enable him to do so within an appropriate period of time. The purpose of service (and substituted service) was to inform the defendant of the contents of the claim and the nature of the claimant's case against him; to give him notice that the court, being a court of competent jurisdiction, would in due course proceed to decide the merits of that claim; and to give him an opportunity to be heard and to present his case before the court. It followed that it was not possible to issue or amend a claim form so as to sue an unnamed defendant if it was conceptually impossible to bring the claim to his attention.

- B 84 In the *Cameron* case there was no basis for inferring that the offending driver was aware of the proceedings. Service on the insurer did not and would not without more constitute service on that offending driver (nor was the insurer directly liable); alternative service on the insurer could not be expected to reach the driver; and it could not be said that the driver was trying to evade service for it had not been shown that he even knew that proceedings had been or were likely to be brought against him. Further, it had not been established that this was an appropriate case in which to dispense with service altogether for any other reason. It followed that the driver could not be sued under the description relied upon by the claimant.

- C 85 This important decision was followed in a relatively short space of time by a series of five appeals to and decisions of the Court of Appeal concerning the way in which and the extent to which proceedings for injunctive relief against persons unknown, including newcomers, could be used to restrict trespass by constantly changing communities of Travellers, Gypsies and protesters. It is convenient to deal with them in broadly chronological order.

- E (7) *Ineos*

- F 86 In *Ineos Upstream Ltd v Persons Unknown* [2019] 4 WLR 100, the claimants, a group of companies and individuals connected with the business of shale and gas exploration by fracking, sought interim injunctions to restrain what they contended were threatened and potentially unlawful acts of protest, including trespass, nuisance and harassment, before they occurred. The judge was satisfied on the evidence that there was a real and imminent threat of unlawful activity if he did not make an order pending trial and it was likely that a similar order would be made at trial. He therefore made the orders sought by the claimants, save in relation to harassment.

- G 87 On appeal to the Court of Appeal it was argued, among other things, that the judge was wrong to grant injunctions against persons unknown and that he had failed properly to consider whether the claimants were likely to obtain the relief they sought at trial and whether it was appropriate to grant an injunction against persons unknown, including newcomers, before they had had an opportunity to be heard.

- H 88 These arguments were addressed head on by Longmore LJ, with whom the other members of the court agreed. He rejected the submission that a claimant could never sue persons unknown unless they were identifiable at the time the claim form was issued. He also rejected, as too absolutist, the submission that an injunction could not be granted to restrain newcomers from engaging in the offending activity, that is to say persons who might only

form the intention to engage in the activity at some later date. Lord Sumption's categorisation of persons who might properly be sued was not intended to exclude newcomers. To the contrary, Longmore LJ continued, Lord Sumption appeared rather to approve the decision in *Bloomsbury* and he had expressed no disapproval of the decision in *Hampshire Waste Services*.

89 Longmore LJ went on tentatively to frame the requirements of an injunction against unknown persons, including newcomers, in a characteristically helpful and practical way. He did so in these terms (at para 34): (1) there must be a sufficiently real and imminent risk of a tort being committed to justify quia timet relief; (2) it is impossible to name the persons who are likely to commit the tort unless restrained; (3) it is possible to give effective notice of the injunction and for the method of such notice to be set out in the order; (4) the terms of the injunction must correspond to the threatened tort and not be so wide that they prohibit lawful conduct; (5) the terms of the injunction must be sufficiently clear and precise as to enable persons potentially affected to know what they must not do; and (6) the injunction should have clear geographical and temporal limits.

(8) *Bromley*

90 The issue of unauthorised encampments by Gypsies and Travellers was considered by the Court of Appeal a short time later in *Bromley London Borough Council v Persons Unknown* [2020] PTSR 1043. This was an appeal against the refusal by the High Court to grant a five-year de facto borough-wide prohibition of encampment and entry or occupation of accessible public spaces in Bromley except cemeteries and highways. The final injunction sought was directed at "persons unknown" but it was common ground that it was aimed squarely at the Gypsy and Traveller communities.

91 Important aspects of the background were that some Gypsy and Traveller communities had a particular association with Bromley; the borough had a history of unauthorised encampments; there were no or no sufficient transit sites to cater for the needs of these communities; the grant of these injunctions in ever increasing numbers had the effect of forcing Gypsies and Travellers out of the boroughs which had obtained them, thereby imposing a greater strain on the resources of those which had not yet applied for such orders; there was a strong possibility that unless restrained by the injunction those targeted by these proceedings would act in breach of the rights of the relevant local authority; and although aspects of the resulting damage could be repaired, there would nevertheless be significant irreparable damage too. The judge was satisfied that all the necessary ingredients for a quia timet injunction were in place and so it was necessary to carry out an assessment of whether it was proportionate to grant the injunction sought in all the circumstances of the case. She concluded that it was not proportionate to grant the injunction to restrain entry and encampments but that it was proportionate to grant an injunction against fly-tipping and the disposal of waste.

92 The particular questions giving rise to the appeal were relatively narrow (namely whether the judge had fallen into error in finding the order sought was disproportionate, in setting too high a threshold for assessment of the harm caused by trespass and in concluding that the local authority had

A failed to discharge its public sector equality duty); but the Court of Appeal was also invited and proceeded to give guidance on the broader question of how local authorities ought properly to address the issues raised by applications for such injunctions in the future. The decision is also important because it was the first case involving an injunction in which the Gypsy and Traveller communities were represented before the High Court, and as a result of their success in securing the discharge of the injunction, it was the first case of this kind properly to be argued out at appellate level on the issues of procedural fairness and proportionality. It must also be borne in mind that the decision of the Supreme Court in *Cameron* was not cited to the Court of Appeal; nor did the Court of Appeal consider the appropriateness as a matter of principle of granting such injunctions. Conversely, there is nothing in *Bromley* to suggest that final injunctions against unidentified newcomers cannot or should never be granted.

93 As it was, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Coulson LJ, with whom Ryder and Haddon-Cave LJJs agreed, endorsed what he described as the elegant synthesis by Longmore LJ in *Ineos* (at para 34) of certain essential requirements for the grant of an injunction against persons unknown in a protester case (paras 29–30). He considered it appropriate to add in the present context (that of Travellers and Gypsies), first, that procedural fairness required that a court should be cautious when considering whether to grant an injunction against persons unknown, including Gypsies and Travellers, particularly on a final basis, in circumstances where they were not there to put their side of the case (paras 31–34); and secondly, that the judge had adopted the correct approach in requiring the claimant to show that there was a strong probability of irreparable harm (para 35).

94 The Court of Appeal was also satisfied that in assessing proportionality the judge had properly taken into account seven factors: (a) the wide extent of the relief sought; (b) the fact that the injunction was not aimed specifically at prohibiting anti-social or criminal behaviour, but just entry and occupation; (c) the lack of availability of alternative sites; (d) the cumulative effect of other injunctions; (e) various specific failures on the part of the authority in respect of its duties under the Human Rights Act and the public sector equality duty; (f) the length of time, that is to say five years, the proposed injunction would be in force; and (g) whether the order sought took proper account of permitted development rights arising by operation of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 (SI 2015/596), that is to say the grant of “deemed planning permission” for, by way of example, the stationing of a single caravan on land for not more than two nights, which had not been addressed in a satisfactory way. Overall, the authority had failed to satisfy the judge that it was appropriate to grant the injunction sought, and the Court of Appeal decided there was no basis for interfering with the conclusion to which she had come.

95 Coulson LJ went on (at paras 99–109) to give the wider guidance to which we have referred, and this is a matter to which we will return a little later in this judgment for it has a particular relevance to the principles to which newcomer injunctions in Gypsy and Traveller cases should be subject. Aspects of that guidance are controversial; but other aspects about which

there can be no real dispute are that local authorities should engage in a process of dialogue and communication with travelling communities; should undertake, where appropriate, welfare and impact assessments; and should respect, appropriately, the culture, traditions and practices of the communities. Similarly, injunctions against unauthorised encampments should be limited in time, perhaps to a year, before review.

(9) *Cuadrilla*

96 The third of these appeals, *Cuadrilla Bowland Ltd v Persons Unknown* [2020] 4 WLR 29, concerned an injunction to restrain four named persons and “persons unknown” from trespassing on the claimants’ land, unlawfully interfering with their rights of passage to and from that land, and unlawfully interfering with the supply chain of the first claimant, which was involved, like *Ineos*, in the business of shale and gas exploration by fracking. The Court of Appeal was specifically concerned here with a challenge to an order for the committal of a number of persons for breach of this injunction, but, at para 48 and subject to two points, summarised the effect of *Ineos* as being that there was no conceptual or legal prohibition against suing persons unknown who were not currently in existence but would come into existence if and when they committed a threatened tort. Nonetheless, it continued, a court should be inherently cautious about granting such an injunction against unknown persons since the reach of such an injunction was necessarily difficult to assess in advance.

(10) *Canada Goose*

97 Only a few months later, in *Canada Goose* [2020] 1 WLR 2802 (para 11 above), the Court of Appeal was called upon to consider once again the way in which, and the extent to which, civil proceedings for injunctive relief against persons unknown could be used to restrict public protests. The first claimant, Canada Goose, was the UK trading arm of an international retailing business selling clothing containing animal fur and down. It opened a store in London but was faced with what it considered to be a campaign of harassment, nuisance and trespass by protesters against the manufacture and sale of such clothing. Accordingly, with the manager of the store, it issued proceedings and decided to seek an injunction against the protesters.

98 Specifically, the claimants sought and obtained a without notice interim injunction against “persons unknown” who were described as “persons unknown who are protestors against the manufacture and sale of clothing made of or containing animal products and against the sale of such clothing at [the claimants’ store]”. The injunction restrained them from, among other things, assaulting or threatening staff and customers, entering or damaging the store and engaging in particular acts of demonstration within particular zones in the vicinity of the store. The terms of the order did not require the claimants to serve the claim form on any “persons unknown” but permitted service of the interim injunction by handing or attempting to hand it to any person demonstrating at or in the vicinity of the store or by email to either of two stated email addresses, that of an activist group and that of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) Foundation (“PETA”), a charitable company dedicated to the protection of the rights of

A animals. PETA was subsequently added to the proceedings as second defendant at its own request.

99 The claimants served many copies of the interim injunction on persons in the vicinity of the store, including over 100 identifiable individuals, but did not attempt to join any of them as parties to the claim. As for the claim form, this was sent by email to the two addresses specified for service of the interim injunction, and to one other individual who had requested a copy.

100 In these circumstances, an application by the claimants for summary judgment and a final injunction was unsuccessful. The judge held that the claim form had not been served on any defendant to the proceedings; that it was not appropriate to permit service by alternative means (under CPR r 6.15) or to dispense with service (under CPR r 6.16); and that the interim injunction would be discharged. He also considered that the description of the persons unknown was too broad, as it was capable of including protesters who might never intend to visit the store, and that the injunction was capable of affecting persons who did not carry out any activities which were otherwise unlawful. In addition, he considered that the proposed final injunction was defective in that it would capture future protesters who were not parties to the proceedings at the time when the injunction was granted. He refused to grant a final injunction.

101 The Court of Appeal dismissed the claimants' appeal. It held, first, that service of proceedings is important in the delivery of justice. The general rule is that service of the originating process is the act by which the defendant is subjected to the court's jurisdiction—and that a person cannot be made subject to the jurisdiction without having such notice of the proceedings as will enable him to be heard. Here there was no satisfactory evidence that the steps taken by the claimants were such as could reasonably be expected to have drawn the proceedings to the attention of the respondent unknown persons; the claimants had never sought an order for alternative service under CPR r 6.15 and there was never any proper basis for an order under CPR r 6.16 dispensing with service.

102 Secondly, the Court of Appeal held that the court may grant an interim injunction before proceedings have been served (or even issued) against persons who wish to join an ongoing protest, and that it is also, in principle, open to the court in appropriate circumstances to limit even lawful activity where there is no other proportionate means of protecting the claimants' rights, as for example in *Hubbard v Pitt* [1976] QB 142 (protesting outside an estate agency), and *Burris v Azadani* [1995] 1 WLR 1372 (entering a modest exclusion zone around the claimant's home), and to this extent the requirements for a newcomer injunction explained in *Ineos* required qualification. But in this case, the description of the "persons unknown" was impermissibly wide; the prohibited acts were not confined to unlawful acts; and the interim injunction failed to provide for a method of alternative service which was likely to bring the order to the attention of the persons unknown. The court was therefore justified in discharging the interim injunction.

103 Thirdly, the Court of Appeal held (para 89) that a final injunction could not be granted in a protester case against persons unknown who were not parties at the date of the final order, since a final injunction operated

only between the parties to the proceedings. As authority for that proposition, the court cited *Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd* [1992] 1 AC 191 per Lord Oliver at p 224 (quoted at para 39 above). That, the court said, was consistent with the fundamental principle in *Cameron* [2019] 1 WLR 1471 that a person cannot be made subject to the jurisdiction of the court without having such notice of the proceedings as will enable him to be heard. It followed, in the court's view, that a final injunction could not be granted against newcomers who had not by that time committed the prohibited acts, since they did not fall within the description of "persons unknown" and had not been served with the claim form. This was not one of the very limited cases, such as *Venables* [2001] Fam 430, in which a final injunction could be granted against the whole world. Nor was it a case where there was scope for making persons unknown subject to a final order. That was only possible (and perfectly legitimate) provided the persons unknown were confined to those in the first category of unknown persons in *Cameron*—that is to say anonymous defendants who were nonetheless identifiable in some other way (para 91). In the Court of Appeal's view, the claimants' problem was that they were seeking to invoke the civil jurisdiction of the courts as a means of permanently controlling ongoing public demonstrations by a continually fluctuating body of protesters (para 93).

104 This reasoning reveals the marked difference in approach and outcome from that of the Court of Appeal in the proceedings now before this court and highlights the importance of the issues to which it gives rise and to which we referred at the outset. Indeed, the correctness and potential breadth of the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in *Canada Goose*, and how that reasoning differs from the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in these proceedings, lie at the heart of these appeals.

(11) *The present case*

105 The circumstances of the present appeals were summarised at paras 6–12 above. In the light of the foregoing discussion, it will be apparent that, in holding that interim injunctions could be granted against persons unknown, but that final injunctions could be granted only against parties who had been identified and had had an opportunity to contest the final order sought, Nicklin J applied the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in *Canada Goose* [2020] 1 WLR 2802. The Court of Appeal, however, departed from that reasoning, on the basis that it had failed to have proper regard to *Gammell* [2006] 1 WLR 658, which was binding on it.

106 The Court of Appeal's approach in the present case, as set out in the judgment of Sir Geoffrey Vos MR, with which the other members of the court agreed, was based primarily on the decision in *Gammell*. It proceeded, therefore, on the basis that the persons to whom an injunction is addressed can be described by reference to the behaviour prohibited by the injunction, and that those persons will then become parties to the action in the event that they breach the injunction. As we will explain, we do not regard that as a satisfactory approach, essentially because it is based on the premise that the injunction will be breached and leaves out of account the persons affected by the injunction who decide to obey it. It also involves the logical paradox that a person becomes bound by an injunction only as a result of

- A infringing it. However, even leaving *Gammell* to one side, the Court of Appeal subjected the reasoning in *Canada Goose* to cogent criticism.

107 Among the points made by the Master of the Rolls, the following should be highlighted. No meaningful distinction could be drawn between interim and final injunctions in this context (para 77). No such distinction had been drawn in the earlier case law concerned with newcomer injunctions.

- B It was unrealistic at least in the context of cases concerned with protesters or Travellers, since such cases rarely if ever resulted in trials. In addition, in the case of an injunction (unlike a damages action such as *Cameron*) there was no possibility of a default judgment: the grant of an injunction was always in the discretion of the court. Nor was a default judgment available under Part 8 procedure. Furthermore, as the facts of the earlier cases demonstrated and *Bromley* [2020] PTSR 1043 explained, the court needed to keep injunctions
- C against persons unknown under review even if they were final in character. In that regard, the Master of the Rolls made the point that, for as long as the court is concerned with the enforcement of an order, the action is not at an end.

4. A new type of injunction?

- D 108 It is convenient to begin the analysis by considering certain strands in the arguments which have been put forward in support of the grant of newcomer injunctions, initially outside the context of proceedings against Travellers. They may each be labelled with the names of the leading cases from which the arguments have been derived, and we will address them broadly chronologically.

- E 109 The earliest in time is *Venables* [2001] Fam 430 discussed at paras 32–33 above. The case is important as possibly the first contra mundum equitable injunction granted in recent times, and in our view correctly explains why the objections to the grant of newcomer injunctions against Travellers go to matters of established principle rather than jurisdiction in the strict sense: i.e. not to the power of the court, as was later confirmed by Lord Scott of Foscote in *Fourie v Le Roux* [2007] 1 WLR 320
- F at para 25 (cited at para 16 above). In that respect the *Venables* injunction went even further than the typical Traveller injunction, where the newcomers are at least confined to a class of those who might wish to camp on the relevant prohibited sites. Nevertheless, for the reasons we explained at paras 25 and 61 above, and which we develop further at paras 155–159 below, newcomer injunctions can be regarded as being analogous to other
- G injunctions or orders which have a binding effect upon the public at large. Like wardship orders contra mundum (para 31 above), *Venables*-type injunctions (paras 32–33 above), reporting restrictions (para 34 above), and embargoes on the publication of draft judgments (para 35 above), they are not limited in their effects to particular individuals, but can potentially affect anyone in the world.

- H 110 *Venables* has been followed in a number of later cases at first instance, where there was convincing evidence that an injunction contra mundum was necessary to protect a person from serious injury or death: see *X (formerly Bell) v O'Brien* [2003] EMLR 37; *Carr v News Group Newspapers Ltd* [2005] EWHC 971 (QB); *A (A Protected Party) v Persons Unknown* [2017] EMLR 11; *RXG v Ministry of Justice* [2020] QB 703;

In re Persons formerly known as Winch [2021] EMLR 20 and [2021] EWHC 3284 (QB); [2022] ACD 22; and *D v Persons Unknown* [2021] EWHC 157 (QB). An injunction contra mundum has also been granted where there was a danger of a serious violation of another Convention right, the right to respect for private life: see *OPQ v BJM* [2011] EMLR 23. The approach adopted in these cases has generally been based on the Human Rights Act rather than on principles of wider application. They take the issue raised in the present case little further on the question of principle. The facts of the cases were extreme in imposing real compulsion on the court to do something effective. Above all, the court was driven in each case to make the order by a perception that the risk to the claimants' Convention rights placed it under a positive duty to act. There is no real parallel between the facts in those cases and the facts of a typical Traveller case. The local authority has no Convention rights to protect, and such Convention rights of the public in its locality as a newcomer injunction might protect are of an altogether lower order.

III The next in time is the *Bloomsbury* case [2003] 1 WLR 1633, the facts and reasoning in which were summarised in paras 58–59 above. The case was analysed by Lord Sumption in *Cameron* [2019] 1 WLR 1471 by reference to the distinction which he drew at para 13, as explained earlier, between cases concerned with anonymous defendants who were identifiable but whose names were unknown, such as squatters occupying a property, and cases concerned with defendants, such as most hit and run drivers, who were not only anonymous but could not be identified. The distinction was of critical importance, in Lord Sumption's view, because a defendant in the first category of case could be served with the claim form or other originating process, whereas a defendant in the second category could not, and consequently could not be given such notice of the proceedings as would enable him to be heard, as justice required.

III2 Lord Sumption added at para 15 that where an interim injunction was granted and could be specifically enforced against some property or by notice to third parties who would necessarily be involved in any contempt, the process of enforcing it would sometimes be enough to bring the proceedings to the defendant's attention. He cited *Bloomsbury* as an example, stating:

“the unnamed defendants would have had to identify themselves as the persons in physical possession of copies of the book if they had sought to do the prohibited act, namely disclose it to people (such as newspapers) who had been notified of the injunction.”

III3 Lord Sumption categorised *Cameron* itself as a case in the second category, stating at para 16:

“One does not, however, identify an unknown person simply by referring to something that he has done in the past. ‘The person unknown driving vehicle registration number Y598 SPS who collided with vehicle registration number KGo3 ZJZ on 26 May 2013’, does not identify anyone. It does not enable one to know whether any particular person is the one referred to.”

A Nor was there any specific interim relief, such as an injunction, which could be enforced in a way that would bring the proceedings to the unknown person's attention. The impossibility of service in such a case was, Lord Sumption said, "due not just to the fact that the defendant cannot be found but to the fact that it is not known who the defendant is" (ibid). The alternative service approved by the Court of Appeal—service on the insurer—could not be expected to reach the driver, and would be tantamount to no service at all. Addressing what, if the case had proceeded differently, might have been the heart of the matter, Lord Sumption added that although it might be appropriate to dispense with service if the defendant had concealed his identity in order to evade service, no submission had been made that the court should treat the case as one of evasion of service, and there were no findings which would enable it to do so.

C 114 We do not question the decision in *Cameron*. Nor do we question its essential reasoning: that proceedings should be brought to the notice of a person against whom damages are sought (unless, exceptionally, service can be dispensed with), so that he or she has an opportunity to be heard; that service is the means by which that is effected; and that, in circumstances in which service of the amended claim on the substituted defendant would be impossible (even alternative service being tantamount to no service at all), the judge had accordingly been right to refuse permission to amend.

D 115 That said, with the benefit of the further scrutiny that the point has received on this appeal, we have, with respect, some difficulties with other aspects of Lord Sumption's analysis. In the first place, we agree that it is generally necessary that a defendant should have such notice of the proceedings as will enable him to be heard before any final relief is ordered. E However, there are exceptions to that general rule, as in the case of injunctions granted *contra mundum*, where there is in reality no defendant in the sense which Lord Sumption had in mind. It is also necessary to bear in mind that it is possible for a person affected by an injunction to be heard after a final order has been made, as was explained at para 40 above. F Furthermore, notification, by means of service, and the consequent ability to be heard, is an essentially practical matter. As this court explained in *Abela v Baadarani* [2013] 1 WLR 2043, para 37, service has a number of purposes, but the most important is to ensure that the contents of the document served come to the attention of the defendant. Whether they have done so is a question of fact. If the focus is on whether service can in practice be effected, as we think it should be, then it is unnecessary to carry out the preliminary exercise of classifying cases as falling into either the first or the second of G Lord Sumption's categories.

H 116 We also have reservations about the theory that it is necessary, in order for service to be effective, that the defendant should be identifiable. For example, Lord Sumption cited with approval the case of *Brett Wilson LLP v Persons Unknown* [2016] 4 WLR 69, as illustrating circumstances in which alternative service was legitimate because "it is possible to locate or communicate with the defendant and to identify him as the person described in the claim form" (para 15). That was a case concerned with online defamation. The defendants were described as persons unknown, responsible for the operation of the website on which the defamatory statements were published. Alternative service was effected by sending the claim form to

email addresses used by the website owners, who were providers of a proxy registration service (ie they were registered as the owners of the domain name and licensed its operation by third parties, so that those third parties could not be identified from the publicly accessible database of domain owners). Yet the identities of the defendants were just as unknown as that of the driver in *Cameron*, and remained so after service had been effected: it remained impossible to identify any individuals as the persons described in the claim form. The alternative service was acceptable not because the defendants could be identified, but because, as the judge stated (para 16), it was reasonable to infer that emails sent to the addresses in question had come to their attention.

117 We also have difficulty in fitting the unnamed defendants in *Bloomsbury* [2003] 1 WLR 1633 within Lord Sumption's class of identifiable persons who in due course could be served. It is true that they would have had to identify themselves as the persons referred to if they had sought to do the prohibited act. But if they learned of the injunction and decided to obey it, they would be no more likely to be identified for service than the hit and run driver in *Cameron*. The *Bloomsbury* case also illustrates the somewhat unstable nature of Lord Sumption's distinction between anonymous and unidentifiable defendants. Since the unnamed defendants in *Bloomsbury* were unidentifiable at the time when the claim was commenced and the injunction was granted, one would have thought that the case fell into Lord Sumption's second category. But the fact that the unnamed defendants would have had to identify themselves as the persons in possession of the book if (but only if) they disobeyed the injunction seems to have moved the case into the first category. This implies that it is too absolutist to say that a claimant can never sue persons unknown unless they are identifiable at the time the claim form is issued. For these reasons also, it seems to us that the classification of cases as falling into one or other of Lord Sumption's categories (or into a third category, as suggested by the Court of Appeal in *Canada Goose*, para 63, and in the present case, para 35) may be a distraction from the fundamental question of whether service on the defendant can in practice be effected so as to bring the proceedings to his or her notice.

118 We also note that Lord Sumption's description of *Bloomsbury* and *Gammell* as cases concerned with interim injunctions was influential in the later case of *Canada Goose*. It is true that the order made in *Bloomsbury* was not, in form, a final order, but it was in substance equivalent to a final order: it bound those unknown persons for the entirety of the only relevant period, which was the period leading up to the publication of the book. As for *Gammell*, the reasoning did not depend on whether the injunctions were interim or final in nature. The order in Ms Gammell's case was interim ("until trial or further order"), but the point is less clear in relation to the order made in the accompanying case of Ms Maughan, which stated that "this order shall remain in force until further order".

119 More importantly, we are not comfortable with an analysis of *Bloomsbury* which treats its legitimacy as depending upon its being categorised as falling within a class of case where unnamed defendants may be assumed to become identifiable, and therefore capable of being served in due course, as we shall explain in more detail in relation to the supposed

- A *Gammell* solution, notably included by Lord Sumption in the same class alongside *Bloomsbury*, at para 15 in *Cameron*.

120 We also observe that *Cameron* was not concerned with equitable remedies or equitable principles. Nor was it concerned with newcomers. Understandably, given that the case was an action for damages, Lord Sumption's focus was particularly on the practice of the common law courts and on cases concerned with common law remedies (eg at paras 8 and 18–19). Proceedings in which injunctive relief is sought raise different considerations, partly because an injunction has to be brought to the notice of the defendant before it can be enforced against him or her. In some cases, furthermore, the real target of the injunctive relief is not the unidentified defendant, but the “no cause of action defendants” against whom freezing injunctions, *Norwich Pharmacal* orders, *Bankers Trust* orders and internet blocking orders may be obtained. The result of the orders made against those defendants may be to enable the unnamed defendant then to be identified and served, and effective relief obtained: see, for example, *CMOC Sales and Marketing Ltd v Person Unknown* [2019] Lloyd's Rep FC 62. In other words, the identification of the unknown defendant can depend upon the availability of injunctions which are granted at a stage when that defendant remains unidentifiable. Furthermore, injunctions and other orders which operate contra mundum, to which (as we have already observed) newcomer injunctions can be regarded as analogous, raise issues lying beyond the scope of Lord Sumption's judgment in *Cameron*.

121 It also needs to be borne in mind that the unnamed defendants in *Bloomsbury* formed a tiny class of thieves who might be supposed to be likely to reveal their identity to a media outlet during the very short period when their stolen copy of the book was an item of special value. The main purpose of seeking to continue the injunction against them was not to act as a deterrent to the thieves or even to enable them to be apprehended or committed for contempt, but rather to discourage any media publisher from dealing with them and thereby incurring liability for contempt as an aider and abetter: see *Cameron*, para 10; *Bloomsbury*, para 20. As we have explained (paras 41 and 46 above), it is not unusual in modern practice for an injunction issued against defendants, including persons unknown, to be designed primarily to affect the conduct of non-parties.

122 In that regard, it is to be noted that Lord Sumption's reason for regarding the injunction in *Bloomsbury* as legitimate was not the reason given by the Vice-Chancellor. His justification lay not in the ability to serve persons who identified themselves by breach, but in the absence of any injustice in framing an injunction against a class of unnamed persons provided that the class was sufficiently precisely defined that it could be said of any particular person whether they fell inside or outside the class of persons restrained. That justification may be said to have substantial equitable foundations. It is the same test which defines the validity of a class of discretionary beneficiaries under a trust: see *In re Baden's Deed Trusts* [1971] AC 424, 456. The trust in favour of the class is valid if it can be said of any given postulant whether they are or are not a member of the class.

123 That justification addresses what the Vice-Chancellor may have perceived to be one of the main objections to the joinder of (or the grant of injunctions against) unnamed persons, namely that it is too vague a way of

doing so: see para 7. But it does not seek directly to address the potential for injustice in restraining persons who are not just unnamed, but genuine newcomers: e g in the present context persons who have not at the time when the injunction was granted formed any desire or intention to camp at the prohibited site. The facts of the *Bloomsbury* case make that unsurprising. The unnamed defendants had already stolen copies of the book at the time when the injunction was granted, and it was a fair assumption at the time of the hearing before the Vice-Chancellor that they had formed the intention to make an illicit profit from its disclosure to the media before the launch date. Three had already tried to do so, been identified and arrested. The further injunction was just to catch the one or two (if any) who remained in the shadows and to prevent any publication facilitated by them in the meantime.

124 There is therefore a broad contextual difference between the injunction granted in *Bloomsbury* and the typical newcomer injunction against Travellers. The former was directed against a small group of existing criminals, who could not sensibly be classed as newcomers other than in a purely technical sense, where the risk of loss to the claimants lay within a tight timeframe before the launch date. The typical newcomer injunction against Travellers, on the other hand, is intended to restrain Travellers generally, for as long a period as the court can be persuaded to grant an injunction, and regardless of whether particular Travellers have yet become aware of the prohibited site as a potential camp site. The Vice-Chancellor's analysis does not seek to render joinder as a defendant unnecessary, whereas (as will be explained) the newcomer injunction does. But the case certainly does stand as a precedent for the grant of relief otherwise than on an emergency basis against defendants who, although joined, have yet to be served.

125 We turn next to the supposed *Gammell* [2006] 1 WLR 658 solution, and its apparent approval in *Cameron* as a juridically sound means of joining unnamed defendants by their self-identification in the course of disobeying the relevant injunction. It has the merit of being specifically addressed to newcomer injunctions in the context of Travellers, but in our view it is really no solution at all.

126 The circumstances and reasoning in *Gammell* were explained in paras 63–66 above. For present purposes it is the court's reasons for concluding that Ms Gammell became a defendant when she stationed her caravans on the site which matter. At para 32 Sir Anthony Clarke MR said this:

“In each of these appeals the appellant became a party to the proceedings when she did an act which brought her within the definition of defendant in the particular case . . . In the case of KG she became both a person to whom the injunction was addressed and the defendant when she caused or permitted her caravans to occupy the site. In neither case was it necessary to make her a defendant to the proceedings later.”

The Master of the Rolls' analysis was not directed to a submission that injunctions could not or should not be granted at all against newcomers, as is now advanced on this appeal. No such submission was made. Furthermore, he was concerned only with the circumstances of a person who had both been served with and (by oral explanation) notified of the terms of the

A injunction and who had then continued to disobey it. He was not concerned with the position of a newcomer, wishing to camp on a prohibited site who, after learning of the injunction, simply decided to obey it and move on to another site. Such a person would not, on his analysis, become a defendant at all, even though constrained by the injunction as to their conduct. Service of the proceedings (as opposed to the injunction) was not raised as an issue in that case as the necessary basis for in personam jurisdiction, other than merely for holding the ring. Neither *Cameron* nor *Fourie v Le Roux* had been decided. The real point, unsuccessfully argued, was that the injunction should not have the effect against any particular newcomer of placing them in contempt until a personalised proportionality exercise had been undertaken. The need for a personalised proportionality exercise is also pursued on this appeal as a reason why newcomer injunctions should never be granted against Travellers, and we address it later in this judgment.

C 127 The concept of a newcomer automatically becoming (or self-identifying as) a defendant by disobeying the injunction might therefore be described, in 2005, as a solution looking for a problem. But it became a supposed solution to the problem addressed in this appeal when prayed in aid, first briefly and perhaps tentatively by Lord Sumption in *Cameron* at para 15 and secondly by Sir Geoffrey Vos MR in great detail in the present case, at paras 28, 30–31, 37, 39, 82, 85, 91–92, 94 and 96 and concluding at 99 of the judgment. It may fairly be described as lying at the heart of his reasoning for allowing the appeals, and departing from the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in *Canada Goose*.

D 128 This court is not of course bound to consider the matter, as was the Master of the Rolls, as a question of potentially binding precedent. We have the refreshing liberty of being able to look at the question anew, albeit constrained (although not bound) by the ratio of relevant earlier decisions of this court and of its predecessor. We conduct that analysis in the following paragraphs. While we have no reason to doubt the efficacy of the concept of self-identification as a defendant as a means of dealing with disobedience by a newcomer with an injunction, the propriety of which is not itself under challenge (as it was not in *Gammell*), we are not persuaded that self-identification as a defendant solves the basic problems inherent in granting injunctions against newcomers in the first place.

E 129 The *Gammell* solution, as we have called it, suffers from a number of problems. The most fundamental is that the effect of an injunction against newcomers should be addressed by reference to the paradigm example of the newcomer who can be expected to obey it rather than to act in disobedience to it. As Lord Bingham observed in *South Bucks District Council v Porter* [2003] 2 AC 558 (cited at para 65 above) at para 32, in connection with a possible injunction against Gypsies living in caravans in breach of planning controls, “When granting an injunction the court does not contemplate that it will be disobeyed”. Lord Rodger JSC cited this with approval (at para 17) in the *Meier* case [2009] 1 WLR 2780 (para 67 above). Similarly, Baroness Hale of Richmond JSC stated in the same case at para 39, in relation to an injunction against trespass by persons unknown, “We should assume that people will obey the law, and in particular the targeted orders of the court, rather than that they will not.”

130 A further problem with the *Gammell* solution is that where the defendants are defined by reference to the future act of infringement, a person who breaches the order will, by that very act, become bound by it. The Court of Appeal of Victoria remarked, in relation to similar reasoning in the New Zealand case of *Tony Blain Pty Ltd v Splain* [1993] 3 NZLR 185, that an order of that kind “had the novel feature—which would have appealed to Lewis Carroll—that it became binding upon a person only because that person was already in breach of it”: *Maritime Union of Australia v Patrick Stevedores Operations Pty Ltd* [1998] 4 VR 143, 161.

131 Nevertheless, a satisfactory solution, which respects the procedural rights of all those whose behaviour is constrained by newcomer injunctions, including those who obey them, should if possible be found. The practical need for such injunctions has been demonstrated both in this jurisdiction and elsewhere: see, for example, the Canadian case of *MacMillan Bloedel Ltd v Simpson* [1996] 2 SCR 1048 (where reliance was placed at para 26 on *Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd* [1992] 1 AC 191 as establishing the contra mundum effect even of injunctions inter partes), American cases such as *Joel v Various John Does* (1980) 499 F Supp 791, New Zealand cases such as *Tony Blain Pty Ltd v Splain* (para 130 above), *Earthquake Commission v Unknown Defendants* [2013] NZHC 708 and *Commerce Commission v Unknown Defendants* [2019] NZHC 2609, the Cayman Islands case of *Ernst & Young Ltd v Department of Immigration* 2015 (1) CILR 151, and Indian cases such as *ESPN Software India Pvt Ltd v Tudu Enterprise* (unreported) 18 February 2011.

132 As it seems to us, the difficulty which has been experienced in the English cases, and to which *Gammell* has hitherto been regarded as providing a solution, arises from treating newcomer injunctions as a particular type of conventional injunction inter partes, subject to the usual requirements as to service. The logic of that approach has led to the conclusion that persons affected by the injunction only become parties, and are only enjoined, in the event that they breach the injunction. An alternative approach would begin by accepting that newcomer injunctions are analogous to injunctions and other orders which operate contra mundum, as noted in para 109 above and explained further at paras 155–159 below. Although the persons enjoined by a newcomer injunction should be described as precisely as may be possible in the circumstances, they potentially embrace the whole of humanity. Viewed in that way, if newcomer injunctions operate in the same way as the orders and injunctions to which they are analogous, then anyone who knowingly breaches the injunction is liable to be held in contempt, whether or not they have been served with the proceedings. Anyone affected by the injunction can apply to have it varied or discharged, and can apply to be made a defendant, whether they have obeyed it or disobeyed it, as explained in para 40 above. Although not strictly necessary, those safeguards might also be reflected in provisions of the order: for example, in relation to liberty to apply. We shall return below to the question whether this alternative approach is permissible as a matter of legal principle.

133 As we have explained, the *Gammell* solution was adopted by the Court of Appeal in the present case as a means of overcoming the difficulties arising in relation to final injunctions against newcomers which had been

A identified in *Canada Goose* [2020] 1 WLR 2802. Where, then, does our rejection of the *Gammell* solution leave the reasoning in *Canada Goose*?

134 Although we do not doubt the correctness of the decision in *Canada Goose*, we are not persuaded by the reasoning at paras 89–93, which we summarised at para 103 above. In addition to the criticisms made by the Court of Appeal which we have summarised at para 107 above, and with which we respectfully agree, we would make the following points.

B 135 First, the court's starting point in *Canada Goose* was that there were "some very limited circumstances", such as in *Venables*, in which a final injunction could be granted contra mundum, but that protester actions did not fall within "that exceptional category". Accordingly, "The usual principle, which applies in the present case, is that a final injunction operates only between the parties to the proceedings: *Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd* [1992] 1 AC 191, 224" (para 89). The problem with that approach is that it assumes that the availability of a final injunction against newcomers depends on fitting such injunctions within an existing exclusive category. Such an approach is mistaken in principle, as explained in para 21 above.

D 136 The court buttressed its adoption of the "usual principle" with the observation that it was "consistent with the fundamental principle in *Cameron* . . . that a person cannot be made subject to the jurisdiction of the court without having such notice of the proceedings as will enable him to be heard" (ibid). As we have explained, however, there are means of enabling a person who is affected by a final injunction to be heard after the order has been made, as was discussed in *Bromley* and recognised by the Master of the Rolls in the present case.

E 137 The court also observed at para 92 that "An interim injunction is temporary relief intended to hold the position until trial", and that "Once the trial has taken place and the rights of the parties have been determined, the litigation is at an end". That is an unrealistic view of proceedings of the kind in which newcomer injunctions are generally sought, and an unduly narrow view of the scope of interlocutory injunctions in the modern law, as explained at paras 43–49 above. As we have explained (e.g. at paras 60 and 73 above), there is scarcely ever a trial in proceedings of the present kind, or even adversarial argument; injunctions, even if expressed as being interim or until further order, remain in place for considerable periods of time, sometimes for years; and the proceedings are not at an end until the injunction is discharged.

G 138 We are also unpersuaded by the court's observation that private law remedies are unsuitable "as a means of permanently controlling ongoing public demonstrations by a continually fluctuating body of protesters" (para 93). If that were so, where claimants face the prospect of continuing unlawful disruption of their activities by groups of individuals whose composition changes from time to time, then it seems that the only practical means of obtaining the relief required to vindicate their legal rights would be for them to adopt a rolling programme of applications for interim orders, resulting in litigation without end. That would prioritise formalism over substance, contrary to a basic principle of equity (para 151 below). As we shall explain, there is no overriding reason why the courts cannot devise procedures which enable injunctions to be granted which

prohibit unidentified persons from behaving unlawfully, and which enable such persons subsequently to become parties to the proceedings and to seek to have the injunctions varied or discharged.

139 The developing arguments about the propriety of granting injunctions against newcomers, set against the established principles re-emphasised in *Fourie v Le Roux* and *Cameron*, and then applied in *Canada Goose*, have displayed a tendency to place such injunctions in one or other of two silos: interim and final. This has followed through into the framing of the issues for determination in this appeal and has, perhaps in consequence, permeated the parties' submissions. Thus, it is said by the appellants that the long-established principle that an injunction should be confined to defendants served with the proceedings applies only to final injunctions, which should not therefore be granted against newcomers. Then it is said that since an interim injunction is designed only to hold the ring, pending trial between the parties who have by then been served with the proceedings, its use against newcomers for any other purpose would fall outside the principles which regulate the grant of interim injunctions. Then the respondents (like the Court of Appeal) rely upon the *Gammell* solution (that a newcomer becomes a defendant by acting in breach of the interim injunction) as solving both problems, because it makes them parties to the proceedings leading to the final injunction (even if they then take no part in them) and justifies the interim injunction against newcomers as a way of smoking them out before trial. In sympathy with the Court of Appeal on this point we consider that this constant focus upon the duality of interim and final injunctions is ultimately unhelpful as an analytical tool for solving the problem of injunctions against newcomers. In our view the injunction, in its operation upon newcomers, is typically neither interim nor final, at least in substance. Rather it is, against newcomers, what is now called a without notice (i.e. in the old jargon *ex parte*) injunction, that is an injunction which, at the time when it is ordered, operates against a person who has not been served in due time with the application so as to be able to oppose it, who may have had no notice (even informal) of the intended application to court for the grant of it, and who may not at that stage even be a defendant served with the proceedings in which the injunction is sought. This is so regardless of whether the injunction is in form interim or final.

140 More to the point, the injunction typically operates against a particular newcomer before (if ever) the newcomer becomes a party to the proceedings, as we have explained at paras 129–132 above. An ordinarily law-abiding newcomer, once notified of the existence of the injunction (e.g. by seeing a copy of the order at the relevant site or by reading it on the internet), may be expected to comply with the injunction rather than act in breach of it. At the point of compliance that person will not be a defendant, if the defendants are defined as persons who behave in the manner restrained. Unless they apply to do so they will never become a defendant. If the person is a Traveller, they will simply pass by the prohibited site rather than camp there. They will not identify themselves to the claimant or to the court by any conspicuous breach, nor trigger the *Gammell* process by which, under the current orthodoxy, they are deemed then to become a defendant by self-identification. Even if the order was granted at a formally interim stage, the compliant Traveller will not ever become a party to the

A proceedings. They will probably never become aware of any later order in final form, unless by pure coincidence they pass by the same site again looking for somewhere to camp. Even if they do, and are again dissuaded, this time by the final injunction, they will not have been a party to the proceedings when the final order was made, unless they breached it at the interim stage.

B **141** In considering whether injunctions of this type comply with the standards of procedural and substantive fairness and justice by which the courts direct themselves, it is the compliant (law-abiding) newcomer, not the contemptuous breaker of the injunction, who ought to be regarded as the paradigm in any process of evaluation. Courts grant injunctions on the assumption that they will generally be obeyed, not as stage one in a process intended to lead to committal for contempt: see para 129 above, and the cases there cited, with which we agree. Furthermore the evaluation of potential injustice inherent in the process of granting injunctions against newcomers is more likely to be reliable if there is no assumption that the newcomer affected by the injunction is a person so regardless of the law that they will commit a breach of it, even if the grant necessarily assumes a real risk that they (or a significant number of them) would, but for the injunction, invade the claimant's rights, or the rights (including the planning regime) of those for whose protection the claimant local authority seeks the injunction. That is the essence of the justification for such an injunction.

E **142** Recognition that injunctions against newcomers are in substance always a type of without notice injunction, whether in form interim or final, is in our view the starting point in a reliable assessment of the question whether they should be made at all and, if so, by reference to what principles and subject to what safeguards. Viewed in that way they then need to be set against the established categories of injunction to see whether they fall into an existing legitimate class, or, if not, whether they display features by reference to which they may be regarded as a legitimate extension of the court's practice.

F **143** The distinguishing features of an injunction against newcomers are in our view as follows:

(i) They are made against persons who are truly unknowable at the time of the grant, rather than (like Lord Sumption's class 1 in *Cameron*) identifiable persons whose names are not known. They therefore apply potentially to anyone in the world.

G (ii) They are always made, as against newcomers, on a without notice basis (see para 139 above). However, as we explain below, informal notice of the application for such an injunction may nevertheless be given by advertisement.

H (iii) In the context of Travellers and Gypsies they are made in cases where the persons restrained are unlikely to have any right or liberty to do that which is prohibited by the order, save perhaps Convention rights to be weighed in a proportionality balance. The conduct restrained is typically either a plain trespass or a plain breach of planning control, or both.

(iv) Accordingly, although there are exceptions, these injunctions are generally made in proceedings where there is unlikely to be a real dispute to be resolved, or triable issue of fact or law about the claimant's entitlement, even though the injunction sought is of course always discretionary. They

and the proceedings in which they are made are generally more a form of enforcement of undisputed rights than a form of dispute resolution.

(v) Even in cases where there might in theory be such a dispute, or a real prospect that article 8 rights might prevail, the newcomers would in practice be unlikely to engage with the proceedings as active defendants, even if joined. This is not merely or even mainly because they are newcomers who may by complying with the injunction remain unidentified. Even if identified and joined as defendants, experience has shown that they generally decline to take any active part in the proceedings, whether because of lack of means, lack of pro bono representation, lack of a wish to undertake costs risk, lack of a perceived defence or simply because their wish to camp on any particular site is so short term that it makes more sense to move on than to go to court about continued camping at any particular site or locality.

(vi) By the same token the mischief against which the injunction is aimed, although cumulatively a serious threatened invasion of the claimant's rights (or the rights of the neighbouring public which the local authorities seek to protect), is usually short term and liable, if terminated, just to be repeated on a nearby site, or by different Travellers on the same site, so that the usual processes of eviction, or even injunction against named parties, are an inadequate means of protection.

(vii) For all those reasons the injunction (even when interim in form) is sought for its medium to long term effect even if time-limited, rather than as a means of holding the ring in an emergency, ahead of some later trial process, or even a renewed interim application on notice (and following service) in which any defendant is expected to be identified, let alone turn up and contest.

(viii) Nor is the injunction designed (like a freezing injunction, search order, *Norwich Pharmacal* or *Bankers Trust* order or even an anti-suit injunction) to protect from interference or abuse, or to enhance, some related process of the court. Its purpose, and no doubt the reason for its recent popularity, is simply to provide a more effective, possibly the only effective, means of vindication or protection of relevant rights than any other sanction currently available to the claimant local authorities.

144 Cumulatively those distinguishing features leave us in no doubt that the injunction against newcomers is a wholly new type of injunction with no very closely related ancestor from which it might be described as evolutionary offspring, although analogies can be drawn, as will appear, with some established forms of order. It is in some respects just as novel as were the new types of injunction listed in para 143(viii) above, and it does not even share their family likeness of being developed to protect the integrity and effectiveness of some related process of the courts. As Mr Drabble KC for the appellants tellingly submitted, it is not even that closely related to the established *quia timet* injunction, which depends upon proof that a named defendant has threatened to invade the claimant's rights. Why, he asked, should it be assumed that, just because one group of Travellers have misbehaved on the subject site while camping there temporarily, the next group to camp there will be other than model campers?

145 Faced with the development by the lower courts of what really is in substance a new type of injunction, and with disagreement among them

A about whether there is any jurisdiction or principled basis for granting it, it behoves this court to go back to first principles about the means by which the court navigates such uncharted water. Much emphasis was placed in this context upon the wide generality of the words of section 37 of the 1981 Act. This was cited in para 17 above, but it is convenient to recall its terms:

B “(1) The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so.

“(2) Any such order may be made either unconditionally or on such terms and conditions as the court thinks just.”

C This or a very similar formulation has provided the statutory basis for the grant of injunctions since 1873. But in our view a submission that section 37 tells you all you need to know proves both too much and too little. Too much because, as we have already observed, it is certainly not the case that judges can grant or withhold injunctions purely on their own subjective perception of the justice and convenience of doing so in a particular case. Too little because the statutory formula tells you nothing about the principles which the courts have developed over many years, even centuries, to inform the judge and the parties as to what is likely to be just or convenient.

D **146** Prior to 1873 both the jurisdiction to grant injunctions and the principles regulating their grant lay in the common law, and specifically in that part of it called equity. It was an equitable remedy. From 1873 onwards the jurisdiction to grant injunctions has been confirmed and restated by statute, but the principles upon which they are granted (or withheld) have remained equitable: see *Fourie v Le Roux* [2007] 1 WLR 320 (paras 16 and 17 above) per Lord Scott of Foscote at para 25. Those principles continue to tell the judge what is just and convenient in any particular case. Furthermore, equitable principles generally provide the answer to the question whether settled principles or practice about the general limits or conditions within which injunctions are granted may properly be adjusted over time. The equitable origin of these principles is beyond doubt, and their continuing vitality as an analytical tool may be seen at work from time to time when changes or developments in the scope of injunctive relief are reviewed: see e.g. *Castanho v Brown & Root (UK) Ltd* [1981] AC 557 (para 21 above).

F **147** The expression of the readiness of equity to change and adapt its principles for the grant of equitable relief which has best stood the test of time lies in the following well-known passage from *Spry* (para 17 above) at p 333:

H “The powers of courts with equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctions are, subject to any relevant statutory restrictions, unlimited. Injunctions are granted only when to do so accords with equitable principles, but this restriction involves, not a defect of powers, but an adoption of doctrines and practices that change in their application from time to time. Unfortunately there have sometimes been made observations by judges that tend to confuse questions of jurisdiction or of powers with questions of discretions or of practice. The preferable analysis involves a recognition of the great width of equitable powers, an historical appraisal of the

categories of injunctions that have been established and an acceptance that pursuant to general equitable principles injunctions may issue in new categories when this course appears appropriate.”

148 In *Broad Idea* [2023] AC 389 (para 17 above) at paras 57–58 Lord Leggatt JSC (giving the opinion of the majority of the Board) explained how, via *Broadmoor Special Health Authority v Robinson* [2000] QB 775 and *Cartier International AG v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd* [2017] Bus LR 1 and [2018] 1 WLR 3259, that summary in *Spry* has come to be embedded in English law. The majority opinion in *Broad Idea* also explains why what some considered to be the apparent assumption in *North London Railway Co v Great Northern Railway Co* (1883) 11 QBD 30, 39–40 that the relevant equitable principles became set in stone in 1873 was, and has over time been conclusively proved to be, wrong.

149 The basic general principle by reference to which equity provides a discretionary remedy is that it intervenes to put right defects or inadequacies in the common law. That is frequently because equity perceives that the strict pursuit of a common law right would be contrary to conscience. That underlies, for example, rectification, undue influence and equitable estoppel. But that conscience-based aspect of the principle has no persuasive application in the present context.

150 Of greater relevance is the deep-rooted trigger for the intervention of equity, where it perceives that available common law remedies are inadequate to protect or enforce the claimant’s rights. The equitable remedy of specific performance of a contractual obligation is in substance a form of injunction, and its availability critically depends upon damages being an inadequate remedy for the breach. Closer to home, the inadequacy of the common law remedy of a possession order against squatters under CPR Pt 55 as a remedy for trespass by a fluctuating body of frequently unidentifiable Travellers on different parts of the claimant’s land was treated in *Meier* [2009] 1 WLR 2780 (para 67 above) as a good reason for the grant of an injunction in relation to nearby land which, because it was not yet in the occupation of the defendant Travellers, could not be made the subject of an order for possession. Although the case was not about injunctions against newcomers, and although she was thinking primarily of the better tailoring of the common law remedy, the following observation of Baroness Hale JSC at para 25 is resonant:

“The underlying principle is *ubi ius, ibi remedium*: where there is a right, there should be a remedy to fit the right. The fact that ‘this has never been done before’ is no deterrent to the principled development of the remedy to fit the right, provided that there is proper procedural protection for those against whom the remedy may be granted.”

To the same effect is the dictum of Anderson J (in New Zealand) in *Tony Blain Pty Ltd v Splain* [1993] 3 NZLR 185 (para 130 above) at p 187, cited by Sir Andrew Morritt V-C in *Bloomsbury* [2003] 1 WLR 1633 at para 14.

151 The second relevant general equitable principle is that equity looks to the substance rather than the form. As Lord Romilly MR stated in *Parkin v Thorold* (1852) 16 Beav 59, 66–67:

“Courts of Equity make a distinction in all cases between that which is matter of substance and that which is matter of form; and if it find, that by

- A insisting on the form, the substance will be defeated, it holds it to be inequitable to allow a person to insist on such form, and thereby defeat the substance.”

That principle assists in the present context for two reasons. The first (discussed above) is that it illuminates the debate about the type of injunction with which the court is concerned, here enabling an escape from the twin silos of final and interim and recognising that injunctions against newcomers are all in substance without notice injunctions. The second is that it enables the court to assess the most suitable means of ensuring that a newcomer has a proper opportunity to be heard without being shackled to any particular procedural means of doing so, such as service of the proceedings.

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- C 152 The third general equitable principle is equity’s essential flexibility, as explained at paras 19–22 above. Not only is an injunction always discretionary, but its precise form, and the terms and conditions which may be attached to an injunction (recognised by section 37(2) of the 1981 Act), are highly flexible. This may be illustrated by the lengthy and painstaking development of the search order, from its original form in *Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd* [1976] Ch 55 to the much more sophisticated current form annexed to Practice Direction 25A supplementing CPR Pt 25 and which may be modified as necessary. To a lesser extent a similar process of careful, incremental design accompanied the development of the freezing injunction. The standard form now sanctioned by the CPR is a much more sophisticated version than the original used in *Mareva Cia Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers SA* [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 509. Of course, this flexibility enables not merely incremental development of a new type of injunction over time in the light of experience, but also the detailed moulding of any standard form to suit the justice and convenience of any particular case.
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- E

- F 153 Fourthly, there is no supposed limiting rule or principle apart from justice and convenience which equity has regarded as sacrosanct over time. This is best illustrated by the history of the supposed limiting principle (or even jurisdictional constraint) affecting all injunctions apparently laid down by Lord Diplock in *The Siskina* [1979] AC 210 (para 43 above) that an injunction could only be granted in, or as ancillary to, proceedings for substantive relief in respect of a cause of action in the same jurisdiction. The lengthy process whereby that supposed fundamental principle has been broken down over time until its recent express rejection is described in detail in the *Broad Idea* case [2023] AC 389 and needs no repetition. But it is to be noted the number of types of injunctive or quasi-injunctive relief which quietly by-passed this supposed condition, as explained at paras 44–49 above, including *Norwich Pharmacal* and *Bankers Trust* orders and culminating in internet blocking orders, in none of which was it asserted that the respondent had invaded, or even threatened to invade, some legal right of the applicant.
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- H 154 It should not be supposed that all relevant general equitable principles favour the granting of injunctions against newcomers. Of those that might not, much the most important is the well-known principle that equity acts in personam rather than either in rem or (which may be much the same thing in substance) contra mundum. A main plank in the appellants’

submissions is that injunctions against newcomers are by their nature a form of prohibition aimed, potentially at least, at anyone tempted to trespass or camp (depending upon the drafting of the order) on the relevant land, so that they operate as a form of local law regulating how that land may be used by anyone other than its owner. Furthermore, such an injunction is said in substance to criminalise conduct by anyone in relation to that land which would otherwise only attract civil remedies, because of the essentially penal nature of the sanctions for contempt of court. Not only is it submitted that this offends against the in personam principle, but it also amounts in substance to the imposition of a regime which ought to be the preserve of legislation or at least of byelaws.

155 It will be necessary to take careful account of this objection at various stages of the analysis which follows. At this stage it is necessary to note the following. First, equity has not been blind, or reluctant, to recognise that its injunctions may in substance have a coercive effect which, however labelled, extends well beyond the persons named as defendants (or named as subject to the injunction) in the relevant order. Very occasionally, orders have already been made in something approaching a contra mundum form, as in the *Venables* case already mentioned. More frequently the court has expressly recognised, after full argument, that an injunction against named persons may involve third parties in contempt for conduct in breach of it, where for example that conduct amounts to a contemptuous abuse of the court's process or frustrates the outcome which the court is seeking to achieve: see the *Bloomsbury* case [2003] 1 WLR 1633 and *Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd* [1992] 1 AC 191, discussed at paras 37–41, 61–62 and 121–124 above. In all those examples the court was seeking to preserve confidentiality in, or the intellectual property rights in relation to, specified information, and framed its injunction in a way which would bind anyone into whose hands that information subsequently came.

156 A more widespread example is the way in which a *Mareva* injunction is relied upon by claimants as giving protection against asset dissipation by the defendant. This is not merely (or even mainly) because of its likely effect upon the conduct of the defendant, who may well be a rogue with no scruples about disobeying court orders, but rather its binding effect (once notified to them) upon the defendant's bankers and other reputable custodians of his assets: see *Z Ltd v A-Z and AA-LL* [1982] QB 558 (para 41 above).

157 Courts quietly make orders affecting third parties almost daily, in the form of the embargo upon publication or other disclosure of draft judgments, pending hand-down in public: see para 35 above. It cannot be doubted that if a draft judgment with an embargo in this form came into the hands of someone (such as a journalist) other than the parties or their legal advisors it would be a contempt for that person to publish or disclose it further. Such persons would plainly be newcomers, in the sense in which that term is here being used.

158 It may be said, correctly, that orders of this kind are usually made so as to protect the integrity of the court's process from abuse. Nonetheless they have the effect of attaching to a species of intangible property a legal regime giving rise to a liability, if infringed, which sounds in contempt, regardless of the identity of the infringer. In conceptual terms, and shorn of

A the purpose of preventing abuse, they work in rem or contra mundum in much the same way as an anti-trespass injunction directed at newcomers pinned to a post on the relevant land. The only difference is that the property protected by the former is intangible, whereas in the latter it is land. In relation to any such newcomer (such as the journalist) the embargo is made without notice.

B 159 It is fair comment that a major difference between those types of order and the anti-trespass order is that the latter is expressly made against newcomers as “persons unknown” whereas the former (apart from the exceptional *Venables* type) are not. But if the consequences of breach are the same, and equity looks to the substance rather than to the form, that distinction may be of limited weight.

C 160 Protection of the court’s process from abuse, or preservation of the utility of its future orders, may fairly be said to be the bedrock of many of equity’s forays into new forms of injunction. Thus freezing injunctions are designed to make more effective the enforcement of any ultimate money judgment: see *Broad Idea* [2023] AC 389 at paras 11–21. This is what Lord Leggatt JSC there called the enforcement principle. Search orders are designed to prevent dishonest defendants from destroying relevant documents in advance of the formal process of disclosure. D *Norwich Pharmacal* orders are a form of advance third party disclosure designed to enable a claimant to identify and then sue the wrongdoer. Anti-suit injunctions preserve the integrity of the appropriate forum from forum shopping by parties preferring without justification to litigate elsewhere.

E 161 But internet blocking orders (para 49 above) stand in a different category. The applicant intellectual property owner does not seek assistance from internet service providers (“ISPs”) to enable it to identify and then sue the wrongdoers. It seeks an injunction against the ISP because it is a much more efficient way of protecting its intellectual property rights than suing the numerous wrongdoers, even though it is no part of its case against the ISP that it is, or has even threatened to be, itself a wrongdoer. The injunction is based upon the application of “ordinary principles of equity”: see *Cartier* [2018] 1 WLR 3259 (para 20 above) per Lord Sumption JSC at para 15. Specifically, the principle is that, once notified of the selling of infringing goods through its network, the ISP comes under a duty, but only if so requested by the court, to prevent the use of its facilities to facilitate a wrong by the sellers. The proceedings against the ISP may be the only proceedings which the intellectual property owner intends to take. Proceedings directly against the wrongdoers are usually impracticable, because of difficulty in identifying the operators of the infringing websites, their number and their location, typically in places outside the jurisdiction of the court: see per Arnold J at first instance in *Cartier* [2015] Bus LR 298, para 198.

G 162 The effect of an internet blocking order, or the cumulative effect of such orders against ISPs which share most of the relevant market, is therefore to hinder the wrongdoers from pursuing their infringing sales on the internet, without them ever being named or joined as defendants in the proceedings or otherwise given a procedural opportunity to advance any defence, other than by way of liberty to apply to vary or discharge the order: see again per Arnold J at para 262.

163 Although therefore internet blocking orders are not in form A
injunctions against persons unknown, they do in substance share many of
the supposedly objectionable features of newcomer injunctions, if viewed
from the perspective of those (the infringers) whose wrongdoings are in
substance sought to be restrained. They are, quoad the wrongdoers, made
without notice. They are not granted to hold the ring pending joinder of the
wrongdoers and a subsequent interim hearing on notice, still less a trial. The B
proceedings in which they are made are, albeit in a sense indirectly, a form of
enforcement of rights which are not seriously in dispute, rather than a means
of dispute resolution. They have the effect, when made against the ISPs who
control almost the whole market, of preventing the infringers carrying on
their business from any location in the world on the primary digital platform
through which they seek to market their infringing goods. The infringers C
whose activities are impeded by the injunctions are usually beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the English court. Indeed that is a principal
justification for the grant of an injunction against the ISPs.

164 Viewed in that way, internet blocking orders are in substance more
of a precedent or jumping-off point for the development of newcomer
injunctions than might at first sight appear. They demonstrate the imaginative
way in which equity has provided an effective remedy for the protection and D
enforcement of civil rights, where conventional means of proceeding against
the wrongdoers are impracticable or ineffective, where the objective of
protecting the integrity or effectiveness of related court process is absent,
and where the risk of injustice of a without notice order as against alleged
wrongdoers is regarded as sufficiently met by the preservation of liberty to
them to apply to have the order discharged.

165 We have considered but rejected summary possession orders E
against squatters as an informative precedent. This summary procedure
(avoiding any interim order followed by final order after trial) was originally
provided for by RSC Ord 113, and is now to be found in CPR Pt 55. It is
commonly obtained against persons unknown, and has effect against
newcomers in the sense that in executing the order the bailiff will remove not
merely squatters present when the order was made, but also squatters who F
arrived on the relevant land thereafter, unless they apply to be joined as
defendants to assert a right of their own to remain.

166 Tempting though the superficial similarities may be as between
possession orders against squatters and injunctions against newcomers, they
afford no relevant precedent for the following reasons. First, they are the
creature of the common law rather than equity, being a modern form of the G
old action in ejectment which is at its heart an action in rem rather than in
personam: see *Manchester Corp'n v Connolly* [1970] Ch 420, 428–429 per
Lord Diplock, *McPhail v Persons, Names Unknown* [1973] Ch 447, 457 per
Lord Denning MR and more recently *Meier* [2009] 1 WLR 2780,
paras 33–36 per Baroness Hale JSC. Secondly, possession orders of this kind
are not truly injunctions. They authorise a court official to remove persons
from land, but disobedience to the bailiff does not sound in contempt. H
Thirdly, the possession order works once and for all by a form of execution
which puts the owner of the land back in possession, but it has no ongoing
effect in prohibiting entry by newcomers wishing to camp upon it after the
order has been executed. Its shortcomings in the Traveller context are one of

A the reasons prayed in aid by local authorities seeking injunctions against newcomers as the only practicable solution to their difficulties.

167 These considerations lead us to the conclusion that, although the attempts thus far to justify them are in many respects unsatisfactory, there is no immovable obstacle in the way of granting injunctions against newcomer Travellers, on an essentially without notice basis, regardless of whether in form interim or final, either in terms of jurisdiction or principle. But this by no means leads straight to the conclusion that they ought to be granted, either generally or on the facts of any particular case. They are only likely to be justified as a novel exercise of an equitable discretionary power if:

C (i) There is a compelling need, sufficiently demonstrated by the evidence, for the protection of civil rights (or, as the case may be, the enforcement of planning control, the prevention of anti-social behaviour, or such other statutory objective as may be relied upon) in the locality which is not adequately met by any other measures available to the applicant local authorities (including the making of byelaws). This is a condition which would need to be met on the particular facts about unlawful Traveller activity within the applicant local authority's boundaries.

D (ii) There is procedural protection for the rights (including Convention rights) of the affected newcomers, sufficient to overcome the strong prima facie objection of subjecting them to a without notice injunction otherwise than as an emergency measure to hold the ring. This will need to include an obligation to take all reasonable steps to draw the application and any order made to the attention of all those likely to be affected by it (see paras 226–231 below); and the most generous provision for liberty (ie permission) to apply to have the injunction varied or set aside, and on terms that the grant of the injunction in the meantime does not foreclose any objection of law, practice, justice or convenience which the newcomer so applying might wish to raise.

F (iii) Applicant local authorities can be seen and trusted to comply with the most stringent form of disclosure duty on making an application, so as both to research for and then present to the court everything that might have been said by the targeted newcomers against the grant of injunctive relief.

(iv) The injunctions are constrained by both territorial and temporal limitations so as to ensure, as far as practicable, that they neither outflank nor outlast the compelling circumstances relied upon.

G (v) It is, on the particular facts, just and convenient that such an injunction be granted. It might well not for example be just to grant an injunction restraining Travellers from using some sites as short-term transit camps if the applicant local authority has failed to exercise its power or, as the case may be, discharge its duty to provide authorised sites for that purpose within its boundaries.

H 168 The issues in this appeal have been formulated in such a way that the appellants have the burden of showing that the balancing exercise involved in weighing those competing considerations can never come down in favour of granting such an injunction. We have not been persuaded that this is so. We will address the main objections canvassed by the appellants and, in the next section of this judgment, set out in a little more detail how we conceive that the necessary protection for newcomers' rights should

generally be built into the process for the application for, grant and subsequent monitoring of this type of injunction. A

169 We have already mentioned the objection that an injunction of this type looks more like a species of local law than an in personam remedy between civil litigants. It is said that the courts have neither the skills, the capacity for consultation nor the democratic credentials for making what is in substance legislation binding everyone. In other words, the courts are acting outside their proper constitutional role and are making what are, in effect, local laws. The more appropriate response, it is argued, is for local authorities to use their powers to make byelaws or to exercise their other statutory powers to intervene. B

170 We do not accept that the granting of injunctions of this kind is constitutionally improper. In so far as the local authorities are seeking to prevent the commission of civil wrongs such as trespass, they are entitled to apply to the civil courts for any relief allowed by law. In particular, they are entitled to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the court so as to obtain an injunction against potential trespassers. For the reasons we have explained, courts have jurisdiction to make such orders against persons who are not parties to the action, ie newcomers. In so far as the local authorities are seeking to prevent breaches of public law, including planning law and the law relating to highways, they are empowered to seek injunctions by statutory provisions such as those mentioned in para 45 above. They can accordingly invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the court, which extends, as we have explained, to the granting of newcomer injunctions. The possibility of an alternative non-judicial remedy does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction. C
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171 Although we reject the constitutional objection, we accept that the availability of non-judicial remedies, such as the making of byelaws and the exercise of other statutory powers, may bear on questions (i) and (v) in para 167 above: that is to say, whether there is a compelling need for an injunction, and whether it is, on the facts, just and convenient to grant one. This was a matter which received only cursory examination during the hearing of this appeal. Mr Anderson KC for Wolverhampton submitted (on instructions quickly taken by telephone during the short adjournment) that, in summary, byelaws took too long to obtain (requiring two stages of negotiation with central government), would need to be separately made in relation to each site, would be too inflexible to address changes in the use of the relevant sites (particularly if subject to development) and would unduly criminalise the process of enforcing civil rights. The appellants did not engage with the detail of any of these points, their objection being more a matter of principle. E
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172 We have not been able to reach any conclusions about the issue of practicality, either generally or on the particular facts about the cases before the court. In our view the theoretical availability of byelaws or other measures or powers available to local authorities as a potential alternative remedy is not shown to be a reason why newcomer injunctions should never be granted against Travellers. Rather, the question whether byelaws or other such measures or powers represent a workable alternative is one which should be addressed on a case by case basis. We say more about that in the next section of this judgment. H

A 173 A second main objection in principle was lack of procedural fairness, for which Lord Sumption's observations in *Cameron* were prayed in aid. It may be said that recognition that injunctions against newcomers are in substance without notice injunctions makes this objection all the more stark, because the newcomer does not even know that an injunction is being sought against them when the order is made, so that their inability to attend to oppose is hard-wired into the process regardless of the particular facts.

B 174 This is an objection which applies to all forms of without notice injunction, and explains why they are generally only granted when there is truly no alternative means of achieving the relevant objective, and only for a short time, pending an early return day at which the merits can be argued out between the parties. The usual reason is extreme urgency, but even then it is customary to give informal notice of the hearing of the application to the persons against whom the relief is sought. Such an application used then to be called "ex parte on notice", a partly Latin phrase which captured the point that an application which had not been formally served on persons joined as defendants so as to enable them to attend and oppose it did not in an appropriate case mean that it had to be heard in their absence, or while they were ignorant that it was being made. In the modern world of the CPR, D where "ex parte" has been replaced with "without notice", the phrase "ex parte on notice" admits no translation short of a simple oxymoron. But it demonstrates that giving informal notice of a without notice application is a well-recognised way of minimising the potential for procedural unfairness inherent in such applications. But sometimes even the most informal notice is self-defeating, as in the case of a freezing injunction, where notice may E provoke the respondent into doing exactly that which the injunction is designed to prohibit, and a search order, where notice of any kind is feared to be likely to trigger the bonfire of documents (or disposal of laptops) the prevention of which is the very reason for the application.

175 In the present context notice of the application would not risk defeating its purpose, and there would usually be no such urgency as would justify applying without notice. The absence of notice is simply inherent in F an application for this type of injunction because, quoad newcomers, the applicant has no idea who they might turn out to be. A practice requirement to advertise the intended application, by notices on the relevant sites or on suitable websites, might bring notice of the application to intended newcomers before it came to be made, but this would be largely a matter of happenstance. It would for example not necessarily come to the attention of G a Traveller who had been camping a hundred miles away and who alighted for the first time on the prohibited site some time after the application had been granted.

176 But advertisement in advance might well alert bodies with a mission to protect Travellers' interests, such as the appellants, and enable them to intervene to address the court on the local authority's application with focused submissions as to why no injunction should be granted in the particular case. There is an (imperfect) analogy here with representative H proceedings (paras 27–30 above). There may also be a useful analogy with the long-settled rule in insolvency proceedings which requires that a creditors' winding up petition be advertised before it is heard, in order to give advance notice to stakeholders in the company (such as other creditors)

and the opportunity to oppose the petition, without needing to be joined as defendants. We say more about this and how advance notice of an application for a newcomer injunction might be given to newcomers and persons and bodies representing their interests in the next section of this judgment.

177 It might be thought that the obvious antidote to the procedural unfairness of a without notice injunction would be the inclusion of a liberal right of anyone affected to apply to vary or discharge the injunction, either in its entirety or as against them, with express provision that the applicant need show no change of circumstances, and is free to advance any reason why the injunction should either never have been granted or, as the case may be, should be discharged or varied. Such a right is generally included in orders made on without notice applications, but Mr Drabble KC submitted that it was unsatisfactory for a number of reasons.

178 The first was that, if the injunction was final rather than interim, it would be decisive of the legal merits, and be incapable of being challenged thereafter by raising a defence. We regard this submission as one of the unfortunate consequences of the splitting of the debate into interim and final injunctions. We consider it plain that a without notice injunction against newcomers would not have that effect, regardless of whether it was in interim or final form. An applicant to vary or discharge would be at liberty to advance any reasons which could have been advanced in opposition to the grant of the injunction when it was first made. If that were not implicit in the reservation of liberty to apply (which we think it is), it could easily be made explicit as a matter of practice.

179 Mr Drabble KC's next objection to the utility of liberty to apply was more practical. Many or most Travellers, he said, would be seeking to fulfil their cultural practice of leading a peripatetic life, camping at any particular site for too short a period to make it worth going to court to contest an injunction affecting that site. Furthermore, unless they first camped on the prohibited site there would be no point in applying, but if they did camp there it would place them in breach of the injunction while applying to vary it. If they camped elsewhere so as to comply with the injunction, their rights (if any) would have been interfered with, in circumstances where there would be no point in having an expensive and risky legal argument about whether they should have been allowed to camp there in the first place.

180 There is some force in this point, but we are not persuaded that the general disinclination of Travellers to apply to court really flows from the newcomer injunctions having been granted on a without notice application. If for example a local authority waited for a group of Travellers to camp unlawfully before serving them with an application for an injunction, the Travellers might move to another site rather than raise a defence to the prevention of continued camping on the original site. By the time the application came to be heard, the identified group would have moved on, leaving the local authority to clear up, and might well have been replaced by another group, equally unidentifiable in advance of their arrival.

181 There are of course exceptions to this pattern of temporary camping as trespassers, as when Travellers buy a site for camping on, and are then proceeded against for breach of planning control rather than for

- A trespass: see e.g. the *Gammell* case and the appeal in *Bromley London Borough Council v Maughan* heard at the same time. In such a case the potential procedural injustice of a without notice injunction might well be sufficient to require the local authority to proceed against the owners of the site on notice, in the usual way, not least because there would be known targets capable of being served with the proceedings, and any interim application made on notice. But the issue on this appeal is not whether newcomer injunctions against Travellers are always justified, but rather whether the objections are such that they never are.

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- 182 The next logical objection (although little was made of it on this appeal) is that an injunction of this type made on the application of a local authority doing its duty in the public interest is not generally accompanied by a cross-undertaking in damages. There is of course a principled reason why public bodies doing their public duty are relieved of this burden (see *Financial Services Authority v Sinaloa Gold plc* [2013] 2 AC 28), and that reasoning has generally been applied in newcomer injunction cases against Travellers where the applicant is a local authority. We address this issue further in the next section of this judgment (at para 234) and it would be wrong for us to express more definite views on it, in the absence of any submissions about it. In any event, if this were otherwise a decisive reason why an injunction of this type should never be granted, it may be assumed that local authorities, or some of them, would prefer to offer a cross undertaking rather than be deprived of the injunction.

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- 183 The appellants' final main point was that it would always be impossible when considering the grant of an injunction against newcomers to conduct an individualised proportionality analysis, because each potential target Traveller would have their own particular circumstances relevant to a balancing of their article 8 rights against the applicant's claim for an injunction. If no injunction could ever be granted in the absence of an individualised proportionality analysis of the circumstances of every potential target, then it may well be that no newcomer injunction could ever be granted against Travellers. But we reject that premise. To the extent that a particular Traveller who became the subject of a newcomer injunction wished to raise particular circumstances applicable to them and relevant to the proportionality analysis, this would better be done under the liberty to apply if, contrary to the general disinclination or inability of Travellers to go to court, they had the determination to do so.

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- 184 We have already briefly mentioned Mr Drabble KC's point about the inappropriateness of an injunction against one group of Travellers based only upon the disorderly conduct of an earlier group. This is in our view just an evidential point. A local authority that sought a borough-wide injunction based solely upon evidence of disorderly conduct by a single group of campers at a single site would probably fail the test in any event. It will no doubt be necessary to adduce evidence which justifies a real fear of widespread repetition. Beyond that, the point goes nowhere towards constituting a reason why such injunctions should never be granted.

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- 185 The point was made by Stephanie Harrison KC for Friends of the Earth (intervening because of the implications of this appeal for protesters) that the potential for a newcomer injunction to cause procedural injustice was not regulated by any procedure rules or practice statements under the

CPR. Save in relation to certain statutory applications referred to in para 51 above this is true at present, but it is not a good reason to inhibit equity's development of a new type of injunction. A review of the emergence of freezing injunctions and search orders shows how the necessary procedural checks and balances were first worked out over a period of development by judges in particular cases, then addressed by textbook writers and academics and then, at a late stage in the developmental process, reduced to rules and practice directions. This is as it should be. Rules and practice statements are appropriate once experience has taught judges and practitioners what are the risks of injustice that need to be taken care of by standard procedures, but their reduction to settled (and often hard to amend) standard form too early in the process of what is in essence judge-made law would be likely to inhibit rather than promote sound development. In the meantime, the courts have been actively reviewing what these procedural protections should be, as for example in the *Ineos* and *Bromley* cases (paras 86–95 above). We elaborate important aspects of the appropriate protections in the next section of this judgment.

186 Drawing all these threads together, we are satisfied that there is jurisdiction (in the sense of power) in the court to grant newcomer injunctions against Travellers, and that there are principled reasons why the exercise of that power may be an appropriate exercise of the court's equitable discretion, where the general conditions set out in para 167 above are satisfied. While some of the objections relied upon by the appellants may amount to good reasons why an injunction should not be granted in particular cases, those objections do not, separately or in the aggregate, amount to good reason why such an injunction should never be granted. That is the question raised by this appeal.

5. The process of application for, grant and monitoring of newcomer injunctions and protection for newcomers' rights

187 We turn now to consider the practical application of the principles affecting an application for a newcomer injunction against Gypsies and Travellers, and the safeguards that should accompany the making of such an order. As we have mentioned, these are matters to which judges hearing such applications have given a good deal of attention, as has the Court of Appeal in considering appeals against the orders they have made. Further, the relevant principles and safeguards will inevitably evolve in these and other cases in the light of experience. Nevertheless, they do have a bearing on the issues of principle we have to decide, in that we must be satisfied that the points raised by the appellants do not, individually or collectively, preclude the grant of what are in some ways final (but regularly reviewable) injunctions that prevent persons who are unknown and unidentifiable at the date of the order from trespassing on and occupying local authority land. We have also been invited to give guidance on these matters so far as we feel able to do so having regard to our conclusions as to the nature of newcomer injunctions and the principles applicable to their grant.

(1) Compelling justification for the remedy

188 Any applicant for the grant of an injunction against newcomers in a Gypsy and Traveller case must satisfy the court by detailed evidence that

A there is a compelling justification for the order sought. This is an overarching principle that must guide the court at all stages of its consideration (see para 167(i)).

B 189 This gives rise to three preliminary questions. The first is whether the local authority has complied with its obligations (such as they are) properly to consider and provide lawful stopping places for Gypsies and Travellers within the geographical areas for which it is responsible. The second is whether the authority has exhausted all reasonable alternatives to the grant of an injunction, including whether it has engaged in a dialogue with the Gypsy and Traveller communities to try to find a way to accommodate their nomadic way of life by giving them time and assistance to find alternative or transit sites, or more permanent accommodation. The third is whether the authority has taken appropriate steps to control or even prohibit unauthorised encampments and related activities by using the other measures and powers at its disposal. To some extent the issues raised by these questions will overlap. Nevertheless, their importance is such that they merit a degree of separate consideration, at least at this stage. A failure by the local authority in one or more of these respects may make it more difficult to satisfy a court that the relief it seeks is just and convenient.

D (i) An obligation or duty to provide sites for Gypsies and Travellers

190 The extent of any obligation on local authorities in England to provide sufficient sites for Gypsies and Travellers in the areas for which they are responsible has changed over time.

E 191 The starting point is section 23 of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 (“CSCDA 1960”) which gave local authorities the power to close common land to Gypsies and Travellers. As Sedley J observed in *R v Lincolnshire County Council, Ex p Atkinson* (1995) 8 Admin LR 529, local authorities used this power with great energy. But they made little or no corresponding use of the related powers conferred on them by section 24 of the CSCDA 1960 to provide sites where caravans might be brought, whether for temporary purposes or for use as permanent residences, and in that way compensate for the closure of the commons. As a result, it became increasingly difficult for Travellers and Gypsies to pursue their nomadic way of life.

G 192 In the light of the problems caused by the CSCDA 1960, section 6 of the Caravan Sites Act 1968 (“CSA 1968”) imposed on local authorities a duty to exercise their powers under section 24 of the CSCDA 1960 to provide adequate accommodation for Gypsies and Travellers residing in or resorting to their areas. The appellants accept that in the years that followed many sites for Gypsies and Travellers were established, but they contend with some justification that these sites were not and have never been enough to meet all the needs of these communities.

H 193 Some 25 years later, the CJPOA repealed section 6 of the CSA 1968. But the *power* to provide sites for Travellers and Gypsies remained. This is important for it provides a way to give effect to the assessment by local authorities of the needs of these communities, and these are matters we address below.

194 The position in Wales is rather different. Any local authority applying for a newcomer injunction affecting Wales must consider the

impact of any legislation specifically affecting that jurisdiction including the Housing (Wales) Act 2014 (“H(W)A 2014”). Section 101(1) of the H(W)A 2014 imposes on the authority a duty to “carry out an assessment of the accommodation needs of Gypsies and Travellers residing in or resorting to its area”. If the assessment identifies that the provision of sites is inadequate to meet the accommodation needs of Gypsies and Travellers in its area and the assessment is approved by the Welsh Ministers, the authority has a *duty* to exercise its powers to meet those needs under section 103 of the H(W)A 2014.

(ii) General “needs” assessments

195 For many years there has been an obligation on local authorities to carry out an assessment of the accommodation needs of Gypsies and Travellers when carrying out their periodic review of housing needs under section 8 of the Housing Act 1985.

196 This obligation was first imposed by section 225 of the Housing Act 2004. This measure was repealed by section 124 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016. Instead, the duty of local housing authorities in England to carry out a periodic review of housing needs under section 8 of the Housing Act 1985 has since 2016 included (at section 8(3)) a duty to consider the needs of people residing in or resorting to their district with respect to the provision of sites on which caravans can be stationed.

(iii) Planning policy

197 Since about 1994, and with the repeal of the statutory duty to provide sites, the general issue of Traveller site provision has come increasingly within the scope of planning policy, just as the government anticipated.

198 Indeed, in 1994, the government published planning advice on the provision of sites for Gypsies and Travellers in the form of Department of the Environment Circular 1/94 entitled *Gypsy Sites and Planning*. This explained that the repeal of the statutory duty to provide sites was expected to lead to more applications for planning permission for sites. Local planning authorities (“LPAs”) were advised to assess the needs of Gypsies and Travellers within their areas and to produce a plan which identified suitable *locations* for sites (location-based policies) and if this could not be done, to explain the *criteria* for the selection of appropriate locations (criteria-based policies). Unfortunately, despite this advice, most attempts to secure permission for Gypsy and Traveller sites were refused and so the capacity of the relatively few sites authorised for occupation by these nomadic communities continued to fall well short of that needed, as Lord Bingham explained in *South Bucks District Council v Porter* [2003] 2 AC 558, at para 13.

199 The system for local development planning in England is now established by the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 (“PCPA 2004”) and the regulations made under it. Part 2 of the PCPA 2004 deals with local development and stipulates that the LPA is to prepare a development scheme and plan; that this must set out the authority’s policies; that in preparing the local development plan, the authority must have regard to national policy; that each plan must be sent to the Secretary of State for

A independent examination and that the purpose of this examination is, among other things, to assess its soundness and that will itself involve an assessment whether it is consistent with national policy.

200 Meantime, the advice in Circular 1/94 having failed to achieve its purpose, the government has from time to time issued new planning advice on the provision of sites for Gypsies and Travellers in England, and that advice may be taken to reflect national policy.

B 201 More specifically, in 2006 advice was issued in the form of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Circular 1/06 *Planning for Gypsy and Traveller Caravan Sites*. The 2006 guidance was replaced in March 2012 by *Planning Policy for Traveller Sites* (“PPTS 2012”). In August 2015, a revised version of PPTS 2012 was issued (“PPTS 2015”) and this is to be read with the National Planning Policy Framework. There has recently been a challenge to a decision refusing planning permission on the basis that one aspect of PPTS 2015 amounts to indirect discrimination and has no proper justification: *Smith v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government* [2023] PTSR 312. But for present purposes it is sufficient to say (and it remains the case) that there is in these policy documents clear advice that LPAs should, when producing their local plans, identify and update annually a supply of specific deliverable sites sufficient to provide five years’ worth of sites against their locally set targets to address the needs of Gypsies and Travellers for permanent and transit sites. They should also identify a supply of specific, developable sites or broad locations for growth for years 6–10 and even, where possible, years 11–15. The advice is extensive and includes matters to which LPAs must have regard including, among other things, the presumption in favour of sustainable development; the possibility of cross-authority co-operation; the surrounding population’s size and density; the protection of local amenities and the environment; the need for appropriate land supply allocations and to respect the interests of the settled communities; the need to ensure that Traveller sites are sustainable and promote peaceful and integrated co-existence with the local communities; and the need to promote access to appropriate health services and schools. The LPAs are also advised to consider the need to avoid placing undue pressure on local infrastructure and services, and to provide a settled base that reduces the need for long distance travelling and possible environmental damage caused by unauthorised encampments.

F 202 The availability of transit sites (and information as to where they may be found) is also important in providing short-term or temporary accommodation for Gypsies and Travellers moving through a local authority area, and an absence of sufficient transit sites in an area (or information as to where available sites may be found) may itself be a sufficient reason for refusing a newcomer injunction.

(iv) Consultation and co-operation

H 203 This is another matter of considerable importance, and it is one with which all local authorities should willingly engage. We have no doubt that local authorities, other responsible bodies and representatives of the Gypsy and Traveller communities would benefit from a dialogue and co-operation to understand their respective needs; the concerns of the local authorities, local charities, business and community groups and members

of the public; and the resources available to the local authorities for deployment to meet the needs of these nomadic communities having regard to the wider obligations which the authorities must also discharge. In this way a deeper level of trust may be established and so facilitate and encourage a constructive approach to the implementation of proportionate solutions to the problems the nomadic communities continue to present, without immediate and expensive recourse to applications for injunctive relief or enforcement action.

(v) Public spaces protection orders

204 The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 confers on local authorities the power to make public spaces protection orders (“PSPOs”) to prohibit encampments on specific land. PSPOs are in some respects similar to byelaws and are directed at behaviour and activities carried on in a public place which, for example, have a detrimental effect on the quality of life of those in the area, are or are likely to be persistent or continuing, and are or are likely to be such as to make the activities unreasonable. Further, PSPOs are in general easier to make than byelaws because they do not require the involvement of central government or extensive consultation. Breach of a PSPO without reasonable excuse is a criminal offence and can be enforced by a fixed penalty notice or prosecution with a maximum fine of level three on the standard scale. But any PSPO must be reasonable and necessary to prevent the conduct and detrimental effects at which it is targeted. A PSPO takes precedence over any byelaw in so far as there is any overlap.

(vi) Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994

205 The CJPOA empowers local authorities to deal with unauthorised encampments that are causing damage or disruption or involve vehicles, and it creates a series of related offences. It is not necessary to set out full details of all of them. The following summary gives an idea of their range and scope.

206 Section 61 of the CJPOA confers powers on the police to deal with two or more persons who they reasonably believe are trespassing on land with the purpose of residing there. The police can direct these trespassers to leave (and to remove any vehicles) if the occupier has taken reasonable steps to ask them to leave and they have caused damage, disruption or distress as those concepts are elucidated in section 61(10). Failure to leave within a reasonable time or, if they do leave, a return within three months is an offence punishable by imprisonment or a fine. A defence of reasonable excuse may be available in particular cases.

207 Following amendment in 2003, section 62A of the CJPOA confers on the police a power to direct trespassers with vehicles to leave land at the occupier’s request, and that is so even if the trespassers have not caused damage or used threatening behaviour. Where trespassers have at least one vehicle between them and are there with the common purpose of residing there, the police, (if so requested by the occupier) have the power to direct a trespasser to leave and to remove any vehicle or property, subject to this proviso: if they have caravans that (after consultation with the relevant local

A authorities) there is a suitable pitch available on a site managed by the authority or social housing provider in that area.

208 Focusing more directly on local authorities, section 77 of the CJPOA confers on the local authority a power to direct campers to leave open-air land where it appears to the authority that they are residing in a vehicle within its area, whether on a highway, on unoccupied land or on occupied land without the consent of the occupier. There is no need to establish that these activities have caused damage or disruption. The direction must be served on each person to whom it applies, and that may be achieved by directing it to all occupants of vehicles on the land; and failing other effective service, it may be affixed to the vehicles in a prominent place. Relevant documents should also be displayed on the land in question. It is an offence for persons who know that such an order has been made against them to fail to comply with it.

(vii) Byelaws

209 There is a measure of agreement by all parties before us that the power to make and enforce byelaws may also have a bearing on the issues before us in this appeal. Byelaws are a form of delegated legislation made by local authorities under an enabling power. They commonly require something to be done or refrained from in a particular area or location. Once implemented, byelaws have the force of law within the areas to which they apply.

210 There is a wide range of powers to make byelaws. By way of example, a general power to make byelaws for good rule and government and for the prevention and suppression of nuisances in their areas is conferred on district councils in England and London borough councils by section 235(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 (“the LGA 1972”). The general confirming authority in relation to byelaws made under this section is the Secretary of State.

211 We would also draw attention to section 15 of the Open Spaces Act 1906 which empowers local authorities in England to make byelaws for the regulation of open spaces, for the imposition of a penalty for breach and for the removal of a person infringing the byelaw by an officer of the local authority or a police constable. Notable too is section 164 of the Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict c 55) which confers a power on the local authority to make byelaws for the regulation of public walks and pleasure grounds and for the removal of any person infringing any such byelaw, and under section 183, to impose penalties for breach.

212 Other powers to make byelaws and to impose penalties for breach are conferred on authorities in relation to commons by, for example, the Commons Act 1899 (62 & 63 Vict c 30).

213 Appropriate authorities are also given powers to make byelaws in relation to nature reserves by the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 (12, 13 & 14 Geo 6, c 97) (as amended by the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006); in relation to National Parks and areas of outstanding natural beauty under sections 90 and 91 of the 1949 Act (as amended); concerning the protection of country parks under section 41 of the Countryside Act 1968; and for the protection and

preservation of other open country under section 17 of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000. A

214 We recognise that byelaws are sometimes subjected to detailed and appropriate scrutiny by the courts in assessing whether they are reasonable, certain in their terms and consistent with the general law, and whether the local authority had the power to make them. It is an aspect of the third of these four elements that generally byelaws may only be made if provision for the same purpose is not made under any other enactment. Similarly, a byelaw may be invalidated if repugnant to some basic principle of the common law. Further, as we have seen, the usual method of enforcement of byelaws is a fine although powers to seize and retain property may also be included (see, for example, section 237ZA of the LGA 1972), as may powers to direct removal. B

215 The opportunity to make and enforce appropriate elements of this battery of potential byelaws, depending on the nature of the land in issue and the form of the intrusion, may seem at first sight to provide an important and focused way of dealing with unauthorised encampments, and it is a rather striking feature of these proceedings that byelaws have received very little attention from local authorities. Indeed, Wolverhampton City Council has accepted, through counsel, that byelaws were not considered as a means of addressing unauthorised encampments in the areas for which it is responsible. It maintains they are unlikely to be sufficient and effective in the light of (a) the existence of legislation which may render the byelaws inappropriate; (b) the potential effect of criminalising behaviour; (c) the issue of identification of newcomers; and (d) the modest size of any penalty for breach which is unlikely to be an effective deterrent. C

216 We readily appreciate that the nature of travelling communities and the respondents to newcomer injunctions may not lend themselves to control by or yield readily to enforcement of these various powers and measures, including byelaws, alone, but we are not persuaded that the use of byelaws or other enforcement action of the kinds we have described can be summarily dismissed. Plainly, we cannot decide in this appeal whether the reaction of Wolverhampton City Council to the use of all of these powers and measures including byelaws is sound or not. We have no doubt, however, that this is a matter that ought to be the subject of careful consideration on the next review of the injunctions in these cases or on the next application for an injunction against persons unknown, including newcomers. D

(viii) A need for review E

217 Various aspects of this discussion merit emphasis at this stage. Local authorities have a range of measures and powers available to them to deal with unlawful encampments. Some but not all involve the enactment and enforcement of byelaws. Many of the offences are punishable with fixed or limited penalties, and some are the subject of specified defences. It may be said that these form part of a comprehensive suite of measures and powers and associated penalties and safeguards which the legislature has considered appropriate to deal with the threat of unauthorised encampments by Gypsies and Travellers. We rather doubt that is so, particularly when dealing with communities of unidentified trespassers including newcomers. F

- A But these are undoubtedly matters that must be explored upon the review of these orders.

(2) *Evidence of threat of abusive trespass or planning breach*

- B 218 We now turn to more general matters and safeguards. As we have foreshadowed, any local authority applying for an injunction against persons unknown, including newcomers, in Gypsy and Traveller cases must satisfy the court by full and detailed evidence that there is a compelling justification for the order sought (see para 167(i) above). There must be a strong probability that a tort or breach of planning control or other aspect of public law is to be committed and that this will cause real harm. Further, the threat must be real and imminent. We have no doubt that local authorities are well equipped to prepare this evidence, supported by copies of all relevant documents, just as they have shown themselves to be in making applications for injunctions in this area for very many years.

- C 219 The full disclosure duty is of the greatest importance (see para 167(iii)). We consider that the relevant authority must make full disclosure to the court not just of all the facts and matters upon which it relies but also and importantly, full disclosure of all facts, matters and arguments of which, after reasonable research, it is aware or could with reasonable diligence ascertain and which might affect the decision of the court whether to grant, maintain or discharge the order in issue, or the terms of the order it is prepared to make or maintain. This is a continuing obligation on any local authority seeking or securing such an order, and it is one it must fulfil having regard to the one-sided nature of the application and the substance of the relief sought. Where relevant information is discovered after the making of the order the local authority may have to put the matter back before the court on a further application.

E 220 The evidence in support of the application must therefore err on the side of caution; and the court, not the local authority, should be the judge of relevance.

- F (3) *Identification or other definition of the intended respondents to the application*

- G 221 The actual or intended respondents to the application must be defined as precisely as possible. In so far as it is possible actually to identify persons to whom the order is directed (and who will be enjoined by its terms) by name or in some other way, as Lord Sumption explained in *Cameron* [2019] 1 WLR 1471, the local authority ought to do so. The fact that a precautionary injunction is also sought against newcomers or other persons unknown is not of itself a justification for failing properly to identify these persons when it is possible to do so, and serving them with the proceedings and order, if necessary, by seeking an order for substituted service. It is only permissible to seek or maintain an order directed to newcomers or other persons unknown where it is impossible to name or identify them in some other and more precise way. Even where the persons sought to be subjected to the injunction are newcomers, the possibility of identifying them as a class by reference to conduct prior to what would be a breach (and, if necessary, by reference to intention) should be explored and adopted if possible.

(4) The prohibited acts

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222 It is always important that an injunction spells out clearly and in everyday terms the full extent of the acts it prohibits, and this is particularly so where it is sought against persons unknown, including newcomers. The terms of the injunction—and therefore the prohibited acts—must correspond as closely as possible to the actual or threatened unlawful conduct. Further, the order should extend no further than the minimum necessary to achieve the purpose for which it was granted; and the terms of the order must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable persons affected by it to know what they must not do.

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223 Further, if and in so far as the authority seeks to enjoin any conduct which is lawful viewed on its own, this must also be made absolutely clear, and the authority must be prepared to satisfy the court that there is no other more proportionate way of protecting its rights or those of others.

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224 It follows but we would nevertheless emphasise that the prohibited acts should not be described in terms of a legal cause of action, such as trespass or nuisance, unless this is unavoidable. They should be defined, so far as possible, in non-technical and readily comprehensible language which a person served with or given notice of the order is capable of understanding without recourse to professional legal advisers.

D

(5) Geographical and temporal limits

225 The need for strict temporal and territorial limits is another important consideration (see para 167(iv)). One of the more controversial aspects of many of the injunctions granted hitherto has been their duration and geographical scope. These have been subjected to serious criticism, at least some of which we consider to be justified. We have considerable doubt as to whether it could ever be justifiable to grant a Gypsy or Traveller injunction which is directed to persons unknown, including newcomers, and extends over the whole of a borough or for significantly more than a year. It is to be remembered that this is an exceptional remedy, and it must be a proportionate response to the unlawful activity to which it is directed. Further, we consider that an injunction which extends borough-wide is likely to leave the Gypsy and Traveller communities with little or no room for manoeuvre, just as Coulson LJ warned might well be the case (see generally, *Bromley* [2020] PTSR 1043, paras 99–109. Similarly, injunctions of this kind must be reviewed periodically (as Sir Geoffrey Vos MR explained in these appeals at paras 89 and 108) and in our view ought to come to an end (subject to any order of the judge), by effluxion of time in all cases after no more than a year unless an application is made for their renewal. This will give all parties an opportunity to make full and complete disclosure to the court, supported by appropriate evidence, as to how effective the order has been; whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made.

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(6) Advertising the application in advance

226 We recognise that it would be impossible for a local authority to give effective notice to all newcomers of its intention to make an application for an injunction to prevent unauthorised encampments on its land. That is the

A basis on which we have proceeded. On the other hand, in the interests of procedural fairness, we consider that any local authority intending to make an application of this kind must take reasonable steps to draw the application to the attention of persons likely to be affected by the injunction sought or with some other genuine and proper interest in the application (see para 167(ii) above). This should be done in sufficient time before the application is heard to allow those persons (or those representing them or their interests) to make focused submissions as to whether it is appropriate for an injunction to be granted and, if it is, as to the terms and conditions of any such relief.

B 227 Here the following further points may also be relevant. First, local authorities have now developed ways to give effective notice of the grant of such injunctions to those likely to be affected by them, and they do so by the use of notices attached to the land and in other ways as we describe in the next section of this judgment. These same methods, appropriately modified, could be used to give notice of the application itself. As we have also mentioned, local authorities have been urged for some time to establish lines of communication with Traveller and Gypsy communities and those representing them, and all these lines of communication, whether using email, social media, advertisements or some other form, could be used by authorities to give notice to these communities and other interested persons and bodies of any applications they are proposing to make.

C 228 Secondly, we see merit in requiring any local authority making an application of this kind to explain to the court what steps it has taken to give notice of the application to persons likely to be affected by it or to have a proper interest in it, and of all responses it has received.

D 229 These are all matters for the judges hearing these applications to consider in light of the particular circumstances of the cases before them, and in this way to allow an appropriate practice to develop.

(7) Effective notice of the order

F 230 We are not concerned in this part of our judgment with whether respondents become party to the proceedings on service of the order upon them, but rather with the obligation on the local authority to take steps actively to draw the order to the attention of all actual and potential respondents; to give any person potentially affected by it full information as to its terms and scope, and the consequences of failing to comply with it; and how any person affected by its terms may make an application for its variation or discharge (again, see para 167(ii) above).

G 231 Any applicant for such an order must in our view make full and complete disclosure of all the steps it proposes to take (i) to notify all persons likely to be affected by its terms; and (ii) to ascertain the names and addresses of all such persons who are known only by way of description. This will no doubt include placing notices in and around the relevant sites where this is practicable; placing notices on appropriate websites and in relevant publications; and giving notice to relevant community and charitable and other representative groups.

(8) Liberty to apply to discharge or vary

H 232 As we have mentioned, we consider that an order of this kind ought always to include generous liberty to any person affected by its terms to

apply to vary or discharge the whole or any part of the order (again, see para 167(ii) above). This is so whether the order is interim or final in form, so that a respondent can challenge the grant of the injunction on any grounds which might have been available at the time of its grant.

(9) Costs protection

233 This is a difficult subject, and it is one on which we have received little assistance. We have considerable concern that costs of litigation of this kind are way beyond the means of most if not all Gypsies and Travellers and many interveners, as counsel for the first interveners, Friends of the Earth, submitted. This raises the question whether the court has jurisdiction to make a protective or costs capping order. This is a matter to be considered on another day by the judge making or continuing the order. We can see the benefit of such an order in an appropriate case to ensure that all relevant arguments are properly ventilated, and the court is equipped to give general guidance on the difficult issues to which it may give rise.

(10) Cross-undertaking

234 This is another important issue for another day. But a few general points may be made at this stage. It is true that this new form of injunction is not an interim order, and it is not in any sense holding the ring until the final determination of the merits of the claim at trial. Further, so far as the applicant is a public body acting in pursuance of its public duty, a cross undertaking may not in any event be appropriate. Nevertheless, there may be occasions where a cross undertaking is considered appropriate, for reasons such as those given by Warby J in *Birmingham City Council v Afsar* [2019] EWHC 1619 (QB), a protest case. These are matters to be considered on a case-by-case basis, and the applicant must equip the court asked to make or continue the order with the most up-to-date guidance and assistance.

(11) Protest cases

235 The emphasis in this discussion has been on newcomer injunctions in Gypsy and Traveller cases and nothing we have said should be taken as prescriptive in relation to newcomer injunctions in other cases, such as those directed at protesters who engage in direct action by, for example, blocking motorways, occupying motorway gantries or occupying HS2's land with the intention of disrupting construction. Each of these activities may, depending on all the circumstances, justify the grant of an injunction against persons unknown, including newcomers. Any of these persons who have notice of the order will be bound by it, just as effectively as the injunction in the proceedings the subject of this appeal has bound newcomer Gypsies and Travellers.

236 Counsel for the Secretary of State for Transport has submitted and we accept that each of these cases has called for a full and careful assessment of the justification for the order sought, the rights which are or may be interfered with by the grant of the order, and the proportionality of that interference. Again, in so far as the applicant seeks an injunction against newcomers, the judge must be satisfied there is a compelling need for the order. Often the circumstances of these cases vary significantly one from another in terms of the range and number of people who may be affected by the making or refusal of the injunction sought; the legal right to be protected;

- A the illegality to be prevented; and the rights of the respondents to the application. The duration and geographical scope of the injunction necessary to protect the applicant's rights in any particular case are ultimately matters for the judge having regard to the general principles we have explained.

(12) *Conclusion*

- B 237 There is nothing in this consideration which calls into question the development of newcomer injunctions as a matter of principle, and we are satisfied they have been and remain a valuable and proportionate remedy in appropriate cases. But we also have no doubt that the various matters to which we have referred must be given full consideration in the particular proceedings the subject of these appeals, if necessary at an appropriate and early review.

6. *Outcome*

- 238 For the reasons given above we would dismiss this appeal. Those reasons differ significantly from those given by the Court of Appeal, but we consider that the orders which they made were correct. There follows a short summary of our conclusions:

- D (i) The court has jurisdiction (in the sense of power) to grant an injunction against "newcomers", that is, persons who at the time of the grant of the injunction are neither defendants nor identifiable, and who are described in the order only as persons unknown. The injunction may be granted on an interim or final basis, necessarily on an application without notice.

- E (ii) Such an injunction (a "newcomer injunction") will be effective to bind anyone who has notice of it while it remains in force, even though that person had no intention and had made no threat to do the act prohibited at the time when the injunction was granted and was therefore someone against whom, at that time, the applicant had no cause of action. It is inherently an order with effect contra mundum, and is not to be justified on the basis that those who disobey it automatically become defendants.

- F (iii) In deciding whether to grant a newcomer injunction and, if so, upon what terms, the court will be guided by principles of justice and equity and, in particular:

(a) That equity provides a remedy where the others available under the law are inadequate to vindicate or protect the rights in issue.

(b) That equity looks to the substance rather than to the form.

- G (c) That equity takes an essentially flexible approach to the formulation of a remedy.

(d) That equity has not been constrained by hard rules or procedure in fashioning a remedy to suit new circumstances.

These principles may be discerned in action in the remarkable development of the injunction as a remedy during the last 50 years.

- H (iv) In deciding whether to grant a newcomer injunction, the application of those principles in the context of trespass and breach of planning control by Travellers will be likely to require an applicant:

(a) to demonstrate a compelling need for the protection of civil rights or the enforcement of public law not adequately met by any other remedies (including statutory remedies) available to the applicant.

(b) to build into the application and into the order sought procedural protection for the rights (including Convention rights) of the newcomers affected by the order, sufficient to overcome the potential for injustice arising from the fact that, as against newcomers, the application will necessarily be made without notice to them. Those protections are likely to include advertisement of an intended application so as to alert potentially affected Travellers and bodies which may be able to represent their interests at the hearing of the application, full provision for liberty to persons affected to apply to vary or discharge the order without having to show a change of circumstances, together with temporal and geographical limits on the scope of the order so as to ensure that it is proportional to the rights and interests sought to be protected.

(c) to comply in full with the disclosure duty which attaches to the making of a without notice application, including bringing to the attention of the court any matter which (after due research) the applicant considers that a newcomer might wish to raise by way of opposition to the making of the order.

(d) to show that it is just and convenient in all the circumstances that the order sought should be made.

(v) If those considerations are adhered to, there is no reason in principle why newcomer injunctions should not be granted.

Appeal dismissed.

COLIN BERESFORD, Barrister



Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 397 (KB)

Case No: QB-2022-000904

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 23 February 2026

Before :

MRS JUSTICE LAMBERT DBE

- (1) VALERO ENERGY LIMITED
(2) VALERO LOGISTICS UK LIMITED
(3) VALERO PEMBROKESHIRE OIL TERMINAL LIMITED

Claimants

-and-

- (1) PERSONS UNKNOWN WHO, IN CONNECTION WITH ENVIRONMENTAL PROTESTS BY THE 'JUST STOP OIL' OR 'EXTINCTION REBELLION' OR 'INSULATE BRITAIN' OR 'YOUTH CLIMATE SWARM' (ALSO KNOWN AS YOUTH SWARM) MOVEMENTS ENTER OR REMAIN WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE FIRST CLAIMANT UPON ANY OF THE 8 SITES
- (2) PERSONS UNKNOWN WHO, IN CONNECTION WITH ENVIRONMENTAL PROTESTS BY THE 'JUST STOP OIL' OR 'EXTINCTION REBELLION' OR 'INSULATE BRITAIN' OR 'YOUTH CLIMATE SWARM' (ALSO KNOWN AS YOUTH SWARM) MOVEMENTS CAUSE BLOCKADES, OBSTRUCTIONS OF TRAFFIC AND INTERFERE WITH THE PASSAGE BY THE CLAIMANTS AND THEIR AGENTS, SERVANTS, EMPLOYEES, LICENSEES, INVITEES WITH OR WITHOUT VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT TO, FROM, OVER AND ACROSS THE ROADS IN THE VICINITY OF THE 8 SITES
- (3) MRS ALICE BRENCHER AND 16 OTHERS

Defendants

Approved Judgment

Ms K Holland KC (instructed by **CMS Cameron McKenna Nabarro Olswang LLP**) for the
Claimants

The **Defendants** did not attend and were not represented

Hearing date: 16 February 2026

Approved Judgment

Mrs Justice Lambert DBE

Introduction:

1. The Claimants are part of a large petrochemical group, known as Valero Energy Group, which covers 8 sites in the UK, comprising an oil refinery and various oil terminals). On 26 January 2024, Mr Justice Ritchie granted a final injunction (“the Injunction Order”) against the Defendants, (*Valero v Persons Unknown* [2024] EWHC 134 KB). The Defendants were Persons Unknown connected with Just Stop Oil, Extinction Rebellion, Insulate Britain and Youth Climate Swarm who were trespassing on the 8 sites, blocking access to the 8 sites and/or who had been involved in suspected tortious behaviour. The Injunction Order was to last 5 years but made provision for an annual review. The First Review took place on 24 January 2025 before Hill J (*Valero v Persons Unknown* [2025] EWHC 207 (KB)) when it was ordered that the Injunction Order remain in full force and effect (“the First Review Order”).
2. On 16 February 2026, the matter came before me for the purpose of the Second Review hearing. The Claimants were represented by Ms Katherine Holland KC. The Defendants did not attend, nor were they represented. At the conclusion of the hearing I ordered that the Injunction Order should remain in full force and effect pending further review with reasons to be provided. These are those reasons.

Factual Background

3. The factual background is set out in detail in the Ritchie judgment. I do not rehearse it here. All that needs to be recorded for present purposes is that between 1 and 7 April 2022 a number of environmental activists undertook direct action at the Kingsbury Terminal (one of the 8 sites) and on the adjoining access roads. This led to approximately 48 individuals being arrested by the Warwickshire Police at and around that site. Further protest activity took place at and around the Kingsbury Terminal between 9 and 15 April 2022 leading to a number of arrests. The Claimants brought the claim to avoid potentially serious health and safety and environmental consequences of the Defendants’ threatened actions, as well as other serious consequences for the public. Similar direct action occurred at a number of other oil terminals and refineries as well as associated sites. These actions were combined with statements demonstrating a commitment to disrupt indefinitely the oil industry until the Defendants’ demands were met. In consequence, injunctions were granted to a number of other entities involved in the energy industry.

Service of Documents

4. The service of documents in these proceedings is permitted by alternative means in the case of the First and Second and Third Defendants (where no postal address is known). In summary, service on the First and Second Defendants is permitted by a combination of uploading documents to the Valero Service Website, placing copies at a total of 55 locations across the 8 sites and emailing the website addresses set out in Schedule 1 of the order of Master Cook dated 8 June 2023. In the case of the Third Defendants where a postal address is known, service may be effected in the usual way. The subsequent order of Master Eastman of 1 December 2023 provides that exhibits to witness statements need not be physically served and that the Defendants can be informed by way of a covering letter confirming that the exhibit will be available on the Valero

Service Website. The steps taken by the Claimants to serve the relevant court documents are set out in the tenth witness statement of Anthea Adair. I am satisfied that service of court documents has been effected. Ms Adair's eleventh statement sets out how the hearing bundle was served in accordance with the order of Master Eastman of 1 December 2023. Again, I am satisfied on the basis of the evidence before me that the hearing bundle was served in accordance with that order.

The Test to be applied at a Review Hearing

5. In *Wolverhampton CC v London Gypsies & Travellers* [2024] 2 WLR 45 the Supreme Court gave the following guidance in relation to review hearings and indicated that such hearings:

“... give all parties an opportunity to make full and complete disclosure to the court, supported by appropriate evidence, as to how effective the order has been; whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made”

6. In *HS2 v Persons Unknown* [2024] EWHC 1277 (KB) Mr Justice Ritchie considered how a Court should go about this task. He stated:

“32. Drawing these authorities together, on a review of an interim injunction against PUs and named Defendants, this Court is not starting *de novo*. The Judges who have previously made the interim injunctions have made findings justifying the interim injunctions. It is not the task of the Court on review to query or undermine those. However, it is vital to understand why they were made, to read and assimilate the findings, to understand the sub-strata of the *quia timet*, the reasons for the fear of unlawful direct action. Then it is necessary to determine, on the evidence, whether anything material has changed. If nothing material has changed, if the risk still exists as before and the claimant remains rightly and justifiably fearful of unlawful attacks, the extension may be granted so long as procedural and legal rigour has been observed and fulfilled.

33. On the other hand, if material matters have changed, the Court is required to analyse the changes, based on the evidence before it, and in the full light of the past decisions, to determine anew, whether the scope, details and need for the full interim injunction should be altered. To do so, the original thresholds for granting the interim injunction still apply.”

7. In *Arla Foods v Persons Unknown* [2024] EWHC 1952, where the injunction was not interlocutory, a 5-year injunction was granted against animal rights protestors. In relation to the provision made for annual reviews, Jonathan Hilliard KC (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court) stated:

“128. The annual review will allow a continued assessment of whether circumstances have changed so as to make the continuation of the injunction appropriate and the five year maximum an appropriate end-point. In my

judgment, it would not be appropriate to require the Claimants to incur the costs of applying each year for a new or renewed injunction. Rather the review should be of whether the position has developed since the last review.”

8. In *Transport for London v Persons Unknown and Others* [2025] EWHC 55 (KB) 16 January 2025, Mr Justice Morris took a similar approach at [54] to [57]. He referred to the guidance in the *Wolverhampton* case set out above and stated:

“55. In the present cases, TfL has already provided detailed evidence at a full trial and the Court has on two occasions already made a full determination of the issue of risk and the balance of interests. In my judgment, in those circumstances there needed to be some material change in order to justify a conclusion that the Final Injunctions should not continue ...”

9. In the local authority context, in *Rochdale MBC v Persons Unknown* [2025] EWHC 1314 (KB), Garnham J said;

“51. In my judgment, the correct approach is dictated by the Supreme Court’s judgment in *Wolverhampton* and in particular in [225]. This is not a “tick box” exercise, but the matters on which evidence should be adduced and argument focused are (i) how effective the order has been; (ii) whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; (iii) whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and (iv) whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made. The parties should give full disclosure, supported by appropriate evidence, directed towards those questions.

52. There will be cases, such as *Basingstoke*, where an issue has emerged whether at the original hearing or in preparation for the renewed hearing, which needs to be addressed expressly at the renewal hearing. Whether that necessitates an expanded renewal hearing or what Ms Brimelow calls a *de novo* hearing will depend on the facts. The position may also be different where the application for injunctive relief is not made during the currency of the previous order, but after it has expired. But the guiding light will always be the Supreme Court’s judgment in *Wolverhampton*.”

10. Since the date of the First Review of the injunction (on 24 January 2025) Just Stop Oil issued a press release (on 27 March 2025) stating that it would be “*hanging up the hi vis*” at the end of April 2025 (“the March Press Release”). A number of judges have therefore had to consider whether the level of risk remains sufficient to continue various injunctions following the March Press Release. The most relevant initial decision following the March Press Release was that of Sweeting in *J Esso Petroleum Company, Limited v Persons Unknown* [2025] EWHC 1768. The injunction in that case protected various sites including an oil refinery, fuel terminals, logistic hubs and compounds. Sweeting J considered whether there was a continued threat of tortious activity holding that the threat of direct action continued to be a real one. He referred to direct evidence from Just Stop Oil itself acknowledging the effectiveness of injunctions in deterring

their actions, namely a tweet from 13 September 2023 stating in relation to protests on highways that:

“Disruption is frustrating but we have no other choice. Fossil fuel companies have taken out private injunctions that makes protests impossible at oil refineries, oil depots and even petrol stations”.

Mr Justice Sweeting noted that this suggested:

“the removal of the injunction would invite renewed activity of the sort that it was designed to prevent”.

11. At [14] Mr Justice Sweeting noted that Extinction Rebellion and Just Stop Oil continued to focus their attention on the oil and gas sector. In relation to the March Press Release, at [15] he said:

“The press release itself contained a “Note to Editors” that is hard to reconcile with an unequivocal renunciation of direct action. More significantly, undercover reporting on 16 May 2025 referred to an alleged recording of JSO indicating that it had not disbanded, prompting JSO to email its mailing list on 21 May 20205 stating: “GB News was right for once. We are plotting “a very big comeback””. The email further suggested that this renewed campaign might operate under a new title albeit with the same aims and conducted by the same protestors: “Just Stop Oil was just the beginning. A new campaign is in the works – one that will build on our knowledge and success at Just Stop Oil and will face the grinding injustice of our political and economic system head on. We’re just getting started”.”

12. Mr Justice Sweeting referred to similar statements by Extinction Rebellion in the past (to the effect that it was relinquishing forms of protest) which had not been honoured. He also referred to a Just Stop Oil social media photo stating “*JUST GETTING STARTED*” and a report in June 2025 inviting recruitment for Youth Swarm, with events advertised using the Just Stop Oil logo and an organiser quoted as saying: “*This is an inhale before we breathe out and expand into brand new territory, into something even bigger than we’ve tried before. This is the start of something genuinely thrilling.*”
13. Since this decision of Sweeting J (in July 2025), there have been review hearings in other cases when the Courts have decided that the injunctions should be continued. For example, on 18 July 2025 there was a review of an injunction granted in *Gatwick Airport v Persons Unknown* [2025] EWHC 2228 by Mr Duncan Atkinson KC (sitting as a Deputy Judge) and on 26 August 2025 there was a review of an injunction in the case of *London City Airport v Persons Unknown* [2025] EWHC 2223 (KB) by Mr Justice Bourne. In the latter case, Bourne J stated at [16]: “*I accept that removing the injunctions at present would create a real risk of a resumption of activity at airports.*” The review hearing of most factual significance to the instant case is *North Warwickshire Borough Council v Baldwin & others* [2025] EWHC 2403 in which HH Judge Emma Kelly continued an injunction on the basis of the evidence of the continued level of risk at the wider Kingsbury site, as referred to at [14] to [23] of her judgment.

The Evidence

14. Ritchie J made the following finding as to the level of risk on the basis of the evidence which was available to him on 26 January 2024:

“64. In my judgment the evidence shows that the Claimants have a good cause of action and fully justified fears that they face a high risk and an imminent threat that the remaining 17 named Defendants (who would not give undertakings) and/or that the UPs will commit the pleaded torts of trespass and nuisance at the 8 sites in connection with the 4 organisations.”

15. He went on to find that the Defendants did not have a realistic defence to the claim; that the balance of convenience and justice weighed in favour of granting the final injunction to the Claimants and that damages would not be an adequate remedy for the Claimants. He was also satisfied that the various procedural requirements set out in the case law were satisfied by the injunction proposed. Like Hill J, in her 2024 review, I take these findings as my starting point in accordance with the legal framework outlined above.

16. There has been no material change in the case law since the Ritchie judgment and First Review Order. There has been no new legislation which is material to the issues which I must consider. As to the updating factual evidence, Ms Holland referred me to the relevant statements in the hearing bundle, comprising the 7th witness statement of Emma Pinkerton dated 11 December 2025 and the 7th witness statement of David Blackhouse dated 15 December 2025. These statements, which I accept, address the questions posed by the *Wolverhampton* case. In this context therefore:

- a. I am satisfied that the Injunction Order has been effective. Mr Blackhouse sets out that the protest activity has diminished as a direct result of the Injunction Order combined with the protective “blanket” of injunctions that have been obtained throughout the UK by the Claimants and other operators as well as the wider injunction obtained by Warwickshire Borough Council on 6 September 2024 in relation to the Kingsbury site. Ms Pinkerton explains that the presence of the Injunction Order has had a significant deterrent effect, pointing out that this view is reinforced by comments from Just Stop Oil on its Twitter feed where, in response to a comment from member of the public suggesting that protests ought to be carried out at oil refineries, Just Stop Oil tweeted on 9 June 2023 at 10am: *“Do you know what happens if you protest outside oil refineries now? Oil companies have brought injunctions to ban people from taking action at refineries, distribution hubs, even petrol stations. Punishments for breaking injunctions range from unlimited fines to imprisonments.”*
- b. There is no evidence before me justifying discharge of the Injunction Order. Notwithstanding the March Press Release, the risk justifying the grant of the Injunction Order remains. Ms Pinkerton refers to the press release from Just Stop Oil on 25 April 2025 announcing that *“we-re just getting started”* and to various newspaper articles about, and statements of intent from, protest groups. These include a statement of the website of Just Stop Oil that *“A new revolutionary direct action campaign is coming. Help us to build what is best”*

and a statement on the website of Extinction Rebellion that: “*Yes, its 2025, no we are not backing down.....*” and “*This year, XR will act with greater determination, grit and focus*”. Further, as she points out, the risk from other protest groups remains. Mr Blackhouse sets out that he continues to meet regularly with the Police and the Local Resilience Forum in the areas where there are assets and that the verbal briefings provided indicate that the threat remains the same. Ms Pinkerton identifies a long list of recent protest activities, thereby demonstrating the ongoing nature of these incidents.

Conclusion

17. I have reviewed the evidence and recent legal developments. I am satisfied that nothing material has changed and that the risk which justified the making of the Injunction Order still remains. Procedural and legal rigour has been “observed and fulfilled” (*HS2* at [32]).
18. I approve the draft Order and Ritchie J’s order will remain in effect pending further review by this Court in no more than 12 months’ time.



Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWHC 1768 (KB)

Case No: QB-2022-001098

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 11/07/2025

Before:

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE SWEETING

Between:

(1) ESSO Petroleum Company, Limited

Claimants

(2) Exxonmobil Chemical Limited

- and -

(1) PERSONS UNKNOWN who, in connection with the 'Extinction Rebellion' campaign or the 'Just Stop Oil' campaign, enter or remain (without the Consent of the First Claimant) upon any of the Sites.

Defendants

(2) PERSONS UNKNOWN who, in connection with the 'Extinction Rebellion' campaign or the 'Just Stop Oil' campaign, enter or remain (without the Consent of the First Claimant or the Second Claimant) upon The Chemical Plant, Marsh Lane, Southampton S045 1TX.

(3) PERSONS UNKNOWN who, in connection with the 'Extinction Rebellion' campaign or the 'Just Stop Oil' campaign, enter onto any of the Claimants' property and obstruct any of the vehicular entrances or exits to any of the Sites.

(4) Paul Barnes

(5) Diana Hekt

Timothy Morshead KC and Yaaser Vanderman (instructed by **Norton Rose Fulbright LLP**)
for the **Claimants**
The **Defendants** did not appear

Hearing dates: 09/07/2025

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.00am on 11.07.2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

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THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE SWEETING

Mr Justice Sweeting:

Introduction

1. This is the second annual review of the injunction granted in this matter to Esso Petroleum Company, Limited and ExxonMobil Chemical Limited (“the Claimants”). They seek the continuation of the existing order with some amendments. The First, Second, and Third Defendants are identified as Persons Unknown who are connected with the ‘Extinction Rebellion’ (“XR”) campaign or the ‘Just Stop Oil’ (“JSO”) campaign. The Fourth Defendant (“D4”), Paul Barnes, and the Fifth Defendant (“D5”), Diana Hekt, are named individuals.

Background to the Case

2. The injunction was originally obtained by the Claimants in 2022 in response to environmental protest campaigns. The injunction protects various sites (“the Sites”), which include an oil refinery, fuel terminals, logistic hubs, and compounds across the United Kingdom. The Sites form a significant element of the national energy infrastructure. The Fawley site, for instance, is the largest oil refinery in the United Kingdom, providing 20% of the nation’s refinery capacity.
3. The history of protest action at these Sites and elsewhere is well-documented in the evidence, including in the statements of Mr. Anthony Milne, Mr. Stuart Sherbrooke Wortley, Mr. Nawaaz Allybokus, and Mr. Martin Pullman. These statements describe the significant problems experienced by the Claimants, not as isolated events, but as part of a wider pattern of “direct action” at oil terminals across the country. The Sites are mainly complex industrial units which process or store substantial amounts of volatile and highly flammable material capable of being released in liquid or vapour form. The sites are secure and subject to stringent safety measures and protocols which would not be apparent to a member of the public. They therefore involve managed risk. The consequences of any of the risks involved eventuating present a clear and significant danger to those who work at or visit the Sites, anyone entering unlawfully or protesting at the Sites and, not least, the local population and environment.
4. On 19 July 2023, Linden J granted “final” relief, imposing an injunction effective for a period of five years, subject to annual review (“the Linden Order”). Subsequently, on 29 January 2024, Ellenbogen J reviewed the Linden Order, prior to its first annual review, to consider whether any changes were necessary in the light of the Supreme Court’s judgment in *Wolverhampton CC v. London Gypsies & Travellers* [2024] AC 983 (“*Wolverhampton*”). Ellenbogen J concluded that no changes were required, granting similar relief with minor “tidying up” in relation to one area no longer requiring protection and another where previously unregistered land had become registered (“the Ellenbogen Order”). The first annual review hearing took place on 10 July 2024 before Tipples J, who concluded that there had been no material change in circumstances warranting the discharge or amendment of the injunction. She ordered that it continued unchanged. D4 and D5 were, as previously, “carved out” of the injunctions due to assurances they had provided.

Relevant Law

5. The purpose of a review hearing for an injunction, particularly one against Persons Unknown, was clearly articulated by the Supreme Court in *Wolverhampton*. At [225], the Court observed that a review:

“...will give all parties an opportunity to make full and complete disclosure to the court, supported by appropriate evidence, as to how effective the order has been; whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made.”

6. As Mr Morshead KC observed, this is an area of evolving jurisprudence so that it is also open to the Court to review the operation of continuing injunctive relief in the light of legal developments. That has already taken place in this case following the decision in *Wolverhampton*. I am satisfied that the Claimants have drawn to my attention all of the recent relevant case law in relation to the granting of similar injunctive relief.
7. In cases where the review is uncontested, the primary focus is not to revisit the merits afresh but rather to determine whether the injunction has outlasted the compelling need which led to its initial imposition, in view of any changed circumstances. This approach is consistent with the views expressed by Hill J in *Valero v Persons Unknown* (2025 review) [2025] EWHC 207 (KB) at [20-30], and by Garnham J in *Rochdale MBC v Persons Unknown* [2025] EWHC 1314 (hereafter “*Rochdale*”) at [42-52].
8. I agree that this is the practical and proportionate way to approach a review ordered as part of the original grant of relief. Such a review is also an opportunity to make necessary adjustments in the light of experience of the practical operation of the injunction and changing circumstances. The Court should nevertheless be wary of embarking upon fundamental changes to the scope or nature of injunctive relief at a review hearing rather than requiring a further and full application to be made. I also bear in mind that there is no legal presumption of continuance.

Continued Threat of Direct Action

9. The evidence before me, particularly from the fifth and sixth witness statements of Ms Stebbing demonstrates that the threat of direct action at and against the Sites continues to be a real one.
10. First, there is direct evidence from JSO itself acknowledging the effectiveness of injunctions in deterring their actions. A tweet from 13 September 2023 stated, in relation to protests on highways:
- “Disruption is frustrating, but we have no other choice. Fossil fuel companies have taken out private injunctions that makes protests impossible at oil refineries, oil depots and even petrol stations...”
11. This strongly suggests that the injunctions covering oil refineries have compelled JSO to target other infrastructure and, conversely, that the removal of the injunction would invite renewed activity of the sort that it was designed to prevent.

12. Secondly, other courts have also recently found there to be a continuing threat in cases similar to the present application (see *Valero* (above) and *Exolum Pipeline Systems Ltd v Persons Unknown* - 25 February 2025, Swift J reviewing the order made in that case in 2024 – see *Exolum Pipeline System Ltd & Ors v Persons Unknown* [2024] EWHC 1015 (KB)).
13. Thirdly, specific incidents indicate ongoing interest in the Sites. For example, in December 2023, an individual trespassed on the Fawley Site to film its layout by drone, subsequently publishing the footage online, which has gathered over 146,000 views to date. Whilst some time ago and not overtly a protest, the filming of the site and the high number of continuing views demonstrates a persistent interest in the Claimants' infrastructure. Broader interest in the Claimants' assets across England by environmental activists is also described in Ms Stebbing's evidence.
14. Fourthly, XR and JSO continue to focus their attention on the oil and gas sector. Recent examples include multiple environmental activist groups, including JSO, targeting airports in Europe in July-August 2024, with JSO stating that "areas of key importance to the fossil fuel economy will be declared sites of civil resistance around the world". In October 2024, XR activists blockaded the United Kingdom Oil & Gas plc production site in Surrey, and in January 2025, XR occupied the Manchester office of an insurance broker, because it was involved, it was said, in insuring fossil fuel projects. Direct action by other related groups, such as Shut the System and Youth Demand, also occurred in 2025.
15. Fifthly, whilst JSO issued a press release on 27 March 2025 stating it would be "hanging up the hi vis" at the end of April 2025, the evidence in Ms Stebbing's sixth witness statement casts significant doubt on the finality of this change in approach. The press release itself contained a "Note to Editors" that is hard to reconcile with an unequivocal renunciation of direct action. More significantly, undercover reporting on 16 May 2025 referred to an alleged recording of JSO indicating it had not disbanded, prompting JSO to email its mailing list on 21 May 2025 stating: "GB News was right for once. We are "plotting a very big comeback"". The email further suggested that this renewed campaign might operate under a new title albeit with the same aims and conducted by the same protesters:

"Just Stop Oil was just the beginning. A new campaign is in the works—one that will build on our knowledge and success as Just Stop Oil and will face the grinding injustice of our political and economic system head on. We're just getting started."

16. Similar statements by XR in the past, that it was relinquishing particular forms of protest, have not been honoured. On 19 May 2025, JSO posted a social media photo stating "JUST GETTING STARTED". A Times report in June 2025 indicated JSO activists were recruiting for Youth Demand, with events advertised using the JSO logo, and an organiser quoted as saying,

"This is an inhale before we breath out and expand into brand new territory, into something even bigger than we've tried before. This is the start of something genuinely thrilling".

17. As Linden J observed in his judgment in this matter [67]:

“It would have been very easy for Extinction Rebellion or Just Stop Oil to give assurances or evidence to the court that there was no intention to return to their activities of 2021/2022, and no risk of trespass on the Sites or damage to property by protesters in the foreseeable future, but they did not do so.”

18. It may of course be that any leadership or governance that exists within these campaigning movements is limited and that a binding assurance from the centre cannot in fact be given. That in itself would make it difficult to rely upon any announcement that there had been a cessation of the activities at which the injunction is aimed. Equally it continues to be the position that no assurances have been given which leads me to conclude that there remains a real risk of direct action from JSO or XR or those connected with their campaigns.

Service and Provision of Documents

19. I am satisfied that the hearing of this review was properly notified in accordance with paragraph 15 of the Ellenbogen Order. Ms Stebbing’s seventh witness statement details the steps taken, including uploading documents to the webpage, placing copies in clear plastic containers at the Sites, and sending emails to relevant addresses for the First, Second, and Third Defendants. In relation to D4 and D5, service was by email, and where delivery failures occurred for D4, extra measures were taken to provide the information by first-class post.
20. Mr Morshead submitted that the provisions at paragraph 15.1 of the present Order were becoming unwieldy to operate in practice because of the accumulation of documentation produced as a result of the further hearings following the grant of relief. He suggested that if the order were to continue then it would be sensible and necessary to remove the requirement for full paper copies of documents to be deposited, other than the orders themselves (as provided for at paragraph 12), in favour of the links already given on the Warning Notices (see further below) which point to the relevant documents online by means of a link to a website. I agree that requiring the Claimants to maintain a growing library of material at the Sites, in ever larger plastic boxes, is unsatisfactory and may well prove unworkable in future. The solution suggested will meet the requirement to serve the material concerned in an effective way. Links to a website may indeed prove to be a more satisfactory arrangement.

Warning Notices

21. Photographic evidence of four Notices being displayed at all Sites was provided by 13 June 2024 for the annual review hearing. However, it was discovered that Avonmouth and Alton only had two Notices each, and Purfleet had a damaged Notice. These deficiencies had been promptly rectified by ordering new Notices on 11 June 2024.
22. While there was a period where some Sites may not have had the full complement of four Notices, the Claimants have explained that this confusion arose from changes to the wording of the Notices following court orders, and that at all times at least two Notices were present. Furthermore, other methods of notification, such as website publication and email, were consistently used. I accept the Claimants’ submission that this oversight did not cause prejudice to any Persons Unknown, given the other

notification steps undertaken. I also note that the Claimants now conduct monthly checks to ensure Notices and containers are in place.

Fourth and Fifth Defendants

23. D4 and D5 remain carved out of the injunction due to their earlier undertakings and assurances. D5 has provided a signed copy of a further undertaking, effective until 31 July 2026 or the date of the next review hearing. However, D4 has not yet returned a signed copy of his undertaking, despite continued efforts by the Claimants to contact him, including through letters sent on 24 June 2025 and 3 July 2025. The Claimants propose a pragmatic course which is to allow them liberty to apply to make D4 subject to the injunctions in the absence of receiving further assurances of the same sort as were originally obtained from him, a course which has already been taken in earlier orders in these proceedings. I agree with that proposal.

Harm

24. The potential harm arising from direct action at the Sites remains substantial and, potentially, dangerous. The operations at the Sites involve hazardous substances, regulated under the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 2015. Entry by untrained protesters who lack appropriate protective clothing or equipment poses significant risks to personal injury and health and safety. Moreover, such actions clearly risk disrupting the Claimants' operations and, consequently, the United Kingdom's downstream fuel resilience, impacting contractual obligations to customers essential for maintaining critical services, including road, rail, and air travel.

Discussion

25. I have to consider whether any reasons or grounds for the discharge of the injunction have emerged since the last review. The principal factual development has been JSO's announcement in March 2025 in relation to "hanging up the hi vis". However, as I have outlined above, the evidence shows, in my view, that this announcement cannot be taken as an unequivocal and final renunciation of direct action. The amorphous nature of the group, combined with the past experience of similar unfulfilled statements by XR, and JSO's subsequent communications and activities, mean that it would be premature to rely on this announcement as a basis for amending or discharging the injunction. The risk of direct action by those connected with the JSO campaign remains real and imminent.
26. In relation to legal developments, there have been discussions in recent cases concerning two procedural matters: (a) how "Persons Unknown" ought to be described; and (b) whether orders against them should include a requirement for permission before a contempt application may be brought.
27. As to the description of "Persons Unknown," the Supreme Court in *Wolverhampton* stated at paragraph 221:

“...Even where the persons sought to be subjected to the injunction are newcomers, the possibility of identifying them as a class by reference to conduct prior to what would be a breach

(and, if necessary, by reference to intention) should be explored and adopted if possible.”

28. While Nicklin J in *MBR Acres Ltd v Curtin* [2025] EWHC 331 suggested it was "no longer necessary, nor appropriate" to restrain particular categories of defendants for contra mundum injunctions, and Fordham J adopted a similar approach in *University of Cambridge v Persons Unknown* [2025] EWHC 454, I note that Soole J subsequently doubted this position in *University of Cambridge v Persons Unknown* [2025] EWHC 724, reverting to the orthodox approach. I am told that Bourne J at the review hearing of an injunction relating to London City Airports, on 24 June 2025 preferred a more straightforward reading of *Wolverhampton* paragraph 221 and held that this point was procedural, not justifying re-writing orders on review. I find no compelling reason to amend the description of the Defendants in this case when considering it on review save in one respect (see further below). The current description best adheres to the guidance in *Wolverhampton* by identifying a class by reference to conduct notwithstanding the cogent reasons set out by Nicklin J for taking a different course in *MBR*. I do however consider that the prospect of JSO evolving, deliberately, into a differently named campaign essentially involving the same organisation, supporters and protesters is demonstrated on the evidence and requires an adjustment to the description of the Defendants to add “or other environmental campaign” so as not to, potentially, thwart the purpose of the injunction. This course was taken in the City Airport injunction proceedings. Any concern that this may involve a widening of the injunction is tempered by the fact that the description involves conduct that is on its face unlawful and where Convention rights are qualified so that the balancing exercise is heavily in favour of a restraint.
29. As to a requirement for permission before a contempt application may be brought, this measure was adopted in *MBR* and the *University of Cambridge* cases. It is apparent that Nicklin J in *MBR Acres* was significantly influenced by the particular claimants' conduct in that case, which involved trivial and inappropriate contempt applications. However, I observe that the suggestion of a blanket requirement for all newcomer injunctions in protest cases appears to have been made per incuriam given other relevant authorities, such as *AG v Times Newspapers Ltd* [1974] AC 273, *Sectorguard plc v Dienne plc* [2009] EWHC 2693 (Ch), and *PJSC Vseukrainskyi Aktsionernyi Bank v. Maksimov & Ors* [2014] EWHC 4370 (Comm). These cases suggest that the courts already possess adequate mechanisms to address disproportionate committal applications. In the present case, there is no evident need or justification, in my view, to impose a requirement for the Claimants to seek permission before commencing any committal applications. The Supreme Court in *Wolverhampton*, which carefully balanced the interests of landowners and Persons Unknown, did not impose such a requirement. There is no evidence before me that claimants are generally bringing trivial committal applications in cases of this nature. While the specific factual circumstances may have driven the decisions in *MBR Acres* and the *Cambridge* cases, those particular concerns are not present here. Imposing such a permission filter could lead to disproportionate burdens and complexities, potentially requiring multiple hearings and appeals, which would be more stressful for potential defendants and consume significant court resources. It is generally preferable for all matters to be addressed in one committal hearing unless a specific factual reason necessitates otherwise.

30. I am satisfied that the injunction has been effective to date, as there has been no direct action at the Sites for some years. Indeed, the evidence from JSO itself supports this conclusion, indicating that the existence of injunctions at oil refineries has caused them to target other sites.
31. There remains a proper justification for the continuance of the injunction. A real and imminent risk of direct action at the Sites persists if they were to be left unprotected. This view has been consistently taken by multiple judges in this claim and in other similar claims. The substantial harm, particularly the health and safety risks, to those who are not trained to understand the many hazards at the Sites, underscores the necessity of the injunction. The Defendants have no lawful reason to enter or remain upon these restricted and fenced-off private lands for the purpose of direct action. The evidence has clearly demonstrated that the existence of criminal offences is insufficient to deter the Defendants.

Conclusion

32. I conclude that nothing material has changed since the Ellenbogen Order was made to warrant its discharge or amendment. The evidence demonstrates a continued threat of direct action at the Sites. The injunction has not outlasted its need.
33. It remains necessary for the injunction to continue in its present form subject to the limited amendments referred to above.

END

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION

The Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL

Monday, 24 February 2025

BEFORE:

MR JUSTICE SWIFT

BETWEEN:

EXOLUM PIPELINE SYSTEM LIMITED & OTHERS

Claimants

- and -

PERSONS UNKNOWN & ANOTHER

Defendants

MR T MORSHEAD KC on behalf of the Claimants

The Defendants did not appear and were not represented

JUDGMENT
(Approved)

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(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

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MR JUSTICE SWIFT

1. This is an application made following paragraph 3.1.2 of the Order made by Bennathan J on 29 April 2022.
2. The underlying proceedings were issued on 6 April 2022 and were a claim for an injunction against persons unknown. The persons unknown were identified by reference to two classes; firstly those entering or who threatened to enter sites operated by the claimant, Exolum Pipeline System Limited; and secondly persons either blocking or impeding free access to those sites. The sites in question are petrol storage and distribution terminals at Grays in Essex, Bramhall in Stockport, Seal Sands at Stockton-on-Tees, Misterton at Doncaster, Hallen in Bristol, Thetford in Suffolk and Saffron Walden in Cambridgeshire.
3. An interim order was made by Johnson J on 8 April 2022. The return date was on 29 April 2022 and the matter came then before Bennathan J. He made an order prohibiting the Defendants from entering or remaining upon any part of the terminals, as I have referred to, without permission; prohibiting them from damaging the whole or any part of those terminals; prohibiting them from climbing onto tankers on any part of the access roads for those terminals; preventing tunnelling, that is to say any activity that tunnelled under or undermined any part of the access roads to any of the terminals; also preventing such actions as might cause or appear to cause a risk of ignition or explosion anywhere in the vicinity of tankers or the terminals themselves; and finally preventing the Defendants from affixing themselves to any other person or vehicle or object either in the terminals or any of the access roads.
4. At the same time, Bennathan J made a further non-party disclosure order. That order, made pursuant to CPR 3.17, was directed to the local police forces for each of the terminals. The order required those police forces, on notice, to provide various classes of information to the Claimant, the information being such as might identify those persons who had trespassed on or attempted to trespass on any of the terminal sites.
5. The injunction made by Bennathan J was made following consideration of witness statements made by Mark O'Neill (on 6 April 2022 and 27 April 2022), and by

David Cook (on 6 April 2022). For present purposes I can refer primarily to Mr O'Neill's statements. In those statements he described, in particular, events that had happened on 1 April 2022, when various groups of protestors had attempted to gain access to the Grays terminal in Essex. They had caused significant disruption. They had been the cause of potential danger, given the nature of the materials stored on the site, the site being one used for the storage and distribution of hazardous materials. Mr O'Neill also described further disruption that took place the following Tuesday, 5 April 2022. On that occasion protestors had glued themselves together and then glued themselves to the road. Mr O'Neill further referred to plans that he had heard about concerning a possible month of concerted action by activist groups, including Just Stop Oil, Extinction Rebellion, Insulate Britain and the Youth Climate Swarm.

6. In his second statement Mr O'Neill referred to further protests that had taken place on Sunday 10 April 2022. On that day, some 35 protestors had accessed the Grays terminal by climbing over the boundary fence. Twenty of them had gained access to the road loading bays which are the areas on the site where tankers are filled prior to transporting petroleum and other chemicals to customers. He also explained that 2 protestors had made their way to a nearby storage tank on the terminal site that contained kerosene, another flammable product.
7. That information, in summary, caused Bennathan J to make the order I have already described. At paragraph 3.1.2 of the order, Bennathan J provided for a review hearing to take place approximately 12 months from the date of his order to consider whether or not the order as he had made should continue. That provision has since become the premise for a series of annual reviews of the injunction that is in force in relation to the seven terminal sites.
8. The first such review took place on 23 January 2023 and was considered by Soole J. He ordered that the Order made by Bennathan J should continue subject to a further review 12 months thereafter. On that occasion Soole J took the opportunity to consider a further statement from Mr O'Neill made on 16 January 2023. That statement explained the arrangements that had been put in place for service and notification of the order that had been made. Mr O'Neill also referred to continued protest by activist groups, this time at the claimant's terminal at Clydebank, and he referred to his involvement in the

prosecution of activists who had been arrested the previous April, following their activities at Grays. He explained that additional security measures had been put in place at a number of terminals but, for obvious reasons, did not explain the details of those additional measures.

9. At paragraph 27 of that statement Mr O'Neill also explained that on 28 August 2022, a group of 25 protestors had been present at the Grays site, 5 of whom had gained access to the site and were arrested by the police. Prosecutions did not follow, but Mr O'Neill explained, that was a matter of pragmatism rather than for any other reason. He also explained that on 11 November 2022 there had been another attempt to gain access to the Grays site by a number of activists, this time using ladders. That attempt had been unsuccessful. Further within his statement, Mr O'Neill referred to the continuing general activities of Just Stop Oil and other similar environmental activist organisations, to make the point that there was no prospect that those organisations would cease to pursue the tactics they had previously used to draw attention to their cause.
10. As I have said, Soole J made an order on 23 January providing for a further review of Bennathan J's order after a further period of 12 months. That review took place on 20 February 2024 and was considered by Farbey J. She saw no sufficient reason to discharge the order that Bennathan J had made. Her Order was that the injunction should continue and there should be a further review of the injunction 12 months following. The application made to Farbey J was supported by Mr O'Neill fourth witness statement, made on 15 February 2024. Among other matters, he referred to continued protests at the Claimant's Clydebank terminal, and also to the general continuation by Just Stop Oil and other like-minded organisations of their programmes of disruption of public events and other sites associated with oil production and distribution.
11. The application now before me is the third application for review of Bennathan J's Order. It is supported by witness statements made by Mr O'Neill dated 17 February 2025 and by David Cook dated 18 February 2025. I will refer primarily to Mr O'Neill's statement as that contains the majority of the narrative of events over the past 12 months. He explains that the signage required to notify persons of the injunctions and of the review process remain in place and in good order. He explains that the Claimant continues to take measures to make unauthorised access to the terminals more difficult. For obvious

reasons, those measures are not specified in the witness statement. He further explains that Just Stop Oil and others continue their campaigns of protest in the course of 2024, this time targeting airports in England as well as undertaking other opportunistic attacks on property and attacks that disrupt ordinary commercial and private activities.

12. At paragraph 35 of his statement Mr O'Neill lists a number of well reported incidents in the course of the last 12 months, and then at paragraphs 38 and 39 he says this by way of explanation for the need for Bennathan J's order to continue:

“38. There is therefore no evidence to suggest that there will not be future protests throughout 2025 and beyond. The JSO website generally encourages protestors to push for imprisonment to exploit the state's current weakest point: prison capacity. Whilst it may appear to the court that JSO's strategy may mean that protestors will attend the terminals, notwithstanding the injunction, so as to fulfil the strategy of being arrested and being imprisoned due to the penal notice within the injunction, it should not mean that the injunction should not remain in place. Of course, the deterrent element will be a factor for some protestors, and Exolum wants to do all it can to protect its staff, the public and the defendants themselves.

39. As previously set out in O'Neill 3 and O'Neill 4, I have concerns that the claimants' terminals are at risk of further protest activity due to the nature of the claimants' business being closely related to JSO's objective, despite JSO seemingly recently targeting different areas such as airports and historic monuments and documents, and that the website now encourages activists to take action outside the Houses of Parliament to the point of arrest as many times as possible.”

13. The application for review now before me is of the type anticipated by the Supreme Court in its judgment in *Wolverhampton City Council & Ors v London Gypsies and Travellers & Ors* [2024] AC 983. The nature of the Order and of the jurisdiction explained by the Supreme Court in that case has been summarised by Sir Anthony Mann in his judgment in *Jockey Club Racecourses Ltd v Persons Unknown* [2024] EWHC 1786 (Ch) at paragraphs 14 to 20.
14. The continuation of the Order made by Bennathan J has become necessary as orders of this type have themselves become features of what appear to be contests of attrition between activist organisations, such as Just Stop Oil, and any event or operation that

those activists consider will, if disrupted, obtain publicity for and advance their cause. The attacks that Just Stop Oil undertakes are essentially opportunistic. As one or other target is made less accessible by orders such as the one now under consideration, activists will turn their attention somewhere else. The application to continue the Order made in 2022 rests on the premise that were this order to be discharged these terminals would once again be targeted and, having previously been the subject of an injunction, those terminals would be all the more an attractive target. Experience shows that such pessimism is warranted. I fear that, once made, the need for orders such as this one can almost become self-perpetuating, in that any decision to remove the order would, from the point of view of the activists, wave a flag above these terminals marking their return to the category of targets for disruption. Even though Just Stop Oil and other likeminded organisations may be opportunistic, experience shows that they are also persistent and will take any opportunity that presents itself.

15. I accept in the circumstances of this case that there remains a compelling need for the Order made by Bennathan J to remain in force. I accept that the lack of disruption at the terminals covered by this Order is itself the consequence of the existence of the order. I am satisfied that the practical criteria for the continuation of this injunction, that is to say those identified by the Supreme Court in the judgment in the *Wolverhampton* case as the criteria for making orders in the first place, are met.
16. Orders such as this one also seek to take proper account of Convention rights of free speech and freedom of assembly, taking proper account of those rights and also of the right of persons such as the Claimant to free enjoyment of their property. In this instance, the restriction imposed by Bennathan J's order is calibrated to the operation of the sites. Moreover, the balance struck in this case between exercise of rights to free speech and freedom of assembly recognises the particular risks to property and health that could arise in the event of unauthorised access to the site, including tankers entering or leaving that site. The operations at each terminal are inherently dangerous, involving the storage and removal of large quantities of petrochemicals. Safety standards at the site are strict and carefully monitored. Those standards are threatened by unauthorised entry and activity.

17. In the circumstances of this case, the manner and form of protest is important to the way in which the balance between the competing Convention rights should be struck. It is important because of the possible practical consequences that could arise from the way in which the Defendants acted in April 2022. Those actions warranted the response in the form of the Order made by Bennathan J. That Order, including restriction on the otherwise unrestricted exercise of the Convention rights of free speech and freedom of assembly was entirely justified, striking a fair balance. For the reasons I have already given, the Order, as it will be continued, continues to reflect a fair balance between the competing Convention interests.
18. The terms of the order I will make will be largely similar to those already set out in the orders made by Soole J and Farbey J. In the course of submissions leading counsel for the Claimant, Mr Morshead KC, suggested that the review period might be extended to 18 months rather than 12 months. Ultimately, that was not a submission he sought to pursue. Had he pursued that submission I would have been against him. For now, the annual review process represents a workable and pragmatic course. The Order that is in place is a significant measure and it should be reviewed on an annual basis. Any request for any longer review period would need to be accompanied by some form of express positive obligation on the Claimant to look for and bring to the court's attention such matters as might require the court to reconsider the Order in place.
19. I will make an order, largely in the form sought. I have been provided with a draft order by the Claimants. As discussed in the course of submissions, there will need to be some minor variations to paragraph 2 of the draft in order to clarify the material that needs to be contained within the plastic containers that are on the site (that material comprising the Order and evidence that the court has had before it on the various occasions it has considered this injunction since April 2022). I am satisfied that the remaining paragraphs in the draft order are correct, as drafted.

Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof.

Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE

Email: civil@epiqglobal.co.uk

This transcript has been approved by the Judge



Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 118 (KB)

Claim No: KB-2024-001463

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ISSUED IN THE ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE
HEARD AT CARDIFF DISTRICT REGISTRY

Amended under CPR 40.12 on 26.01.2026

Slip Rule - Typing Errors Corrected

Date: 23rd January 2026

Before:

MR JUSTICE RITCHIE

BETWEEN

HANSON QUARRY PRODUCTS EUROPE LIMITED
(t/a Heidelberg Materials UK)

Claimant

And

(2) KYLIE DAVIES
(3) DARREN JOHN JONES
(4) DALE VINCENT

Defendants

Michael Fry of counsel (instructed by **Knights Professional Services Limited**) for the
Claimant

The Defendants appeared in person.

Hearing dates: 20, 21 January 2026.

APPROVED JUDGMENT

Judgment approved by the Court for handing down. This judgment will be handed down by the Judge remotely by circulation to the parties' representatives by email and released to The National Archives. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be at 15:00 pm on
Friday 23rd January 2026

Mr Justice Ritchie:

The Parties

1. The Claimant is a company which owns a quarry at Craig yr Hesg, Berw Road, Pontypridd, Wales CF37 3NG (the Quarry). The Defendants are protesters who are alleged to have breached High Court injunctions prohibiting persons unknown from blocking access to and egress from the Quarry and trespassing on the Quarry.
2. I take into account that the Defendants are litigants in person. They have been offered the right to apply for legal aid and to have lawyers represent them and have chosen not to be represented. As a result, my duty is to ensure any defence which they raise (or do not raise but emerges from the evidence) is carefully considered by me. Counsel's duty is to his client and also to assist the Court with the law and procedure including that relating to any defences so raised and generally.

Bundles

3. For the hearing I was provided with two hard copy lever arch files by the Claimant, two skeleton arguments from the Claimant and an email from the 4th Defendant (who I shall refer to as DV) with attachments. During the hearing I was provided with "KD1" a notice of common law eviction and "DJJ1" a photo of a bailiff. Since the hearing I have read the witness statement of Mr Radcliffe sworn on 30.5.2025 overnight, (it was on the court Cefile but not in the hearing bundle). DV sent a digital bundle containing a case report and a medical certificate overnight between day 1 and day 2.

Summary

4. In March 2024, after planning permission had been granted by the Welsh Government for an extension to the Quarry works, a quite large group of protesters including DV trespassed on the Quarry and set up a camp thereby excluding the Claimant's staff from carrying out their work. The Claimant did not take legal advice but instead went to Able Investigations (Able), a bailiff company in Bristol, whom they contracted to remove the protesters. Able produced a one page eviction warning notice and, on 26.3.2024, with police presence at the Quarry, the Claimant served the notice on the protesters and about half an hour later moved them off the Quarry. Some physical force was used. Two months later the Claimant applied for and obtained an interim injunction and thereafter obtained two High Court injunctions, one made by HHJ Harrison on dated 6.5.2024 (the 2024 Order) and the next made by Deputy High Court Judge Elizabeth O'Neill on 5.6.2025 (the 2025 Order), prohibiting unknown persons (UPs) from blocking access to and egress from their Quarry and from trespassing on Quarry land. The Claimant now asserts that the named Defendants breached those injunctions on 27.5.2025 and 18.6.2025. As a result, on 3.7.2025 the Claimant made applications against the named Defendants for their committal for contempt. Those applications were on the wrong forms, so they were reissued on 4.9.2025 on the correct forms. Having heard the evidence and submissions and read the bundles I indicated my decisions on each of the issues (1) – (3) set out below and adjourned the hearing for more evidence and for consideration of sanctions at a later date. I gave very brief reasons for the

decisions and stated that my full reasoning would be provided later in a reserved judgment. This is my full reasoning.

The Issues

5. I now consider that there are four issues in these applications at this stage. All arose from the evidence but only three were addressed at the hearing and one went unrecognised until I started writing this reserved judgment. The three expressly addressed at the hearing were:
- (1) Were the 2024 and 2025 Orders properly served on these Defendants by the alternative service methods set out in the injunctions?
 - (2) Were the 2024 and 2025 Orders personally served on the Defendants?
 - (3) Did the Defendants or any of them breach one or other of the 2024 or 2025 Orders? Although, at the start of the hearing, there was a further issue: “If breaches are found what sanction should be imposed on each Defendant?” That was adjourned over to a later date for reasons which I shall explain below. The hearing is part heard. The fourth issue arises from the evidence of DV and DJJ but was not addressed by counsel or the Defendants in submissions and I did not properly pick it up. This issue can be put thus:
 - (4) Were DJJ and DV properly within the definitions of the unknown persons (UPs) in the 2024 and 2025 Orders when they were served and when they protested on the relevant dates?
6. No issue was taken over service of the contempt applications and all Defendants appeared at the first directions hearing made after the applications were issued.

The applications, alleged contempt and the Defendants’ responses

7. **Kylie Davies (KD).** KD was informed in the N600 and verbally at the start of the hearing that she did not have to say anything but that I could draw an adverse inference if she said nothing. The Claimant’s N600, dated 4.9.2025, asserted that the 2025 Order was served on KD: (1) on 5th and 6th June 2025 by the four permitted alternative service methods in that Order, and (2) by personal service on 18.6.2025 at around 10.35 am at the Quarry entrance during the protest. As to breach, the Claimant asserted that on 18.6.2025, between 06.45 am (later changed to 09.25 am) and 12.20 pm, KD blocked vehicles from going in and out of the Quarry and trespassed on the Quarry. KD put in no evidence and made no communications with the Claimant or the Court before the final hearing, despite the directions orders set out below, but did attend on all days on time and, when asked, accepted that she was present on 18.6.2025. She denied being properly served and denied knowledge of the 2025 Order and the prohibitions therein. Once those issues were determined by my decisions set out and explained below KD admitted intentionally carrying out the acts which were the breaches, as alleged.
8. **Darren John Jones (DJJ).** DJJ was informed in the N600 and verbally at the start of the hearing that he did not have to say anything but that I could draw an adverse inference if he said nothing. The Claimant’s N600 dated 4.9.2025 asserted that the 2024 Order was served on DJJ: (1) on 5.6.2024 by the four permitted alternative service methods, and (2) by personal service on 27.5.2025 at around 08.00 am at the Quarry entrance during the protest.

Further, the 2025 Order was served: (1) on 5.6.2025 by the permitted alternative service methods, and (2) by personal service on 18.6.2025 at around 08.31 am at the Quarry entrance during the protest. As to breach: (1) the Claimant asserted that on 27.5.2025, between 07.06 am and 11.45 pm, DJJ blocked vehicles from going in and out of the Quarry and trespassed on the Quarry; and (2) on 18.6.2025, between 06.45 am and 12.40 pm, DJJ blocked vehicles from going in and out of the Quarry and trespassed on the Quarry. DJJ put in no evidence and made no communications with the Claimant or the Court before the final hearing, despite the directions order made in October 2025 in his presence. He failed to attend on day one of the hearing and I issued a warrant for his arrest. Due to the fast and efficient actions of South Wales Police he was arrested and brought to Court on day two. He made a fuss and refused to acknowledge his full name. He wished only to be addressed as “Darren”. I obliged. However, he settled down and then took part in the proceedings. He was informed verbally at the start of the hearing that he did not have to say anything but that I could draw an adverse inference if he said nothing. He did attend on day three on time. When asked, he did not accept that he was present on either protest date and he denied being properly served and denied knowledge of the order and the prohibitions. He asserted the documents were frauds. He asserted he was not a PU but was instead a real person called Darren. Once the service and knowledge issues were determined by my decisions, DJJ denied intentionally carrying out the acts which were the breaches, so evidence was called and submissions were made and I stated that I found the breaches proved to the criminal standard, as alleged and that I would give my reasons later in this reserved judgment.

9. **Dale Vincent (DV).** DV was informed in the N600 and verbally at the start of the hearing that he did not have to say anything but that I could draw an adverse inference if he said nothing. The Claimant’s N600, dated 4.9.2025, asserted that the 2024 Order was served on DV: (1) on 5.6.2024, by the permitted alternative service methods, and (2) by personal service on 27.5.2025 at around 08.00 am at the Quarry entrance during the protest. Further, the 2025 Order was served: (1) on 5.6.2025, by the permitted alternative service methods, and (2) by personal service on 18.6.2025 at around 08.31 am at the Quarry entrance during the protest. As to breach: (1) the Claimant asserted that on 27.5.2025, between 07.06 am and 11.45 pm, DV blocked vehicles from going in and out of the Quarry and trespassed on the Quarry; and (2) on 18.6.2025, between 06.45 am and 12.40 pm, DV blocked vehicles from going in and out of the Quarry and trespassed on the Quarry. DV did put in evidence to the Court before the hearing and served it on the Claimant, but not in accordance with the October 2025 set of directions. He complied with earlier directions. His evidence consisted of a trail of emails to the South Wales Police relating to the eviction notice (KD1) given to protesters on 26.3.2024. He attached the full one page notice and he asserted the notice was a fraud and the bailiffs were Freemasons. He made no other relevant communications with the Claimant or the Court after attending in person at the final directions hearing before Constable J in October 2025. He provided no communications before the final hearing, despite the directions orders made on that day. He attended on day one of the hearing. He took part in the proceedings. He was informed in the N600 and verbally at the start of the hearing that he did not have to say anything but that I could draw an adverse inference if he said nothing. When asked, he accepted that he was present on both protest dates but he

denied being properly served and denied knowledge of the order and the prohibitions. He asserted that all the orders were frauds. Once I made my decisions on the service and knowledge issues, DV then denied that he was bound by the Orders because they were against UPs and he was a known person. He also denied the breaches, so evidence was called and submissions were made on breach. No submissions were made by any party on whether the scope of the definition of UPs covered DV himself as a person known to the Claimant as a protester at that time. At the hearing I found the breaches proved to the criminal standard as alleged and stated I would provide a reserved judgment later and order later.

Pleadings and chronology of the action

10. On 20.5.2024 the Claimant made an ex-parte application for an interim injunction against persons unknown. That was heard and granted by Williams J on the same day. The evidence in support was in a witness statement sworn by John Julian Radcliffe (JJR) dated 20.5.2024. He is the operations manager of the Quarry. His evidence, which was accepted by Williams J, showed that planning permission had been granted and protests arose. A threat was made to blow up the Quarry. At full capacity the Quarry produces 8000 tonnes per day of high quality sandstone for national roads and airport runways. About 58 lorries go in and out each day and, if disrupted, the Claimant loses turnover of between £55,000 and £100,000 per day. Explosives are carried in some of the lorries. Leaving them beside the public highway if the lorries are blocked at the entrance is not safe. He evidenced the protesters setting up a camp on the Quarry and he said he recognised DV at the camp in March 2024. The protesters were removed on 26.3.2024 by 18 bailiffs in the presence of many Police officers to keep the peace. He recited various protests in April 2024 and one on 12.4.2024 in which DV was involved and was arrested and bound over on bail by magistrates not to attend the Quarry. In May 2024 there was another protest and by this time the Claimant had painted a yellow line on the road to demarcate the boundary of the Quarry with the highway. The new method used by protesters was only to disrupt lorries for 10 minute periods. Williams J's injunction prohibited UPs from blocking the access to and egress from the Quarry and trespass or damage to fences. Alternative service on the UPs to be prohibited was ordered. Four methods were directed: (1) big signs either side of the entrance; (2) big signs on fences; (3) emails sent to the protesters' group known email addresses with the order and evidence; (4) a page on the Claimant's website dedicated to the protesters. I should mention here that, when he gave evidence, JJR explained that DV was not named as a Defendant at that time because the Claimant knew that he was subject to bail conditions prohibiting him from attending the Quarry. The definition of "persons unknown" (UPs) was:

- “(1) persons unknown entering or remaining without the consent of the claimant on any part of the craig yr hesg quarry
- (2) persons unknown deliberately obstructing and/or interfering with the free movement of vehicles, equipment or persons accessing or egressing from the craig yr hesg quarry
- (3) persons unknown interfering with signs, fences or gates on the perimeter of or within the quarry”

11. On 22.5.2024 the Claimant issued the Claim Form and the Particulars of Claim were dated the same day. The Defendants were UPs. The Claimant asserted 36 days of unlawful trespass by UPs since 25.3.2024. It was pleaded that the Claimant did not know who the protesters were save for one who had been arrested. I infer that was a reference to DV. It was pleaded that he had not been included because he was subject to bail conditions, so it was not “necessary”. Thus, it was pleaded that he, as a known person, was intentionally excluded from the list of Defendants.
12. On the return date, 5.6.2024, no protester appeared and the Claimant obtained a one year injunction (the 2024 Order) from HHJ Harrison against UPs in the same terms as the interim injunction with the same alternative service directions. No protester applied thereafter to vary or set aside the injunction.
13. On 15.5.2025, the Claimant applied for directions for renewal. On 20.5.2025 Goose J made directions for alternative service of the renewal application and the evidence in support on UPs. If there had been a named Defendant or two, the service on them would probably have been personal or postal or by some more specific means, depending on the evidence which the Claimant had gained about their postal or email address. I consider that had DJJ or DV been named as Defendants they would probably have been served at their addresses.
14. On 27.5.2025, the first of the two relevant protests took place about which the contempt applications were later issued. The Claimant’s case before me is that the 2024 Order against UPs was personally served on DV and DJJ on that date. KD is not alleged to have been protesting that day. However, by that time and long before then the Claimant and JJR accept that they knew DV by name as a regular protester. He had been in the March 2024 camp. He had been arrested in April 2024. They had made no application to add him as a named Defendant to the extended injunction. So, at least in relation to DV, the Claimant asserts that it served an injunction binding UPs on a person who was well known to them as a protester.
15. The case was listed for a reconsideration on 5.6.2025 because the 2024 Order was due to expire. The Claimant did not apply to add DV to the claim as a named Defendant, nor DJJ for that matter. On 5.6.2025 deputy High Court Judge O’Neill made the 2025 Order extending the prohibited activities for another year against UPs. The definition of persons unknown was the same. No named Defendant was added. Whilst I have not been provided with the witness statements of JJR provided to the Judge I have accessed JJR’s witness statement dated 30.5.2025 on the Cefile since the hearing. In that JJR asserted that he knew who DJJ was after 27.5.2025 by researching social media postings by Dale Vincent and others. The judgment of the DH CJ is in my bundle. She referred to JJR’s second and third witness statements and summarised that lawful protests had continued after the 2024 Order but unlawful protests had dramatically reduced to 10 since the Order. She summarised that, in JJR’s third witness statement he gave evidence about a recent protest at which copies of the 2024 Order had been given to individual protesters and they had complied with it. I do not know if that was a reference to what took place on 27.5.2025 or not. At para. 28 DH CJ O’Neill noted that *two protesters* had recently become *known* to the Claimant and it was “taking steps” to join the individuals to the claim. The Judge was therefore careful to consider the threat by unknown individuals, not those ones. I infer that the two known protesters

are those named in JJR's witness statement dated 30.5.2025: DJJ and DV, however I will make a final decision on that at the adjourned hearing because I wish to give the parties the opportunity to make further submissions upon it.

16. There is no application in my bundle to amend the Claim Form to add DJJ or DV to the claim either before DHCJ O'Neill's 2025 Order or thereafter, so what she had been told by the Claimant would be done, was not done.
17. About 4 weeks later, on 3.7.2025, the Claimant applied, on form N244, for committal for contempt of all three named Defendants: KD, DJJ and DV. This was the wrong form to use and did not set out the required warnings to the Defendants. These applications were supported by the first affidavit (as distinct from witness statement) of JJR setting out the evidence against KD, DJJ and DV. He made it clear that he knew full well who DV was on 27.5.2025 but did not know DJJ by his full name on 27.5.2025. However, he also stated that by 27.6.2025 (the date of the affidavit), he did know DJJ by name. Indeed, as I set out above, the Claimant knew very well who DJJ was when the case came before DHCJ O'Neill on 5.6.2025, because she was informed that two known Defendants were to be added to the main action and they were both named in the witness statement of JJR dated 30.5.2025.
18. Mould J gave directions on 11.7.2025 which I shall pass over. Murray J gave further directions on 18.8.2025 to correct KD's name which had been misstated. Then, Nicklin J gave directions on 22.8.2025, tidying up the procedural mess created by the wrong application forms being used. He directed the Claimant to issue the correct applications notices and to serve them personally on the Defendants with all the evidence and to file certificates of service and listed a directions hearing on 15.10.2025.
19. On 15.10.2025 the Defendants all attended, so personal service did what it is supposed to do. Constable J gave directions for the hearing of the committal applications. The hearing was listed for a fixed date of 19-23 January in Cardiff with day 1 being a reading day. If the Defendants wanted to give evidence they were directed to file and serve it by 19.11.2025 and otherwise evidence would not be admitted without the permission of the Court (the Defendant chose to file no evidence). The Defendants were ordered to attend in person (DJJ breached that direction and did not attend on day 1). The Defendants were to be sent and comment on the hearing bundle in early 2026 and skeleton arguments were to be filed by 15.1.2026. The Defendants did not file anything and made no comments on the bundle. One other Defendant gave an undertaking and was released from the proceedings (Ms A. Coggins).

Adjournment application

20. During day two I considered DV's application to adjourn. No notice of application was issued. No fee was paid. Despite the documents being sent overnight to the Claimant and the Court, and hence being in breach of the directions order of Constable J I allowed them in evidence. DV grounded his application on his asserted Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and the need for legal assistance. The case law he provided did not assist the application. It was *Mazur v Charles Russell* [2025] EWHC 2341, in which Sheldon J made decisions in relation to costs awards for

work carried out by non-solicitors. This was not relevant. As for the HMG respite scheme for debtors certificate signed by Professor Scott and dated 3.11.2025, it is clear that this proved that in November 2025 DV was receiving treatment for PTSD and recovering from a mental health crisis. I accept that but it was not up to date and from all I have seen of DV's conduct in Court he held his own with excellent clarity of expression and calmness. He was alert and on the ball. I do not consider that granting further time for legal advice would have been fair to the Claimant, whose costs have been enormous for these applications. Nor do I consider that the overriding objective in CPR r.1.1 and the factors therein, in particular procedural efficiency, fair allocation of Court resources, ensuring a level playing field and ensuring compliance with Court orders, weighed in favour of granting the application. Legal aid should have been obtained earlier. DV told me that he did not obtain it because he does not trust lawyers. I dismissed the application.

The lay witness evidence and the documentary evidence

21. I heard evidence from the following witnesses: JJR; KD; DJJ; DV. When making findings of fact I apply the criminal standard.

The evidence and my findings of fact issue by issue

22. The Claimant's live evidence from JJR was given in various bite sized portions relating to each issue to assist the Defendants. His affidavits stood as his evidence in chief. The evidence was contained in his affidavits dated 27.6.2025; 1.8.2025; 4.9.2025 and 1.12.2025. The Defendants' evidence was given in the witness box. Despite the Defendants all breaching the directions given by Constable J, I permitted them to give live evidence on each issue which they raised.

Service of the 2024 Order and issue 4

23. JJR gave evidence that the 2024 Order was served by the 4 alternative methods on 5.6.2024. A certificate of service was also filed. Clear photos of the big yellow signs at the entrance to the Quarry and on the fences was provided. The Order was served on the protesters' public group email addresses and on the Claimant's website. JJR gave evidence that he personally served DV and DJJ on 27.5.2025 during the protest but he did not know who DJJ was then and he provided photos of them being handed the papers. They refused to take them. He explained what they were. He gave evidence that DV told him that he had already seen the 2024 Order. JJR gave evidence of DV's social media postings after the event in which he wrote that he was he was *"not a person and I'm definitely not fucking unknown ... I am a man and I am Dale Vincent"*. I should have noticed that this raised the potential defence that DV was not a Defendant to the claim but confess that I did not. In cross examination and in evidence the Defendants did not dispute any of the Claimant's evidence on this. In their cross examination of JJR they focussed on the events the year before at the camp and what they asserted was the "fraudulent eviction warrant" (KD1). JJR admitted that the bailiffs had drawn KD1 up and he had altered the address, albeit with errors. He accepted the Claimant had hired Able Investigations from Bristol. A Mr Steve Wood's photo was shown to him and he was asked whether he was one of the bailiffs. He stated that the police were in attendance and the Claimant exercised its common law right to evict trespassers from its land. He did not confirm Mr Woods was there. KD asserted she had no knowledge of the injunction in her evidence. DV cross examined JJR on the Royal Crest on the top of KD1 and the question was asked: why a Royal Crest similar to that used by the Court

service was put in a circular red stamp at the top of the document. JJR accepted that this look alike “seal” was potentially not the most appropriate. It was put to him that he was not allowed to use a Royal Crest and he stated the bailiffs had drawn it up, not him. He had not gone to lawyers for advice at that time. In re-examination counsel took him to a Cardiff County Court seal which he considered was different.

24. **Issue 4.** I considered and rejected a submission by a defendant that he was not in the definition of UPs in *Elliott Cuciurean v SoS for Transport* [2022] EWHC 2457 (KB). On appeal that decision was upheld, but only by a majority, in *Elliott Cuciurean v SoS for Transport* [2022] EWCA Civ. 1519. It can be a tricky issue.
25. Because the 2024 Order was directed at UPs, as defined, I consider that the alternative service on KD and DJJ was good service. They were unknown when the Order was made and served. As to the personal service of the 2024 Order on DJJ on 27.5.2025, I consider that was also good service. There being no evidence before me that DJJ was known to the Claimant at the time the 2024 Order was made or the time of service. As for DV, although at the hearing I announced that I had decided that the alternative service and the personal service on him were good service and stated I would give reasons in writing after the hearing. I would like to hear further submissions on issue 4 relating to DV. That is whether DV was a Defendant within the definition of UPs in the 2024 Order at the time of both alternative and personal service. I may change my decision expressed at the hearing and so I leave open this issue until the next hearing. I heard no argument from either DV or the Claimant’s counsel on whether DV fell within the defined Defendants (UPs) on the Claim Form. On reflection, having re-read the Particulars of Claim and the witness statement of JJR put before Williams J, and the later evidence of JJR; having considered DV’s obliquely expressed assertion that he was a “real person” and not an unknown person for the Claimant; I consider that DV has a potential defence that the 2024 Order was specifically not directed at him because he was known to the Claimant at the time the Claim Form was issued and when the interim injunction was sought and at renewal. The Claimant informed the Court during the applications for the interim injunction and the 2024 Order that DV was on bail with prohibitory conditions relating to the Quarry, therefore the Claimant pleaded expressly that they had decided that he was not to be named as a Defendant. There is nothing wrong, per se, with the Claimant choosing not to bring DV in as a named Defendant from the start, for the reasons given in the pleading, but later to rely on alternative service on UPs as service on DV is potentially: (a) unfair, and (b) wrong in principle and (c) not within the strict wording of the UPs on the Claim Form and in the 2024 Order. When a Claimant wishes to bring proceedings against a known Defendant he or she must be named and served in accordance with the CPR, thus personally, at his last known address or as otherwise permitted. The alternative service ordered by HHJ Harrison on UPs was arguably not directed at him. I wish to hear submissions on this because none were made at the hearing, before I decide whether to change my decision on service on DV of the 2024 Order. I also seek submissions on whether I am empowered or permitted to change a decision which I have announced in open Court, albeit with the reasons to be delivered in a reserved judgment.

Service of the 2025 Order and issue 4

26. As to alternative service of the 2025 Order, JJR gave evidence that it took place on 5.6.2025 using the same four methods permitted by the 2024 and 2025 Orders. JJR also gave evidence of personal service on all three Defendant at the protest on 18.6.2025 with photos and videos and he described how each refused to accept service. KD and DJJ were arrested later that morning and bailed. I infer that KD's name became known to the Claimant after the bail conditions (which are in the bundle and which the Police told to the Claimant). JJR gave evidence that DV said during service: "what's changed since the last time you gave us that injunction? ... I am down here all week". DJJ said: "pretend warrant ... unlawful ... you're a dead entity ... we're here for the day." I accept the evidence of JJR in relation to service, having found his approach to his evidence to be both careful and balanced. In relation to KD I have no evidence before me that the Claimant had knowledge of her name before 18.6.2025. She was arrested that day and thereafter the police informed the Claimant of her name. KD asserted that she did not understand the big yellow signs or the paperwork which was offered to her by way of service and which she refused to take. I reject the evidence given by KD and find as a fact that she was aware from the big yellow signs that there was a High Court injunction banning protesters who were unknown to the Claimant and hence unknown to the Court from blocking the Quarry entrance and from trespassing. I find that service by alternative means and personal means took place properly.
27. I find that physically both DJJ and DV were served with the 2025 Order on 18.6.2025 and were well aware of the big yellow signs either side of the Quarry entrance. However, on the issue of whether DJJ and DV were Defendants in the claim within the definition of UPs, it is clear to me that DJJ was a person whose name was well known to the Claimant before the date of the 2025 Order. The Claimant's evidence to DHCJ O'Neill on 5.6.2025 was that two people would be joined to the claim. DJJ was one of them then, at the time when the 5.6.2025 Order was made so arguably DJJ did not come within the definition of UPs. Further, for the reasons set out above, arguably DV was not within the definition of UPs when the 2025 Order was made and so not bound by it because he had not been joined.

Summary in relation to service

28. In relation to the protest on 27.5.2025, KD was not present, DJJ and DV were. I find that when the 2024 Order was made and when the protest took place, DJJ was not known to the Claimant so the decision I have made on good service stands. I find that DJJ was served by both alternative service and by personal service on him on 27.5.2025. In relation to DV I wish to reconsider the decision I announced at the hearing on good service on the basis that there is an arguable defence that DV was not a UP within the definition in the 2024 Order at the time the Order was made.
29. In relation to the 2025 Order, KD was present at the protest on 18.6.2025 and I find that she was served by both methods: the alternative service and the personal service on the day. I find that she came within the definition of UP in the 2025 Order for she was unknown to the Claimant at the time when the Order was made and when it was served. DJJ and DV were well known to the Claimant when the 2025 Order was made but they were not added as named Defendants to the action, or to the 2025 Order, despite the Claimant informing DHCJ O'Neill that they intended to do so for two known persons and were named in JJR's 30.5.2025 witness statement. I wish

to hear further submissions on whether DJJ and DV properly came within the definitions of UPs in the 2025 Order or fell outside it, before making a final decision. I also wish to hear submissions on whether I have the power to change my announced decision on that issue.

Committal for contempt, knowledge of the Orders

30. In law, so long as the correct procedure has been followed, the order and the application to commit and evidence have been served on the Defendant, the Defendant is properly a Defendant to the claim and the terms of the Order are clear and unambiguous, the issue of breach is usually one of fact with two parts:
 - (1) has the Claimant [to the criminal standard] proven that the Defendant breached the prohibitions in the order?
 - (2) Has the Claimant proven that the Defendant did the acts deliberately or intentionally?
31. However, a third requirement was raised by the Defendant's assertions in evidence that they were not aware of the Orders or the contents thereof, made at the hearing. Submissions were made by Mr Fry about the law relating to knowledge. This was considered by Warby LJ in *Cuciurean v SOS for Transport* [2021] EWCA Civ. 357, see paras, 13, 54-62. The question posed was whether the Claimant must prove that the Defendant knew of the order and the prohibitions therein or is mere service enough? The Judge at first instance had found that there was no requirement to prove knowledge (para. 54). At para. 13 Warby LJ noted that Proudman J had found that only service was required (in *Farnsworth v Lacy* [2013] EWHC 3487) and Warby LJ noted the judgment of Lord Oliver in *AG v Times* [1992] 1 AC 181 at 217, that only service was required, not proof of knowledge. Warby LJ noted that lack of actual knowledge would be relevant to sanction (para. 57) and that in *Cuadrilla v Persons Unknown* [2020] EWCA Civ. 9, the Court of appeal had made it clear that, if the Defendant proved he did not know of the order and the prohibitions despite service then no sanction would be imposed. Warby LJ then set out his simple summary of the authorities at para. 58 and this included his ruling that there is no requirement to prove actual knowledge. At 62 he dismissed any worries about the effect of this decision. Soole J considered this in *National Highways v Kirin* [2023] EWHC 3000. He rejected the Defendant's submissions that requirement 3 (knowledge) was necessary to prove breach (see paras. 23, 31 and 36), and ruled that if the Defendant proved, on the balance of probabilities, that he did not have actual knowledge, that would have a substantial effect on sanction.
32. KD asserted she was not aware of the prohibitions. DJJ raised his dyslexia and deafness as the reasons why he did not know of the injunction but provided no evidence of either. He also contradicted himself by saying the injunctions which he knew of were fraudulent. DV asserted the injunctions were fraudulent. I reject the evidence of all three Defendants in relation to knowledge of the existence of the High Court Orders from 2024 and 2025. In the case of DJJ I find that his evidence was intentionally misleading. I have carefully looked at the layout and the signs and the places where all the Defendants walked for hours. These signs had been in place for a year. They were big and yellow with big typeface on them. The words were in plain and simple language and set out what was prohibited. I find that KD, DV and DJJ walked and stood close to the signs for many hours. I take into account that JJR told them of the prohibitions each time when he served the Orders with the injunctions package on the Defendants. I take into

account the fact that both DV and DJJ assert that they were not unknown persons and infer they read the orders which expressly stated they were made against UPs. I find from their presence on 27.5.2024 (that is the presence of DV and DJJ), from their presence on 18.6.2025, from DV and DJJ's social media postings, from the personal service effected on both dates by JJR, from the words said by JJR to them and from the words spoken by KD, DV and DJJ during the protests, that all three Defendants who protested together on 18.6.2025 knew of the 2025 Order and the prohibitions in the Order. I also find that DJJ and DV, who protested on 27.5.2025, knew of the prohibitions in the 2024 Order on that day. I also find that by being provided with the documents personally and by refusing to read them, despite personal service, they were intentionally trying to avoid the effects of the Orders and that they were saddled with constructive knowledge by doing so in any event.

Evidence and findings of fact on breach

33. Once I had given my decisions on service and knowledge, KD admitted breaches of the 2025 Order as asserted. I find that KD breached the 2025 Order prohibiting blocking the entrance to the Quarry for about 3 hours and committed multiple trespasses on the Claimant's land.
34. DJJ denied breaching the 2024 Order or the 2025 Order. In his evidence he asserted that he cannot read or write. He read the affirmation without assistance. He accepted in evidence that JJR told him of the contents of the Orders when he personally served them on him. His main defence was that JJR had called him Darren John Jones and he denied that was his name, he said his name is "Darren". I accept the photos of his presence on both occasions, the videos and the evidence of RJJ is, in my judgment, overwhelming. I reject DJJ's denial. I find that DJJ intentionally did the acts set out on the notice of application to commit him for contempt on 27.5.2025 and 18.6.2025.
35. As for DV, he did not come to the witness box to give any evidence on breach. He admitted his presence and in evidence made no effort to give evidence that he had not done as alleged. I find that DV intentionally carried out the acts set out in the notice of application for committal for contempt on 27.5.2025 and 18.6.2025.
36. Regarding DV and DJJ, my findings about their intentional actions are not sufficient to make a finding of breach. My final decisions on breach in relation to DJJ and DV in relation to the protest on 18.6.2025, and my final decision in relation to DV and the protest on 27.5.2026, will await the further submissions which I have requested. If either or both of the 2024 or 2025 Orders did not bind them as Defendants, then breach is irrelevant because they had a defence to the applications.
37. As for KD's actions on 18.6.2025, and DJJ's actions at the protest on 27.5.2025, breach is relevant because I have found that they were properly served and KD had knowledge of the 2025 Order and DJJ had knowledge of the 2024 Order and the prohibitions therein.

Sanction

38. The hearing was adjourned for me to deliver a reserved judgment and for evidence to be gathered for sanction and mitigation. It was also adjourned because of my concerns about the Defendants' allegation that the Claimant had issued a fraudulent warrant to protesters on 26.3.2024.

The allegedly fraudulent warrant

39. KD1 was produced by KD during the hearing. It had been sent by DV to the Claimant in August 2025 and was only partly copied into my bundle. The part copied omitted the red circular "imitation" Court Seal. So, I did not see that before the hearing. When it was produced it showed a red circular Seal with a Royal Crest inside and the words "common law eviction" around it. It included the words: "and/or in the Cardiff County Court". The Seal was put at the top right hand corner, just where Court Seals are placed. KD1 went on to require all trespassers to leave the Quarry but gave the wrong address. JJR gave evidence in cross examination of its provenance. On counsel's request I gave a warning against self-incrimination before he answered. Counsel referred me to *S.14 of the Civil Evidence Act 1968* and *Triplex v Lance* [1939] 2 KB 395. Whether or not it was strictly necessary I considered it safest to give the warning. JJR informed me that the Claimant had hired private bailiffs. Able Investigations drafted the notice and put the seal on it. The Claimant used it after amending the address of the quarry and the Bailiffs gave it to the trespassers at the Quarry. The Defendants asserted it was a fraudulent attempt to pretend that the Claimant had a Court Order. No proceedings had been started in Cardiff County Court or any Court at that time.
40. I was not addressed by anyone on the common law right of a freeholder of land to evict trespassers from the land without a Court Order. Rather laughably, KD1 referred to the 2010 edition of Halsbury's Laws for its legal authority. What concerns me is the use of the Royal Crest in a red circular fake seal and the reference to the Cardiff County Court in KD1. Those, in my view, were clumsy attempts which could mislead members of the public that KD1 had more authority than it really did: the authority of a Judge of Cardiff County Court. A close reading of the notice of course showed that it did not, but members of the public who are protesting and trespassing may not all be lawyers, or have access to legal advice and may have a range of learning excellence or difficulties. My concern was so serious that I asked the Claimant to provide any further evidence that it wished to provide before I considered sanction. I also invited the Claimant to consider whether it wished to file evidence from Able to explain the notice. I was informed that the Claimant did wish to do so and the hearing was adjourned partly for that to take place. I consider that the Defendants' focus on what they call the "fraudulent warrant" will be relevant to the sanction decisions I have to make. DV asserted that he would not accept any asserted Court Orders sent to him by the Claimant after that fake warrant had been "served" on him and I have some sympathy with that evidence.
41. High Court and County Court bailiffs or enforcement officers are appointed by the Courts. They can have those appointments revoked. I may consider referring Able to the relevant officers for considerations of such a move. The "Seal" on KD 1 may constitute a contempt of Court and I may refer the notice to the Attorney General for consideration of bringing contempt proceedings against the Claimant and/or Able. Before any such decision is taken I have afforded the Claimant and Able the opportunity to put in evidence and make submissions.

The next hearing

42. I have adjourned the hearing for mitigation and evidence on sanctions and on KD1. I also seek submissions on the overlooked defence, issue 4 above, namely whether DJJ and DV are within the definition of UPs in the Orders and on whether I have the power to alter my announced decisions on service and breach before making the actual orders and before finalising by reserved judgment.

END